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NAA: A1838, 175/11/20/15 PART 4

Series number: A1838

Control symbol: 175/11/20/15 PART 4

Barcode: 424043

Number of pages: 269

Australian policy in relation to the Israeli attack on Egypt, United Kingdom-French intervention and related developments

File No

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FORMER PAPERS *PART 3*

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JOHN FENTON
SECURITY OFFICER
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→ 175/11/20
181/6/1

18th July, 1957.

Memo. No. 291

The Australian Legation,
ROME.SOVIET TROOP CONCENTRATIONS.

I refer to your memorandum 368 of 13th May, 1957, in which you mention a conversation with the Turkish Ambassador concerning Soviet troop movements on the Turkish border.

2. The Embassy in Washington has discussed this matter with the State Department and reports as follows:-

"The Officer in Charge of Soviet Affairs said he had not heard of the report, but he thought such a concentration was possible; for example, it was conceivable that the Russians could station forces on the Turkish border in order to deter both Iraq and Turkey from intervening forcibly in Syria, should they feel that a deterioration in Syria required their intervention. The Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula-Iraq Affairs also said that he had not heard of this report, but he added that if it were true the Turks certainly had shown no signs of being disturbed.

We have also made enquiries in the Office of the Special Assistant/Intelligence in the State Department and will report further if any information becomes available."

(A. P. RENOUF)
for the Secretary.

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175/11/20.

3rd July, 1957.

: DISCUSSION WITH ISRAELI MINISTER

THE MINISTER.

Herewith are notes on the subjects which may be raised by Mr. Nurock.

Gaza

2. No progress has been made on General Burns' proposal for the erection of a barbed wire fence on the demarcation line. Israel accepted the proposal but would prefer that the fence cover the whole line and not just "sensitive" spots. Egypt's acceptance is conditional on the deployment of U.N.E.F. in Israeli territory - an idea which Israel rejects.

3. A second proposal (for the creation of a "security" zone 750 metres wide in which U.N.E.F. would have authority to fire at infiltrators who ignored a challenge) is also held up. The Israelis claim that they were prepared to accept the proposal on the understanding that the zone would be entirely on the Gaza side of the border, but now state that it has since been changed so that the border would bisect the zone. In this form it is not acceptable.

4. Meanwhile an increase in the number of incidents involving loss of life raises the possibility of Israel's return to a policy of retaliation against suspected fedayeen in Gaza. By contrast there has been a marked improvement in the atmosphere on the Israeli-Jordan border.

Gulf of Aqaba

5. The Arabs, mainly through Saudi Arabia, continue to protest at Israeli activities in the Gulf of Aqaba and in a joint communique King Saud and King Hussein warned pilgrims against using the Gulf. Further, in a joint Note to Mr. Dulles, the eleven Arab envoys in Washington claimed the Gulf of Aqaba as closed Arab waters. Mr. Dulles rejected this view and suggested that the Arabs might refer the question to the International Court. The State Department believes that protests are made primarily for the record, a view that is possibly supported by the fact that an Israeli ship recently passed through the Straits of Tiran to Elath without incident.

6. While rejecting Saudi protests, Israel appears to be acting responsibly in regard to the Gulf. She has, for instance, ceased provoking the Arabs by giving excessive publicity to deliveries of oil to Elath.

Delivery of Russian Submarines to Egypt

7. The Israeli press compares the situation that may arise with that resulting from the Czech arms deal and predicts a tightening of the Egyptian blockade. However, the Director-General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry is reported to be much less apprehensive, although it is likely that Egypt's acquisition of submarines will be used as a pretext for requests for increased supplies of arms to Israel.

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F. A. L. W.

8. The State Department feels that the main result will be a boost to Russian prestige in the Middle East. Nonetheless they are publicising the view that the Russian action in supplying the submarines is contrary to the General Assembly resolution of 2nd November calling on United Nations members to refrain from introducing arms into the Middle East.

Freedom of Movement of United Nations Observers in
Demilitarized Zones

9. In the context of the Syrian complaint in the Security Council regarding the building by Israel of a bridge in the Lake Huleh demilitarized zone, the question of freedom of movement of United Nations Observers arose. The Israelis had delayed an investigation by Observers. By consensus, the majority in the Security Council has concluded that there is no valid complaint on the bridge, but the President of the Council asked Leary, United Nations Acting Chief-of-Staff, for a report on conditions in the demilitarized zone set up by the Syrian-Israeli Armistice Agreement.

10. The Israeli Foreign Minister has told Ballard that Israeli "sovereignty" in demilitarized zones permits them in some respects to limit the freedom of United Nations Observers. In our view the Armistice Agreement permits of no restriction. Mrs. Meier also told Ballard that Israel had erected "defensive" fortifications in the Dardara demilitarized area and would not remove them since the United Nations could not guarantee Israel's security.

11. In a recent Note to the Department, Mr. Nurock implied that United Nations Observers were subject to no Israeli restrictions and asserted that in any case this was not a question for discussion in the Security Council. He might be told that -

- (a) we believe that the Security Council should not again discuss the question of the bridge;
- (b) we are glad to observe from his recent Note that no restrictions will be placed on movements of Observers but are puzzled at press reports today (3rd July) to the effect that Israel has refused to admit Observers to the Dardara area;
- (c) we would hope to avoid a debate in the Council on the question of freedom of movement. The Council has discussed this question in the past, however, and it would be difficult to avoid a debate if Leary's report indicated that the Israelis had not been completely co-operative.

(J.C.G. KEVIN)
Assistant Secretary

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DEPARTMENT OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

175/11/20

9 JUL 1957

181/6/1

CANBERRA

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

In reply quote 180.

MEMORANDUM NO. 811/57.

27th June, 1957.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra, A.C.T.

RUSSIAN TROOP CONCENTRATIONS

With reference to your memorandum 458 of 23rd May, (Files 175/11/20 and 181/6/1) we have raised the question of Russian troops on the Turkish border with members of both the Soviet Affairs and Near Eastern Affairs Offices, who have not been able to throw any light on the matter. The Officer in Charge of Soviet Affairs said he had not heard of the report, but he thought such a concentration was possible; for example, it was conceivable that the Russians could station forces on the Turkish border in order to deter both Iraq and Turkey from intervening forcibly in Syria, should they feel that a deterioration in Syria required their intervention. The Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula-Iraq Affairs also said that he had not heard of this report, but he added that if it were true the Turks certainly had shown no signs of being disturbed.

2. We have also made enquiries in the Office of the Special Assistant/Intelligence in the State Department and will report further if any information becomes available.

L.H. Border
L.H. Border,
First Secretary.

Mr Robertson
Attn: Mr. [unclear]
12/7
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Mr White R.L.
send to home

Mr 10/7
B-R

12/68

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Memo.No.. 827/57.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AUSTRALIAN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICE,

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,

STRAND,

LONDON, W.C.2.

4th June 1957

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra A.C.T.

Soviet Troop Concentrations in Turkey

We have discussed with Northern Department, Foreign Office, your memorandum No.363 of 23rd May, 1957 (175/11/20) concerning information emanating from the Turkish Minister in Rome that there has for some time been a concentration of Soviet parachute troops, estimated to number 50,000, on the Turkish border.

2. Northern Department has promised to consult the War Office about this report and to let us have the results of their enquiry. Meanwhile, they offer the following comments: -

- (i) They have not heard this particular report before, and doubt whether there is much in it. The Turks have produced a number of such reports in the past, few of which have been well founded: in this connection, Northern Department recall the alarm expressed by Turkey at the time of the Suez crisis over alleged overflights of Turkey by Soviet aircraft. Upon investigation the Turks were found to have no proof that such overflights had taken place.
- (ii) There are strong garrisons in most border areas of the Soviet Union; but no particular movements in the frontier areas of Georgia or Soviet Armenia have been noticed lately.
- (iii) It is difficult to see what purpose would be served by the stationing in a border area of parachute troops, since these could just as easily be flown to the scene of any intended action from deeper inside the USSR.
- (iv) Throughout the Middle East crisis, the Foreign Office view has been that the Russians have had no intention of becoming militarily involved. This opinion has been strengthened by the tone of Soviet comments on events in Jordan - to take a recent example.

3. A copy of this memorandum has been sent to Rome.

J.R. Rowland

(J.R. Rowland)

for Senior External Affairs Representative

[Handwritten signature]

Rel.

[Handwritten initials]

FILE COPY
HDW/PF

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363 → 175/11/20
181/6/1

The Senior External Affairs Representative,
LONDON.

23rd May, 1957.

The Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

458

Russian Troop Concentrations

Our Minister in Rome has been informed by his Turkish colleague that for some time there has been a concentration of Russian parachute troops on the Turkish border. It is thought that the concentration, which is estimated at 50,000 effectives, may have been intended for use in the Middle East.

2. We should be glad of any information you can obtain on this matter.

(A. P. Renouf),
for the Secretary.

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

175/11/20

RECORD OF CONVERSATION WITH: Mr M. Sharett (Former Foreign Minister and one-time Prime Minister of Israel), and Mr M. Nurock (Israeli Minister)

ON: 22nd May, 1957.

OFFICERS PRESENT: Secretary
J.C.G. Kevin
W.D. Forsyth
A.P. Renouf

MAIN SUBJECTS: Australian Foreign Policy - Basic Considerations; Fear of China in Asia; the Arab-Israel Problem.

Australian Foreign Policy - Basic Considerations

The Secretary explained to Mr Sharett the basic concepts of our foreign policy over the last seven or eight years. He gave the reasons for the emphasis upon our relations with Asian countries, mentioning that our defence policy was now based upon the premise that in the event of large-scale conflict our contribution would be made in the area to our north. He continued that prior to the Second World War, we had had little connection with these countries, most of whom were in those days colonial territories; we had in recent years been engaged upon building bridges between them and Australia by, for example, training Asian students in Australia and by establishing diplomatic missions. Even now we did not have the advantage of many commercial ties as our trade was mainly directed towards Europe.

2. The Secretary said that all this did not mean that we had neglected our responsibilities in other areas of the world. We met these as they arose. However, our resources were scarce and naturally the region of greatest importance to us had to have first call upon them.

3. The Secretary went on that we were not over-optimistic about the long-term prospects of stability in Asia in the face of the dangers that were present. There were some good signs, for example, in Malaya which would acquire its independence in August this year. Even in Malaya, however, there was looming up the difficulty of getting governments which would be able to provide the necessary stability for the further development of the Federation of Malaya and Singapore. The future of Indonesia was another question mark. There were forces at work in Indonesia which threatened disintegration of the country. The immediate problem there was what kind of government would be provided by the President's "conception" of a Cabinet plus a National Council presided over by the President.

4. Mr Sharett enquired whether Marshal Voroshilov's visit to Indonesia meant a re-orientation in Indonesia's foreign policy. The Secretary said that he did not think so; the Voroshilov visit seemed to be in line with Indonesia's neutralist policy.

Fear of China in Asia

5. Mr Sharett asked whether, in referring to dangers to stability in Asia, the Secretary had China in mind. The Secretary said China was one of the dangers he had in mind. The present pattern of Chinese foreign policy seemed to be gradually to bring the peripheral states under Chinese control, first through economic ties and then by having their governments endorse neutralism.

6. Mr Sharett said that he had asked this question because in his

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2/ travels through

→ Mr White

travels through Asia at the end of 1956 he had been impressed with the almost general fear of China he had found; this fear came close to being an obsession. The fear in Europe and the Americas was of the U.S.S.R.; in Asia the fear was of China with fear of the U.S.S.R. very much secondary. The fear was not fear of Chinese expansionism in the immediate future; Asian leaders thought that at present China was too occupied with her development problems. However, in five to six years' time in the estimate of one Asian leader, in ten years in the estimate of another, China must be expected to turn her attention to expanding the territory she controlled.

7. Asked what Asian leaders were doing to prepare to meet the threat they foresaw, Mr Sharett said they seemed determined to do their best to build up their countries, e.g. by eliminating bandit opposition. However, they realized that what they could do could not possibly be enough. At this point their planning appeared to stop and their attitude was one of "Hope for the best". The situation in India was different. Leaders there did not have the same fear of China and seemed confident in the future of India as a great and independent Asian power.

8. Mr Sharett went on that in his view there had been two principal changes in Asia since the Second World War: firstly, the emergence of a series of new and independent states and secondly, the entry upon the Asian scene of a very powerful Asian state, namely, China, with its resources for the first time ruthlessly controlled and directed from the centre. Independence was very dear to the new states and the emergence of China as a great power had only made them cherish it more dearly. This in turn had made the new Asian states react very sensitively in situations which contained the germs of large-scale conflict, for they feared that in such conflict they might lose their independence again. After all, "the world had become used to the idea of Portugal being independent; it was not used to the idea of Laos or Cambodia being independent." Europe and the Americas feared large-scale hostilities for quite another reason. The fear in these regions was not one of a loss of independence but of the terrible destruction that modern weapons of war would bring.

9. Mr Sharett continued that a realization of these basic considerations which were motivating Asian leaders led him to believe that there was now scope for Israel's diplomacy. The Middle East presented a broad picture of foreign intrigue; this meant that in the event of fighting there, foreign intervention was likely. This would create a precedent which might later be employed in Asia. Moreover, while the present state of instability in the Middle East continued, the risk of a general conflagration could never be far distant. In these two ways the Middle East situation represented a danger to independence in Asia. Israel should bring this home to Asian countries in the hope that these countries would exert themselves in the direction of a settlement of the Arab-Israel problem. Australia could give valuable assistance.

The Arab-Israel Problem

10. In reply to a question by Mr Forsyth, Mr Sharett said he could not say when and where an initiative aimed at a general solution might best be made. In reply to another question by Mr Forsyth, he said that he was in favour of a piecemeal approach to the problem. He agreed that the refugee question was the crux of the problem. When Foreign Minister, he had thought that as a start to a solution of this question, Israel should begin paying compensation to the Arab states for Arab land taken over in Palestine. (Israel had been offered and had welcomed an American loan for this purpose.) However, this plan had come up against one insuperable obstacle and that was that why should Israel start paying out money to the Arab states when, because of the blockade, Israel was being heavily penalized economically by the same states?

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3.

11. Mr Sharett said that he had then suggested that the Arab states should make matters easier for Israel by relaxing the blockade without publicity, e.g. by stopping the blacklisting of firms trading with Israel. This suggestion had fallen on deaf ears. Mr Sharett said that even so, Israel had for some years been operating a Family Re-union Plan under which members of Arab families, most of whom had stayed in Israel, might rejoin their families in Israel. Several thousand Arab refugees had taken up residence again in Israel through this Plan.

12. Mr Sharett then agreed with an observation by Mr Forsyth that the United Nations could not continue to pay out large sums for Arab refugees while there was no prospect of a definitive solution of the question. He thought that the Western Powers had not taken a strong enough stand with the Arab states on this question. For example, nothing seemed to have been done about an indication by the Prime Minister of Iraq to a group of American journalists some time ago of Iraq's willingness to provide land for re-settlement of some of the refugees. Mr Sharett added that, of course, many of the refugees were not farmers; however, re-settlement of them would require a lot of land.

Report prepared by: A. P. Renouf

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175711/20.

RESTRICTED 97

The Australian Legation,
TEL AVIV.

RECORD OF CONVERSATION

Mr Z. Dover (Israeli Legation)

Mr A. P. Renouf

6th May, 1957.

(A. P. Renouf),

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~~RESTRICTED~~

File No.

175/11/30

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Record of Conversation with Mr Z. Dover, Legation of Israel

on 6th May, 1957.

Officers Present A. P. Renouf

MAIN SUBJECT(S):

Mr Dover called at his request for a general discussion upon Middle Eastern problems.

2. The only real matter of interest which emerged was the fact that the United States and United Kingdom warnings to Israel about intervention in Jordan were, according to Mr Dover, received with quiet amusement in Tel Aviv. Mr Dover said that these warnings seemed to underestimate the difficulties which Israel would face in occupying the West Bank salient in Jordan. Israel's capacity to occupy foreign territory for any length of time was limited; this capacity was even more limited in the case of the West Bank salient because the salient had no less than 400,000 inhabitants, mostly Palestine refugees who were bitterly hostile to Israel.

3. This statement by Mr Dover was hardly consistent with one which he made subsequently when he said categorically that Israeli forces would have acted had Syrian troops advanced deep into Jordan.

4. I asked Mr Dover whether he had any information to the effect that Saudi Arabia was constructing artillery emplacements on the coast of the Gulf of Aqaba. Mr Dover said that Israel had received information that these emplacements were being built.

5. Referring to the newspaper reports to-day of an Egyptian plot to assassinate King Saud, Mr Dover said that even if these reports were not true, they were interesting as being symptomatic of the mistrust between Saud and Nasser.

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APR 'PF
6/5/57

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FOLLOWING POST(S):

Tel Aviv

ACTION:

Report prepared by *mh*

(A. P. Renouf)

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

175/11/20.

JC:HMD

0.5833

Sent: 2nd May, 1957
1500

TO:-

Australian Legation,
TEL AVIV.

50. CONFIDENTIAL.

Please telegraph briefly general
lines of Egyptian and/or Syrian radio propaganda
being currently directed against Israel..

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M'S.

(COST 14/2)
2nd May, 1957

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

MR. KEVIN
175/11/20.
File No.

Record of Conversation with His Excellency Mr M. Nurock (Israeli Minister)

on 30th April, 1957.

Officers Present Secretary

H. D. White

MAIN SUBJECT(S):

Situation in Jordan, Gulf of Aqaba, Gaza, Suez Canal

Mr Nurock commenced by saying that he had no specific points to raise, but had called for a general discussion.

2. The Secretary then introduced the question of the situation in Jordan. After mentioning the measures recently taken by King Hussein, such as the imposition of a curfew and the restraints placed on Egyptian propaganda, he said that for the moment the King appeared to be holding his own. The Secretary thought that King Hussein's visit to King Saud had probably been to counter the visits of Kuwaty and Ali Sabry. He referred to the Syrian troops in Jordan but suggested there would be no overt Syrian-Egyptian move against the King since they would probably be deterred by thoughts of likely Israeli and Iraqi reactions. After saying that the outcome depended on the King's retaining control of the Army, the Secretary asked Mr Nurock if he considered that King Saud would react to a threat to the monarchy in Jordan.

3. Mr Nurock generally agreed with the Secretary's assessment of the situation. He felt that King Saud may be responding to the approach made to him in Washington and that he might now be taking the opportunity to disengage himself from his commitments to Nasser. He thought that, unlike his father, King Saud had no wish to annihilate the Hashemites but perhaps saw himself as primus inter pares among the Arab Kings. He felt sure that King Saud had little in common with Nasser who had ousted Farouk and that he disliked the Syrians as republicans: he could therefore be expected to resist a threat to the monarchy. Mr Nurock said that Toukan and Khalidi, who were both from the West bank, would give the King strong support and moderate counsel. He was more optimistic regarding the situation than he was a few days ago and felt that there was little danger of Israel's becoming involved. He agreed, too, that Egypt and Syria would probably be deterred from military intervention by the deployment of Iraqi troops.

4. The Minister referred to the situation in the Gulf of Aqaba. The Secretary said recent public statements suggested that the United States attitude on freedom of passage for Israeli ships through the Tiran Straits was not clear, that they were considering reference to the International Court of Justice. He referred to Egyptian and Saudi protests against the passage of the American vessel but suggested that these were mainly for the record. Mr Nurock agreed with this last point. He said that Israel was at present not greatly concerned at the situation in the Gulf of Aqaba. He asked whether we knew of any Saudi troop movements to the Gulf.

2/5.

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*A/S. Div.I *A/S. Div IV *H.E. Sect.					

FOLLOWING POST(S):

Australian Legation, Tel Aviv

Report prepared by (H. D. White)

ACTION:

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2.

5. Turning to the position in Gaza, the Secretary said that we had little recent information but understood that Israel had accepted a proposal by General Burns - to which Egypt has not yet replied - for the erection of barbed wire fences along the demarcation line. In reply to the Secretary's remark that the Egyptians seemed to be co-operating satisfactorily with U.N.R.F. in the administration of the Strip, Mr Nurock said that little administration was required for the 70,000 Arabs there and that the 200,000 refugees were looked after by U.N.R.W.A.

6. The Secretary then brought up the question of the Suez Canal and the recent proceedings in the Security Council. He gave some details of our instructions to Walker, that he should make an objective analysis of the Egyptian record. At the same time, the Secretary said, care had to be taken to avoid jeopardizing the status of the six principles. The Secretary mentioned that we had drawn attention to the Egyptian move by which it would be able to deny passage to Israeli shipping under cover of Article 10 of the 1888 Convention. He suggested that as regards passage of her own vessels Israel should be patient and might have cargoes carried through the Canal by ships of other nations. Consideration in the Security Council was not concluded, the Secretary said, and efforts should still be made to have the Egyptians modify their stand. Mr Nurock contended that patience on Israel's part might gain her support from the Western Powers but would have no effect on Nasser's intransigent attitude. The Suez Canal, he said, was now Israel's main concern and in view of past declarations by the Israeli Government she must soon seek passage through the Canal for an Israeli ship. He considered that the United States had been lamentably weak in the Security Council.

7. Finally Mr Nurock mentioned tentatively the possibility of Israel's seeking courses at the Queen's Staff College, and, after mentioning that Dr Evatt had accepted an invitation to visit Israel, he said that it was likely that the Israeli Government would invite the Prime Minister to visit Israel after the Prime Ministers' Conference in London.

HDW/FF
2/5/57

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. **SECRET**

MR. WHITE

File No.....

Date..... 30th April, 1957.

SUBJECTVISIT BY ISRAELI MINISTERFOR THE SECRETARY

The following matters may be raised by Mr Nurock today:-

1. The Situation in Jordan

At the outset of the present crisis the Israeli Foreign Minister stated that so long as no foreign troops intervened Israel would regard the situation in Jordan as a purely internal affair. Both the United Kingdom and United States have counselled restraint, and Israel's attitude has remained correct. The State Department suggests that Israel is prepared to accept an Iraqi assurance that the movement of Iraqi troops into Jordan would not constitute a threat to Israel.

2. Gaza

Israel has accepted a proposal by General Burns for the erection of a series of 20 double-apron barbed wire obstacles in lengths of 1 kilometre where crossings of the demarcation line were most frequently made. Egypt has not yet replied to the proposal. Israel would prefer the fence along the whole line and with mines laid, but Burns opposes this on the score of cost.

Burns has expressed satisfaction with the co-operation between U.N.E.F. and the Egyptians in Gaza where the situation remains quiet.

3. Gulf of Aqaba

The first of several United States tankers chartered by Israel has passed through the Straits of Tiran and discharged 16,000 tons of oil at Elath. Subsequently Egypt and Saudi Arabia claimed the Gulf as territorial waters and they and other Arab States protested to the United States who, however, are inclined to regard the protests as made only for the record. The United States attitude is now slightly equivocal. They are still considering seeking an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the passage of Israeli ships and Dulles said that the passage of the United States tanker did not constitute a test of the international character of the Straits.

Ballard has reported that the Israelis' main concern is that under Arab pressure Iran may stop supplying oil.

An Israeli ship is due in Elath next month after a voyage round the Cape.

4. Passage of Israeli Ships through the Suez Canal

One amendment to the original Egyptian draft (maintenance of free navigation "within the limits" of the 1888 Convention) is clearly designed to deny passage to Israeli ships.

The State Department view is that Israel will attempt to have former contraband cargoes carried through the Canal in ships of other nations (probably United States) before seeking passage for an Israeli ship.

H. D. White/PF
Middle East

SECRET

Wij
(J. C. G. Kevin),
Assistant Secretary.

175/11/20
SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD SAVINGRAM

O.5587/8

Sent: 24th April, 1957.
2000

SH/BH

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK. Sav.20.

SECRET.

For Walker from Casey. Your 678.

1. You can if you think it desirable put it to Hammarskjöld that Member Governments are under no obligation to express first to the Secretary-General before stating publicly any criticisms which they may have either of the decisions and recommendations of the General Assembly, or the implementation by the Secretary-General of the directives given him by the Assembly. Nor should the expression of criticism by the Head of the Australian Government, especially in relation to a matter of vital national interest, affect adversely the frank and friendly relations which exist between the Secretary-General and representatives of the Australian Government.

2. The more the Secretary-General relies on his own judgment and discretion in the implementation of the Assembly's directives (imperfectly drafted though they may be) on his general powers under the Charter (a source of authority he is fond of invoking) the more he must expect to be the object of legitimate criticism.

3. We do not know what particular aspects of the Secretary-General's efforts in the Middle East the Prime Minister had in mind when he made his statement. However, there are the following matters upon which we consider Hammarskjöld's actions could have been better conditioned to produce a generally satisfactory and fair solution of the Canal problem.

4. Firstly, according to General Wheeler's public statements, Egypt on at least one occasion deliberately delayed the clearance operation for a considerable time. This occasion was the lifting of the tug "Edgar Bonnet". This amounted to a clear breach of the Assembly's resolution of 2nd November which should have been reported to the Assembly. As far as we can make out, the Secretary-General merely waited until Egypt was ready to permit the lifting of the tug.

5. Secondly, by its resolution of 24th November the Assembly instructed the Secretary-General to make arrangements to clear the Canal speedily and effectively. The best arrangements both from the standpoint of time and expense, which could have been made would have included the use of the Anglo-French salvage fleet. The Secretary-General chose not to employ the fleet because Egypt objected. This decision meant that the Canal was closed much longer than need have been the case; the severe economic consequences of this to the trading world can easily be assessed. Egypt's objections to employment of the Anglo-French fleet should, in our view, have been reported to the Assembly and the decision taken there whether or not to use the fleet.

SECRET

OUTWARD SAVINGRAM.

2.

0.5587/8

The Secretary-General's action tended to shield Egypt from the criticisms of the users of the Canal to which she should and might usefully have been exposed.

6. Thirdly, Hammarskjöld's decision to commit the United Nations to participate in dredging operations after the re-opening of the Canal was in our view of doubtful legal validity and politically unwise. This question should have been referred to the General Assembly where an opportunity would have been given to show up Egypt's obstruction of the clearance operation and refusal to carry out the Six Principles.

7. These instances regarding the Suez Canal which we feel reveal disproportionate regard on the part of the Secretary-General for Egypt's position, are paralleled in our view by the Secretary-General's actions with regard to the Egypt-Israel problem. Illustrations are as follows.

8. Firstly, the Secretary-General has taken pains to point out that the Armistice Agreement gives Egypt the right to control Gaza. He has taken no such pains to point out that if this right is to be asserted, other provisions of the Armistice Agreement, (e.g. that denying Egypt belligerent status) must also be observed; in other words, Egypt cannot have it both ways.

9. Secondly, there was a consensus at the close of the recent session of the General Assembly in favour of a United Nations administration of Gaza. According to all the reports we have received, the Secretary-General made no attempt to set up such an administration when Israel pulled out its forces.

10. The Secretary-General will no doubt adduce his own reasons for acting as he has done. Nevertheless, having taken these actions relying on his own judgment and his general powers under the Charter, he cannot expect that Member Governments should regard themselves as bound to abstain from comment.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M'S.

24th April, 1957.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

SECRET

175/11/20

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

Sent: 15th April 1957
1720

TO:

Australian Legation,
TEL AVIV.

45. SECRET.

1. Please advise:-

(a) Israeli reactions to Egyptian-Saudi statement about passage through Gulf of Aqaba by Israeli shipping; and

(b) Israeli views on situation in Jordan.

2. We should also like your assessment of Israeli intentions should situation in Jordan seriously deteriorate.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M.'s.

(COST £1.16.8)

16th April, 1957.

SEC	A/Ss	UN	ER	CR	PAC&AM	AM&SP	S&SEA	SA
E.A.F&ME	AF&ME	INF	DL	MT	C&P			

175/11/20 ~~Mr. A. J. Brown~~
→ Mr. Kenny (6 Feb 1955)
Wk 1/2

PRIME MINISTER'S ADDRESS TO JEWISH DEPUTIES

POINTS WHICH MIGHT BE MADE

1. ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE

Although Israel still struggles to get recognition of her right to live, her position is rather more secure than it was:-

- (a) The Israeli military defeat of Egypt at negligible cost showed that Israel can successfully defend herself. It dealt a severe blow to Egypt's ambitions of hegemony in the Arab world. It may also have prompted in the Arab world a more critical assessment of Egyptian military potential. However, it also inflamed Arab passions against Israel.
- (b) Israel has shown her readiness and ability to defend herself by arms if provoked too far - a deterrent usefully established.
- (c) In the United Nations, although ultimately required to bow to overwhelming pressures, Israel forced recognition of a situation which most of the world had chosen to ignore, and set off the search for ways to remedy it. Whether the remedies will work largely remains to be seen; but the days when for all practical purposes Israel's complaints fell on deaf ears can hardly return.

FILE

2. COMMUNISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST

- (a) The region is now clearly a major objective of the U.S.S.R. whose policy is:-
- (i) to deny its resources to the West non-communist world by all means short of war;
 - (ii) to foster neutralism in the region against the West;
 - (iii) to outflank the Baghdad Pact and weaken the Eastern wing of N.A.T.O.;
 - (iv) to prolong the Israeli-Arab dispute which is the basic reason for the instability of the area;
- (b) The method being used is the active promotion of anti-Western sentiment through military aid and barter deals, a cultural offensive and the championing of Arab nationalism. Egypt and Syria are the major targets;
- (c) The events of the last few months have given impulse to stronger counter action. Hence the Eisenhower Doctrine, the effective implementation of which is very important.
- (d) A heartening sign is the solidarity and resilience shown by members of the Baghdad Pact which promises greater strength. An important development is the United States Decision to join the Military Committee of the Pact.
- The United Kingdom is a member of the Baghdad Pact. Her interest in the Middle East manifests itself also in the Persian Gulf,

in Aden Protectorate and in other contexts. The United Kingdom, in harmony with the United States, maintains a close interest in the peaceful progress of the area in the face of the Communist threat.

3. EGYPT AS A TEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Unbridled nationalism is incompatible with world order. This is the problem which Egypt poses. The international system shows imperfections when confronted by a country which regards state sovereignty as giving it the right to be lawless. The United Nations was meant to take care of this situation but it is not yet an effective deterrent to the lawbreaker because:-

- (i) the Charter concerns itself with situations arising from a direct armed attack upon a country; but it has no automatic machinery and no existing standards for dealing with a country which engages in more subtle forms of trespass or violations of the economic interests of others;
- (ii) Soviet veto in the Security Council combined with the Russian policy that it serves;
- (iii) ultra nationalist pressures in the General Assembly. Too many breaches of international usage are explained away in the name of nationalism, anti-colonialism or neutralism. These things have acquired something of a talismanic character. (Those countries relying upon them

4/ fail to

fail to realise that by encouraging lawlessness disguised as nationalism they are breaking down the system of world order which has made their emergence possible and upon which their future progress depends.)

The point in 3(1) could be developed by quoting Article 1 of the Charter which says that the purposes of the United Nations are:-

1. to maintain international peace and security and to that end to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law adjustments or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

The United Nations has exerted its energies towards the maintenance of peace. It has yet to bring about a settlement of the Canal dispute in conformity with justice and law.

4. SUEZ CANAL

Egypt's actions over the Canal give ample illustration of lawlessness:-

- (a) The Canal was seized in disregard of the international interests in it, public and private;
- (b) It was sabotaged by Egypt in disregard of the 1888 Convention;
- (c) Clearance was obstructed in disregard of General Assembly's resolutions;

5.

- (d) The Canal was denied to Israel in disregard of the 1888 Convention, the Armistice Agreement, and the Security Council's resolution of 1951;
- (e) the Canal is about to be opened and Egypt is now hedging on the Six Principles.

5. AUSTRALIAN POLICY

- (a) We maintained that Israel's technical act of aggression could not be considered apart from the background of continued provocation and Egypt's continued insistence that she was in a state of belligerency with Israel; this view has in effect had some endorsement by the United Nations (e.g. the individual statements affirming the right of free and innocent passage through the Gulf of Aqaba, the duties given to U.N.E.F., the effort (not entirely successful) to limit Egypt's ability to use Gaza to harass Israel).
- (b) It is of the highest importance progressively to find solutions for the various aspects of the Arab-Israel dispute. This is not only in the interests of Israel and the Arabs, but in the interests of world peace. It would also checkmate Soviet designs. There is too much at stake to allow further indifference.
- (c) Israel's Arab neighbours have claims and interests

6/ that should

that should be respected in negotiation; Israel is entitled to enjoy rights:-

- (i) to be left in peace by her neighbours;
 - (ii) to free passage through the Straits of Tiran; and
 - (iii) to use of the Suez Canal.
- (d) We expect, with confidence, that Israel will for her part co-operate to these ends.

CONFIDENTIAL

7.

POINTS NEEDING TO BE WATCHED

- (a) Nasser did not create the Arab-Israel problem; the problem was there before he came on the scene (he seized office in mid-1952). He has, however, seriously exacerbated it.
- (b) The United Nations ~~qua~~ United Nations should not be pilloried for inaction over Hungary as compared with its activity in the Israel-Egypt question: the United Nations is not a supra-national body but one which reflects the consensus of its members (and the willingness of the Great Powers to clash head-on with the Soviet);
- (c) Australia's influence will be the greater if we avoid appearing completely to whitewash Israel who has her share of blame for the Arab-Israel problem: she has not always co-operated, and a just settlement would require some Israeli concessions on Arab refugees, boundaries;
- (d) Our prospects of getting a satisfactory Canal settlement are not bright; in particular, the idea of international operation is dead. False hopes should not be aroused.
- (e) At the same time we should not announce the irrevocable refusal of Nasser to put the Six Principles into effect: the Americans are still working on him. Sharp reference can be made to fact that after six months he has not yet put them into the form of an international instrument.

CONFIDENTIAL

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
8.

- (f) The United States are beginning to show a (slightly) more robust line towards Nasser (in private but not in public). It would be advisable, not to emphasize their past attitudes, but to commend the new.
- (g) There are good Arabs as well as bad Arabs. The main objective is to split them off from Nasser and the Russians. Criticism should therefore be based on the Israeli-Egyptian issues rather than on behaviour of Arabs generally.
- (h) It is best to avoid talking about the power vacuum in the Middle East which gives a handle to the nationalists and neutralists to talk about unwanted western intervention.

CONFIDENTIAL



181/6/14
175/11/20



EMBASSY
AUSTRALIAN LEGATION
RANGOON.

4th April, 1957

File No. 225/30

Memo. No. 260

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra, A.C.T.

Middle East

Attached is a copy of an editorial which appeared in to-day's "Burman" commenting on Mr. Casey's recent statement on the Middle East.

2. The "Burman" is one of the larger English language newspapers and, although it has no fixed policy it generally follows an anti-colonialist line and is inclined to fellow-travelling.

(A. R. Parsons)
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

W Hong fire - 175/11/20.

The Buman

4-4-57.

Casey's Five Points

—000—

There is actually nothing new in the five point plan suggested by Mr. Richard Casey, the Australian External Affairs Minister, in Canberra the other day. They have been thought of before though perhaps not in this quinqued form. The problem is to put them in execution. Mr. Casey's armchair plan does not extend to implementation.

Point One of the Casey Plan, mutual pledge of respect for each other's territorial rights and non-belligerency between the Arabs and the Israelis is the crux of the problem. If this is achieved, all other four automatically follow. For example the question of demilitarised zones does not come in at all if the Israelis and Arabs enter into a pledge, neither do we have to worry about the right of Israeli ships to use the Tiran Straits or the Suez Canal.

In short all the other four points of the Casey plan rest on Point One, and Point One is the job to achieve.

But if we must achieve Point One of the Casey Plan we must begin in a realistic fashion. Mr. Casey himself had used the word "realistic" in his address at Canberra, but in this context we do not use the word in the same fashion, though the sense may be the same. If an approach to the Middle East problem is going to be realistic, the problem must be left to the Arabs and the Israelis to settle it themselves directly. This, they are bound to do but for extraneous political interest shown in the Middle East by the so-called Big Powers.

The differences between the Arabs and the Israelis are so fundamental they are not easily resolved. But even admitted that just as water seeks its own level, on their own a political balance would be created if only outside powers keep their hands off the Middle East.

This evidently the outside powers are not prepared to do, because they too have their own interests in the region. Often, it might be surmised the differences between the Israelis and Arabs suit the convenience of the extraneous powers and they seem to want to perpetuate these differences.

We should think that a "hands off" policy by the Big Powers in the Middle East would solve the problem rather than these various plans and doctrines which are worse than the disease they are out to cure.

And that is the realistic approach in the Middle East, Mr Casey!

10-7
175/11/20
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD TELETYPE MESSAGE.

MESSAGE NO MIN 473 8.4.57

FOR: MR. RENOUF, E A, CANBERRA

FROM: GARDNER, MINS, MELBOURNE

MINISTER AGREES CABINET MEMORANDUM ON MIDDLE EAST.

MESSAGE ENDS

Hub

SECRET

CROTONATE, LONDON (For External)

SECRET.

Your 817. Bermuda.

We could be interested to know when the joint studies mentioned in your paragraphs 3 to 6 will be made and where.

File 181/1
175/11/20.
181/4/1.

SECRET

→ mr white
ARD

4/4/57

175/11/20

POINTS WHICH MIGHT BE MADE

ARAB-ISRAEL

Although Israel still faces many problems, her position is rather more secure than it was:-

- (a) The Israeli military defeat of Egypt at negligible cost exposed the myth of Egypt's armed strength. It also dealt a severe blow to Egypt's ambitions of hegemony in the Arab world. However, it also enflamed Arab passions against Israel.
- (b) Israel has shown her readiness and ability to defend herself by arms if provoked too far - a deterrent usefully established.
- (c) In the United Nations, although ultimately required to bow to overwhelming pressures, Israel forced recognition of ills which most of the world had chosen to ignore, and set off the search for ways to remedy them. Whether the remedies will work largely remains to be seen but the days when for all practical purposes Israel's complaints fell on deaf ears can hardly return.

COMMUNISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST

- (a) The region is now clearly a major objective of the U.S.S.R. whose policy is:-

2/ (i) to deny

full

2.

- (i) to deny its resources to the West by all means short of war;
- (ii) to foster neutralism in the region against the West;
- (iii) to outflank the Baghdad Pact and weaken the Eastern wing of N.A.T.O.;
- (iv) to prolong the Israeli-Arab dispute which is the basic reason for the instability of the area;
- (b) The method being used is the active promotion of anti-Western sentiment through military aid and barter deals, a cultural offensive and the championing of Arab nationalism. Egypt and Syria are the major targets;
- (c) The events of the last few months have given impulse to stronger counter action. Hence the Eisenhower Doctrine, the effective implementation of which is very important;
- (d) A heartening sign is the solidarity and resilience ^{by} shown/members of the Baghdad Pact which promises to go from strength to strength. An important development is the United States decision to join the Military Committee of the Pact.

EGYPT

Unbridled nationalism is incompatible with world order. This is the problem which Egypt poses. The international system shows imperfections when confronted by a country which regards state

3/ sovereignty

sovereignty as giving it the right to be lawless. The United Nations was meant to take care of this situation but it can only do so ineffectively because of:-

- (i) Soviet veto in the Security Council;
- (ii) ultra nationalist pressures in the General Assembly.

Too many breaches of international usage are explained away in the name of nationalism, anti-colonialism or neutralism. These things have acquired something of a talismanic character. (Those quoting them fail to realise that by encouraging lawlessness disguised as nationalism they are breaking down the system of world order which has made their emergence possible and upon which their future progress depends.)

SUEZ CANAL

Egypt's actions over the Canal give ample illustration of lawlessness:-

- (a) The Canal was seized in disregard of the international interests in it, public and private;
- (b) It was sabotaged by Egypt in disregard of the 1888 Convention;
- (c) Clearance was obstructed in disregard of General Assembly's resolutions;
- (d) The Canal was denied to Israel in disregard of the 1888

4/ Convention ...

Convention, the Armistice Agreement, and the Security Council's resolution of 1951;

- (e) Egypt now threatens to operate the Canal also in disregard of the Six Principles.

AUSTRALIAN POLICY

- (a) We maintained that Israel's technical act of aggression could not be considered apart from the background of continued provocation; this view has in effect been endorsed by the United Nations;
- (b) We feel that the present opportunity of cleaning up the Arab-Israel problem must not be allowed to pass. This is not only in the interests of Israel and the Arabs, but in the interests of world peace. It would also checkmate Soviet designs;
- (c) We believe that Israel's rights:-
 - (i) to be left in peace by her neighbours;
 - (ii) to free passage through the Straits of Tiran; and
 - (iii) to use of the Suez Canal,
 should be made secure once and for all.
- (d) We expect, with confidence, that Israel will for her part co-operate to these ends.

MATTERS WHICH SHOULD BE WATCHED

- (a) Nasser did not create the Arab-Israel problem; the problem was there before he came on the scene (he seized office in mid-1952). He has, however, seriously exacerbated it.
- (b) The United Nations qua United Nations should not be pilloried for inaction over Hungary as compared with its activity in the Israel-Egypt question. The United Nations is not a supra-national body but one which reflects the consensus of its members.
- (c) Israel has her share of blame for the Arab-Israel problem.
- (d) Our prospects of getting a satisfactory Canal settlement are not bright; in particular, the idea of international operation is dead. False hopes should not be aroused.
- (e) The United States are beginning to show a more robust line. It would be advisable not to emphasize their past attitudes.
- (f) There are good Arabs as well as bad Arabs. We do not want to offend them. Criticism should therefore be based on the Israeli-Egyptian complex rather than on the Israeli-Arab complex.
- (g) We should not speak of a power vacuum in the Middle East. This is likely to worry the Arab States;

2/ (h)

2.

(h) We should not speak of the abandonment of British interest in the Middle East and the substitution of United States interest. What has happened is a temporary check to British interest and the advent of American interest; the probable future is one of composite interest, and there is no reason to believe that the United States wants to go it alone.

CONFIDENTIAL
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CONFIDENTIAL

File No. 175/11/20

Date 2nd April, 1957.

SUBJECT

MR HAMMARSKJOELD'S VISIT TO CAIRO

FOR MR. KEVIN

Mr Hammarskjöld's Accomplishments

1. Mr Hammarskjöld seems to have accomplished the following:-

Gaza

2. He "believes" he secured "a moral commitment" from Nasser not to bring troops into the Strip. Furthermore, Nasser accepted (but not in the form of a signed document) the following division of responsibility between U.N.E.F. and the Egyptian Administration:-

- (a) Egypt will advise Gaza residents of her policy of preventing infiltration into Israel; the regulations against infiltration will again be put into force;
- (b) A Palestine police unit will be designated to prevent infiltration and to co-operate with U.N.E.F. in this task. This unit will be instructed "to take immediate action on request by U.N.E.F. dealing with actual or apprehended infiltration."
- (c) U.N.E.F. can arrest infiltrators within 750 metres on the Gaza side of the demarcation line and "will hand them over to the police authority for appropriate judicial action";
- (d) "Egypt will eventually accept" giving U.N.E.F. authority to shoot at infiltrators who refuse to stop when challenged in this zone during the curfew prescribed by the Administration, "provided Israel on its side accepts the same." In the meantime, co-operation between U.N.E.F. and the Palestine police is to be encouraged; joint night patrols with authority to shoot should be explored.

3. Mr Hammarskjöld believes he secured the above by saying U.N.E.F. would be withdrawn unless satisfactory arrangements could be made. He considers the results of his visit show that Nasser wants U.N.E.F. to remain.

Aqaba

4. Mr Hammarskjöld does "not expect Egypt to make difficulties over passage of Israeli shipping provided the Israelis do not shout too loud about it." Mr Hammarskjöld has not given any basis for this expectation. *Cf. statement attributed to Nasser that he will prevent Israeli passage through Suez & Aqaba*

Suez Canal

5. Nasser had asked Mr Hammarskjöld for criticisms of his draft memorandum. Mr Hammarskjöld claims that he secured two amendments in the memorandum, to wit:-

- (a) The insertion of a sentence saying that Egypt is "looking forward with confidence to continued co-operation with the nations of the world in advancing the usefulness of the Canal"; and

CONFIDENTIAL

2/ (b) ...

CONFIDENTIAL

2.

- (b) The insertion of a provision that Egypt "will study appropriate further arrangements that could be made for fact-finding, consultation and arbitration on matters not otherwise covered in the present paragraph" (the paragraph refers to discrimination and complaints arising out of the Canal Code).

Comment

Gaza

6. It is useful to have confirmation that Nasser wants U.N.E.F. to remain in Gaza. The "agreement" upon the division of responsibilities in Gaza between U.N.E.F. and the Egyptian administration is also a step forward. However, the value of the "agreement" depends completely upon Egyptian good faith, especially in that:-

- (a) infiltrators are to be handed over to the Palestine police for "appropriate judicial action";
- (b) U.N.E.F. has no right to shoot at infiltrators who refuse to stop when challenged;
- (c) Nasser is only morally bound not to bring troops into Gaza or so Mr Hammarskjöld believes.

7. Mr Hammarskjöld claims as an accomplishment the fact that the "agreement" is not contingent upon Israel accepting U.N.E.F. on its side of the demarcation lines. This may be an accomplishment but on the other hand it may also be an indication that Egypt does not attach much importance to the "agreement". Only time will tell.

Aqaba

8. Mr Hammarskjöld apparently did not obtain any concession from Nasser.

Suez Canal

9. Mr Hammarskjöld does not appear to have accomplished anything substantial. The amendments he secured to the Egyptian draft memorandum could have some meaning for the future but only if Egypt so wills.

Conclusion

10. The results of Mr Hammarskjöld's visit are disappointing, particularly as regards the Suez Canal.

MR
A. P. Renouf,
E.A.M.E. Branch

CONFIDENTIAL

175/11/20

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

1st April, 1957.

THE SECRETARY

You asked about the number of refugees from Palestine. In November, 1948, the total number was estimated at 700,000. In June, 1956, the number was 922,279.

lik
(J.C.G. Kevin),
Assistant Secretary.

HDW/PF
Middle East

Done

Tell Kevin (for
speech) the number
who "fled".

HWG

1 m/s to PS file with 1/4

Mr. Kevin
Lee

Mr. Lee

*This miss seems
points - PE tel*

tel 39/3

Attached is a copy
of some comments I
have submitted to
Mr. Goryph on passages
in the draft of the Minister's
speech dealing with the
role of the United Nations
in the Middle Eastern questions.

16.5. 29/3/57.

Lee

175/11/20

SECRET

SECRET

29th March, 1957

DRAFT MINISTERIAL STATEMENT ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Mr. Forsyth

I have seen the passages in the draft of the Minister's speech dealing with the role of the United Nations in the Middle East situation. With respect, I am in fundamental disagreement with them because they appear to suggest that the United Nations handling was dominated by the irresponsible use of voting strength by the Afro-Asian bloc. I think insufficient regard is paid in the draft to the following considerations:

(a) As to Suez

The dispute was taken to the Security Council by the United Kingdom and France, who already were almost persuaded that there was no alternative to the use of force. In twentyfour hours negotiation, Lloyd, Pineau and Fawzi, who without loss of face could not have met otherwise than under United Nations auspices, unexpectedly came up with the six principles.

(b) United Kingdom, French and Israeli Use of Force

The purpose of the United States recourse to the United Nations was not to bring Nasser to heel, but to bring about the withdrawal of United Kingdom, French and Israeli forces. The question got into the General Assembly only after Security Council action had been rendered impossible, not by an East-West split, or Afro-Asian intransigence, but by disagreement among the Western Great Powers.

Whether or not the United Kingdom-French opinion was the better opinion, it was a minority opinion, with which the majority of our own friends were in profound disagreement. The United Kingdom and France were not compelled to withdraw by some sort of United Nations force majeure. They elected to withdraw because withdrawal was shown to be the lesser of two evils. The United Nations was the vehicle chosen by our dissenting friends to persuade us to that view. There were numbers outside the Afro-Asian group more than sufficient to produce a blocking one-third vote. The fact is that most of our traditional friends freely, though in the Australian view erroneously, chose to use their voting strength against our position and not in support.


The draft implies also that the United States did not have and pursue positive policies in the United Nations. With respect, I believe that to be an inadequate interpretation of what went on. The United States did not initiate

... SECRET

United Nations action without a policy of its own and in the hope that debate would produce one. It had a policy which it pursued unswervingly and in the long run successfully. The United States manifested considerable diplomatic skill in persuading the Afro-Asian group to go no further than the essentials of the United States position.

Another assessment of the United Nations' role in the Middle East is -

- (1) As to Suez: Direct negotiation under United Nations auspices achieved more (the six principles) in twentyfour hours than other methods in three months. Further exploitation of that method was rendered impossible by events which developed outside the United Nations.
- (ii) As to Armed Intervention:
 - (a) Fundamental but genuine disagreement in the Western camp made Anglo-French withdrawal inevitable regardless of any action the United Nations might take. The Assembly resolutions gave the United Kingdom and France the chance to pull out quickly with rather less loss of face than would otherwise have been possible and before United States economic pressures could begin to hurt or the Baghdad Pact or the Commonwealth could be overstrained.
 - (b) United Nations action greatly facilitated a peaceful solution to an explosive situation.
 - (c) Israel could easily have emerged from its initiative with much rougher handling than it got. The demand started out as "unconditional withdrawal". It finished up so close to conditional withdrawal that the Israelis were able to say that that is what they thought it was.


(Keith Brennan).

United Nations Division

175/11/20

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

28th March, 1957.

MR KEVIN

	<u>Israel</u>	<u>Tasmania</u>	<u>A.C.T.</u>
Area (sq. miles)	8,050	26,215	939
Population	1,850,000 * (estimate)	308,752	*30,315

* 1954 census

H.D.W.

H. D. White
Middle East

File copy

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

~~RESTRICTED~~

File No. *175/11/20*

Memorandum No.

To:- *Washington 272.*
New York 141
Tel Aviv 44
London 231

RECORD OF CONVERSATION

....

Attached for your information is a copy of a
record of conversation between *Secretary*
and *Lebanese Cfg.*
on *20th March*

for the Secretary.

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT RECORD of Conversation with: Lebanese Consul-General (Mr Shadid)
on: 20th March, 1957

Officers Present: Secretary

H.D. White

Main Subjects Discussed: The Middle East Situation

The Consul-General called at his own request.

2. The Secretary opened the discussion by asking about the Lebanon's relations with her neighbours, particularly Syria. The Consul-General said his country had difficulties with Syria: a recent case had arisen over the alleged attempted coup in Syria as a result of which the frontier was sometimes closed.

3. Dealing with relations with the other Arab States, Mr Shadid said although the Lebanon was a member of the Arab League there were differences between them. The one question on which there was complete agreement was the Palestine question. It was this that was the immediate cause of the Suez Canal problem. Taking up this point, the Secretary said that there was one fundamental - that Israel exists and will continue to exist. It was therefore essential that a solution be found to do justice to both sides. It was necessary, the Secretary went on, for the Arabs and Israel to negotiate, but he understood that the Arabs were unwilling to do so to avoid implying recognition of Israel.

4. The Consul General replied that the whole problem hinged on four United Nations resolutions. The resolution on recognition had been implemented but not those on partition, the repatriation or compensation of refugees and the internationalization of Jerusalem. He claimed that implementation of these three would be followed by the recognition of Israel by not only the Lebanon but also by Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, Mr Shadid said, ^{he} Arabs had shown their willingness to negotiate by their acceptance of the Lausanne protocol of 1949.*

2/

* Text attached (the working paper is a map of Palestine showing the partition of Palestine in accordance with the 1947 resolution)

✓ Approved by *hew*
H.D.

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2.

5. The Secretary then returned to the Suez Canal problem to dispute the Consul-General's assertion that it stemmed from the Palestine question. He said that Nasser's policies and evident ambitions to Arab leadership could not be ignored; ^{Nasser} he was of course concerned with the Palestine question, but at the same time he used it to rally support for his ambitions. Other countries, such as Australia, the Secretary said, were bound to consider the way these policies affected them.

6. Turning to the question of Gaza the Secretary said that a solution would be possible by the implementation of the resolution which had gained general support in the Assembly: the strip could be administered in effect by the United Nations but without derogating from Egypt's rights, pending a final settlement.

7. The Secretary stressed the dangers inherent in the present Middle East situation which was the world's major problem. It was not just a question of raids, but the danger of a world conflagration. Meanwhile the Russians were intervening, but only to serve their own interests. Mr Shadid said that the Lebanon recognized the Communist threat and that their Foreign Minister, Dr Malik, was strongly pro-West.

8. The Consul-General then mentioned the refugee problem. Lebanon was too small to resettle any more, he said, although it was not impossible for other states to do. He claimed that the fedayeen from Gaza were not Egyptians, but Palestinian refugees. The Secretary recalled an Israeli suggestion that some refugees might be resettled in Israel, but thought it would apply only to refugees in Gaza.

9. Finally the Secretary said that the Lebanon might be able to bring the two sides together. A solution would probably take time, but the danger was that there might not be much time available.

Report prepared by: H. D. White

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Secretary,
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Washington,
New York
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ATTACHMENT

PROTOCOL

"The United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, anxious to achieve as quickly as possible the objectives of the General Assembly resolution of 11 December, 1948, regarding refugees, the respect for their rights and the preservation of their property, as well as territorial and other questions, has proposed to the delegation of Israel and to the delegations of the Arab States that the working document attached hereto be taken as a basis for discussions with the Commission.

The interested delegations have accepted this proposal with the understanding that the exchanges of views which will be carried on by the Commission with the two parties will bear upon the territorial adjustments necessary to the above indicated objectives."

(The working paper is a map of Palestine showing the partition of Palestine in accordance with the 1947 resolution.)

DEPARTMENT OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

145711/20

Commonwealth Offices,
Treasury Place,
MELBOURNE. C.2.

4th March, 1957.

Dear Mr. Einfeld,

I have your letter of 28th February,
and I would like to thank you for the Victorian
Jewish Community's expression of support for the
Commonwealth Government's policy in the present
Middle East Crisis.

You may rest assured that the
resolutions passed at the meeting of 6th February
will have my close attention.

I am,

Yours sincerely,

R. G. CASEY

(R.G. CASEY)

Sydney D. Einfeld, Esq.,
President,
Executive Council of Australian Jewry,
G.P.O. Box 3759,
SYDNEY.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

(MR. KEVIN).

Forwarded for your information and *action necessary*

R.H. Gardner
(R.H. Gardner)
Private Secretary

C.R.
6.3.57.

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIAN JEWRY

Suite 208, 243 Elizabeth St.,
Sydney.

G.P.O. Box 3759.
28th February, 1957.

The Right Honourable R.G. Casey, C.H., D.S.O., M.C., M.P.
Minister for External Affairs,
Parliament House,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Dear Mr. Casey,

At a public meeting of the Victorian Jewish community held in Melbourne on 6th February, 1957, certain resolutions in connection with the situation in Israel were carried and I have been requested to forward these to you for the information of the Commonwealth Government.

The resolutions are:-

"The Victorian Jewish Community gathered together on Wednesday, 6th February, 1957, at the Assembly Hall, Melbourne:

Expresses its appreciation to the Government of Australia for its policy as expressed by the Minister for External Affairs, Mr. R.G. Casey, and the Australian delegates at United Nations who have stressed the urgent necessity for effective practical action by the United Nations to safeguard Israel's vital interests and security as a pre-requisite for the preservation of peace in the Middle East.

Trusts that the Australian Government will, at an early date, initiate and support vigorous United Nations action to eliminate the discrimination against Israel navigation in the free waters of Akaba and Suez, the blockade of Israel and the renewal of further acts of violence and aggression against Israel, and thus prevent any possibility of a return to the conditions that led to the recent conflagration and lay the foundations for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East."

I remain, Sir,

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) Sydney D. Einfeld.
PRESIDENT.

SDE/PL

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I remain, Sir,


Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) Sydney D. Einfeld.
PRESIDENT.

SDE/PL



In reply quote No.



February 28, 1957

Memorandum No. 272/57

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA..A.C.T.

Ambassador's Speech on the Middle East

The Ambassador delivered an address on the Middle East before the 71st Annual Meeting of the New England Association of Secondary Schools and Colleges in Boston on 7th December, 1956. The speech was subsequently printed in the Congressional Record of 14th February, at the request of Senator J.W. Fulbright (D. Ark). An extract from that Record, giving the text of the speech and the Senator's introductory remarks, is attached.

L.H. Border
First Secretary.

GR

congressional action for this reason it is of the utmost importance to have agreement between the executive and political branches of the Government in launching any policy as momentous as the Eisenhower doctrine. Wilson set the pattern for executive-congressional cooperation in the conduct of World War I. It is well to remember also that when Roosevelt promised aid to France in the dark days of 1940 he was careful to make clear that his message carried no implication of military commitments, because, as he said, "only Congress can make such commitments."

Nor should the Senators forget that when Congress authorized the President to negotiate with the United Nations Security Council for the assignment of American forces to a U. N. army it provided that the final agreement should be submitted to Congress for approval. In the same act Congress made a special point of withholding authorization for the President to supply the U. N. with any additional forces. The President may well have had this act in mind when he decided to lay before Congress his request for military aid for Near East victims of Communist aggression.

Those who see in the Near East resolution an unconstitutional delegation of power seem to regard it as authorizing a White House declaration of war, but it does nothing of the kind. Certainly the Monroe Doctrine which extended a protective arm around all the Latin American Republics for so many years was not a declaration of war. Rather, like the Eisenhower doctrine, it was a peace policy which might have led to war only in case of aggression within the area covered. In the present instance, the President has asked Congress to join in declaring a policy of protecting the Near East from Communist conquest and to authorize the use of Armed Forces if necessary. Such forces might be used in police action, but the decision of whether a state of war would result and how it should be met would still be up to Congress.

The resolution is not a blank grant of power, as Senator FULBRIGHT contends, but the declaration of a solemn executive congressional policy, which the President would administer in accord with the terms Congress lays down. This sound procedure has been used in the making of tariffs and in many other spheres. It is especially appropriate in foreign relations where the President is the spokesman for the Nation.

The resolution as the committee has amended it apparently is acceptable to the administration. Even though it has been weakened, it still asserts the essential principle. The language may be as strong as the Senate can be persuaded to adopt. But we believe the original version is preferable.

The Realities of Friendship

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. J. W. FULBRIGHT

OF ARKANSAS

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Thursday, February 14, 1957

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Appendix of the RECORD a recent address by His Excellency, the Australian Ambassador, the Honorable Sir Percy Spender, K. B. E., Q. C., to the 71st annual meeting of the New England Association of Secondary Schools and Colleges, on December 7, 1956, at the Hotel Statler, Boston, in the Commonwealth

of Massachusetts. Sir Percy Spender is one of the most popular envoys in Washington. His views, in my opinion, merit the careful consideration of my distinguished colleagues.

I have received from the Government Printing Office an estimate that the cost of printing the address in the RECORD will be \$179.67. Notwithstanding this estimate, I ask unanimous consent that the address be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ADDRESS BY THE AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR, THE HONORABLE SIR PERCY SPENDER, K. B. E., Q. C., TO THE 71ST ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NEW ENGLAND ASSOCIATION OF SECONDARY SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES, DECEMBER 7, 1956, AT HOTEL STATLER, BOSTON

You have very kindly given me freedom of choice on what I might speak to you about tonight. It is certainly not an occasion for the discussion of other than a serious matter and I would be paying my audience no compliment were I to allow this opportunity to pass without directing my remarks and your minds to some consideration of developments in the Middle East—not the least importantly to the residual effects of events in that fermenting region upon the relations among the great nations of the Western Alliance.

I speak to you as the representative of a country that is and will remain a constant loyal friend of this great country, having as it has the vast responsibility of leading the free world at this critical stage of history.

The past few weeks have witnessed happenings of great moment—happenings which it is no exaggeration to say may yet determine the future of the free world. In this instance I am not referring to the conflict between Israel and Egypt, but to the melancholy fact that this conflict and the attempts of Great Britain to separate the belligerents have produced as a damaging byproduct—like the waste from an atomic reaction—a profound disturbance of the relationships in an alliance which had, up to now, successfully withstood the intense strains of two world wars and the equally stressful conditions of a cold war which has endured for a decade.

It would be a disservice to the cause of the two nations—the United States of America and Great Britain—and to the free world were we to shut our eyes to the serious extent of the disturbance. Hostile reactions have been aroused, misunderstandings created between two great and friendly nations, whose continued friendship is essential for their own survival and, because of that, essential to the survival of freedom everywhere. And this includes certain nations who never cease talking about freedom and national independence whilst utterly failing to understand that the greatest danger to their freedom and independence in the short as well as the long run is the threat of Soviet penetration and the hovering and brutal might of the Soviet Government.

Much needs to be done—and rapidly—to repair the damage which has occurred. It will not be sufficient merely to repair fences. Something much more than that is needed. It is urgently necessary to erect new barricades of freedom throughout the world. For we must not delude ourselves into thinking that all that has happened in the past few weeks are but mere incidents which will pass like a bad dream. Their consequences will be felt for a long time to come. It is the task of statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic and elsewhere rapidly to restore the great trust and confidence which the two countries must continue to enjoy if the free world and the cause of freedom is to survive. Those who engage in recrimination—and

how easy it is to do this—will serve not their own countries but those who are enemies of their countries and the democratic system.

It is something to ponder upon—and I hasten to say that I am not concerned at the moment with justification or the apportionment of blame, for nothing could be more futile or unproductive—that what the cold war failed, from the Russian point of view, to produce, namely a grave weakening of the bonds among the Western allies, has in some measure now been achieved primarily because of the actions of a petty Middle Eastern dictator whose regime is patterned on the precepts which we fought together to destroy more than 10 years ago.

I do not want to go into a long history of the case of Colonel Nasser but it is at least necessary to consider some of the factors which have brought the free world to its present pass. I will not, for example, concern myself with the details of his defiance of the accepted standards of international conduct and his breach of treaty rights in his nationalization of the Suez Canal. I would, however, wish to observe—what has in recent weeks unfortunately been so completely forgotten—that it was his utterly illegal conduct from which all other acts have stemmed. This has been smudged over or obliterated in the blackout of more spectacular events. But the stark facts remain.

We cannot accordingly discuss the present situation without giving some attention to the things which preceded the Israeli move into the Sinai Peninsula.

Few would be at all concerned to deny that when Israel invaded Egypt it was, in terms of international law, an act of aggression.

But by the same token few could deny, with truth, that the movement of Israeli troops into Egyptian territory had been preceded over a period of years by a continuous provocation from Egypt of a most cold and calculated nature.

What are the facts? For years past Egypt has conducted an illegal and unrelenting blockade against the use of the Suez Canal by Israeli ships.

Egyptian gun emplacements on islands in the Gulf of Aqaba have prevented Israeli ships from using this alternative route from the East via the Red Sea.

Egyptian commando bands ranging far into Israeli territory have murdered Israelis in the community farmlands of the border regions, and beyond.

The Cairo radio has constantly broadcast the most inflammatory propaganda consistent only with a state of war between nations and has flagrantly threatened the very existence of Israel as an independent state.

Add to all this the efforts which Egypt has directed toward forming alliances which would ring Israel with hostile neighbors and complete the picture with the formation of a joint Egypt-Syria-Jordan military command.

These cumulative provocations place the action of Israel surely in a somewhat different light from the one which Egypt would have us see.

This "aggression," if you like, by Israel, did not come out of a clear blue sky, as it were. It was in many respects a reaction which we would regard as normal if it had been indulged in by an average human being defending his home and family against a group ganging up to take away from him his living and his life.

It is surely something we can understand even if we cannot bring ourselves to condone it.

Let me now examine the actions of Britain and France. I do so from the point of view of an Australian and since I was in Australia a little more than a week ago I know that what I say reflects not only the considered view of the Australian Government but also the view of the great majority of the Aus-

italian people, whose immediate preoccupation with the Olympic games has not blinded them to the great significance for them as a people and a nation of the march of events in the Suez region.

This country of yours has for a long time based much of its policy upon the wise principles of what is known as the Monroe Doctrine, which recognizes that events taking place far beyond its own territorial borders which affect its vital interests as a nation are of supreme concern to it and must be dealt with as such. These principles are not irrelevant in the national life of other nations.

Britain and France are two of the great maritime nations of the world. Their economic existence—indeed their national existence—depends in great measure on the free passage of their ships along the great trade routes of the world, and their industries pulsate with the oil which flows to them from the huge fields of the Middle East.

They found themselves confronted with a war which gave every indication of being fought on either side of and over the great international waterway and threatened to interrupt their commerce and to disrupt their industries. They decided upon a certain course of action and if, in the upshot, that course of action has produced some of the problems it sought to circumvent it does not, in my view, alter the fact that the action was taken to preserve for hundreds of millions of people their livelihood and living standards.

The world has had plenty of experience of local wars being fought in areas of less significance internationally than Suez and the world has had plenty of experience of isolating or attempting to isolate such outbreaks. But the Suez Canal area has such vital meaning—and I do not use the phrase lightly—that Britain and France believed that something had to be done, and done immediately. In the context of my remarks it is not of any purpose now to debate whether they were right or wrong in their judgment. Australia through its Prime Minister, Mr. Menzies, has made it quite clear where we stand on this issue.

There was at that time no reason to believe that the United Nations could or would act quickly to put out the fire. There was every reason to believe they would not. That throws some light on why Britain and France made their military move into the Suez Canal area.

It was action designed to separate the belligerents and I believe that in that sense it clearly succeeded. It was action without thought of territorial gain and action directed only against military targets strictly necessary for that purpose.

Those are some of the primary facts which I believe have to be recognized if we are to have any worthwhile solution of the problems of the Middle East on a long-term basis. They are facts which are necessary to a proper perspective. Unfortunately, they are only a part of the developing story.

The worst result from the point of view of all the countries of the West has been the deep disturbance of the relations between Britain and France on the one hand, and the United States on the other.

The United Nations has chosen over the past couple of weeks to condemn Britain, France, and Israel and to do so in circumstances which paid scant if any regard to the conduct of Egypt in bringing about the unfortunate events of this period. There have been charges of concert among the three nations—charges which I deny here and now—but the net result has been to separate and divide an alliance, which has done and promised to do more for the freedom of nations than any other combination of nations in history.

This is the real tragedy of the Suez affair. Economies, though grievously tested, can and will survive long interruption to the use

of the canal for world trade. Industries deprived of life-giving oil will slow down and the people of Western Europe will tighten their belts once again, for just another period in their lifetime. The free world can face and overcome those kinds of crises, although not without their portion of human suffering.

But I have the gravest misgivings on the future of the free world without the stabilizing influence for ultimate good which is implicit in the association now so seriously threatened.

There have been mistakes and there have been misunderstandings and neither all the mistakes nor all the misunderstandings have been on the one side or the other.

You may criticize the United Kingdom and France according to your lights, for having employed what I have heard described as the 19th century diplomacy of sending ships and soldiers.

But remember that desperate ills require drastic measures. I think it is only now becoming apparent that if Britain and France had not taken action when they did there was a very real probability of Russian intervention and for the first time in history the menace of Russia standing astride one of the great arteries of trade with all the implications for the free world of such a development.

I must ask, also, whether the United Nations, in its present mood, proposes to give deep consideration to the long-range questions of a thoroughgoing Middle East settlement? Are they to rest content with branding Israel and Britain and France aggressors without conceding that all three had reasons—whether you agree with them or not—for acting as they did when they did?

Is the sole solution of this problem to be a smoothing down of the ruffled feathers of Gamal Abdel Nasser, returning the canal to him, cleared at no cost to him of the ships which he himself had wantonly and irresponsibly scuttled there in order to thwart the nations of the West? I say now that this man is no friend of the West. He is no friend of other Arab nations whose interests he pretends to serve but whose interests in truth he is determined to subjugate to his own inordinate and dangerous ambitions. This is no man that one can deal with on terms of honor. This is no man on whose word you can rely.

Nasser is the leader of a totalitarian military government which does not derive its power from the consent of the governed but from the power inherent in a secret police and from a mob fanned to hatred by totalitarian catch-cries designed to divert attention from the poverty and misery which plagues his people.

We believe that this man must be headed off before he delivers the whole of the Middle East into the greedy hands of the Kremlin.

You may say that we are wrong in our assessment. You have every right to do so. But I honestly believe that every event that has taken place in recent weeks has served only to reinforce that assessment.

The United Nations General Assembly has, in effect, ordered Britain and France out of the Middle East and is now in the process of replacing the British and French forces with a United Nations Emergency Force whose functions and authority seem vaguely defined, and which is neither an armed force nor an observer force but something in the twilight between.

What I find disturbing is that this whole exercise appears to depend entirely or almost entirely upon the consent of Nasser.

Starkly faced with military extinction, he now appears to set the terms. Already the stage is being set for the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Forces as soon as British and French forces have been evacuated, so leaving Nasser in undisputed and complete control of the canal and with all the problems which are plaguing this important part of the world left unresolved. In

this maneuver Soviet Russia is playing a dominant if undercover role.

This is one of the crucial moments of history. The United Nations emergency force must—whatever Egypt may demand—remain in the canal zone until the problem of the canal is solved by United Nations action and until by United Nations action the problem of Israel's borders is also satisfactorily settled and an end put to the dangerous recurrent border incidents.

If the United Nations force is withdrawn without these matters having been solved, we will head for disaster. We will have lost the change, perhaps the last chance, of arresting the drift toward war which has been increasingly evident in this part of the world. We will have prepared the way for large-scale penetration by Soviet Russia into the Middle East with incalculable consequences for the free world and all its nations, big and small.

Is Israel to be returned to the hemmed-in condition from which she sought to extricate herself—and hemmed in this time by nations supplied with implements of war from Russia?

I can understand a desire for peace and permanent peace throughout the world. He would be a poor man in public affairs who sought any other end. But an even greater aim in my view is peace with justice. Peace can always be purchased at the price of surrender. But that is the peace of the grave.

There are problems in the Middle East which must be solved and the time presents the opportunity to solve them while we have troops in the canal zone.

First and foremost, the canal itself must be cleared of the obstructions which now prevent and may long continue to interfere with its navigation.

Second, the canal must be removed from the possibility of future unilateral political action by one nation, or even by a group of nations, which would prevent its free use by other nations. The canal must be, for all time, established as a free international waterway. Third, the present state of hostilities between Egypt and Israel must be ended.

But, in addition to the foregoing prerequisites to a long-term settlement of Middle Eastern problems, the United Nations must make it plain to the world and especially to the Arab nations, which have threatened to eliminate Israel as a nation and drive it into the sea, that the present State of Israel was established by the United Nations and will be maintained by the United Nations at all costs.

Further, the boundary problems between Israel and Egypt must be resolved and effective means evolved to retain them inviolate. Finally, the tragic refugee problem must be settled and both Israelis and Arabs must be obliged to carry out their respective parts in its resolution.

We have achieved peace of a sort in the Middle East. At least, there is for the moment an absence of fighting so I suppose we can call it peace. We have achieved similar sorts of peace in a number of other areas of conflict in the years since the last war. But how often have we achieved peace simply for the sake of peace alone while justice has had little part in the settlement? I am afraid that as things look now we are in danger of repeating that performance once again in the Middle East. There are these short-range benefits, but there is the dismal prospect of long-range disaster if the true lovers of liberty in this world are divorced to form new liaisons of a makeshift variety.

Britain and French influence in the Middle East, or anywhere else for that matter, cannot be diminished unless there is an effective alternative to meet the power vacuum so created. At the moment Russia is doing her utmost to become the new so-called friend of the Arab nations and one of the outcomes of our present difficulties could well

be the influence of the Soviet Union as the new power and influence in the affairs of the Middle East. Her arms are flowing into the Arab countries, her technicians go with them, and her alien and evil philosophy follows in their wake.

The United States has, I do not doubt, won some accretion of influence herself among some of the Afro-Asian nations. This, no doubt, is a good thing but I contend from the very depth of my heart that the interests of the United States as much as the interests of Britain and France depend finally and irrevocably on the relationships which have real depth, the relationships which depend on concepts put forward by Frenchmen and Americans and Britons a century and a half ago. Britons and Americans speak the same language. All 3 nations speak, and what is more, have a deep understanding of the language of liberty and freedom which is not written in dictionaries and books of grammar but in men's hearts and minds.

The heart of the matter is this: that the problems of this century follow one another in an unhappy monotony from year to year. The problems of Korea give way to the problems of Indochina; the problems of Indochina in turn give way to other difficulties; and in that dismal succession the problems of the Middle East have their place.

But transcending these situations there exists a far greater conflict between ideologies which can only be seen from the historical standpoint. It is in this battle that we have stood together for going on 2 centuries and in which the future dignity of mankind demands that we must continue to stand united. Freedom and liberty are not exclusive to us. These are enjoyed by many nations and people large and small. But you and France and we who call ourselves British have long been in the forefront of the battle for the liberty of the individual against the power of the state.

It is essential, for the sake of those who do not enjoy freedom in the lands behind the Iron Curtain, indeed in countries of Asia and Africa—many of whom have been so enthusiastic in the move to condemn Britain and France—that the Western Alliance be repaired and put back into working order.

For what must concern us now is how we are to make constructive efforts to mend the breach that has occurred and erect new barricades of freedom.

I believe that the approach must be one of realism and it has been to that end that I have spoken with the complete frankness which friendship entitles one to do. As an Australian I feel that we have a rather unique position in the matter. Certainly we have stuck pretty solidly with our mother country in recent weeks. At the same time there has never been the slightest impairment of the condition of true friendship which exists between the United States and Australia. If I have been outspoken it is because I believe our friendship has the depth and strength to stand it.

I have been frank because I have felt that the facts, at any rate as we see them, have been less than adequately understood in the United States.

We see Soviet infiltration into the Middle East manifesting itself in the arms deals with Syria and Egypt; we believe that this sort of assistance, once acquiesced in labels a recipient, in the Communist mind, as a satellite and domination follows not very long thereafter.

We see the Soviet making her first moves toward the waters of the Mediterranean contemporaneously with the humiliation of two proud members of the free world.

We see the General Assembly of the United Nations concentrating an almost emotional fury upon Britain and France as if consumed with an eagerness to allow attention to be diverted from the terrible rapine and terror

in Hungary, where so many simple working men and women and children have been ruthlessly destroyed.

In short we witness a state of affairs in which whilst Russia rides unhindered, Great Britain and France face further aggravation of their economic difficulties and see their prestige seriously impaired in the Middle East and throughout a large part of the world, and the basis of Western European Defense policy, which includes holding defensive positions in the Middle East, gravely weakened.

Among the friends of human freedom these are considerations which must give rise to deep concern; and the deepest concern of all must be reserved for the entry on the debit side which shows that those who by tradition and practice must be friends have been at odds.

Unless we can find a way swiftly to throw a bridge of understanding over the treacherous currents which have been released I am very much afraid that we will see further Russian efforts to gain advantage from the confusions now existing and to expand its aggressive plans.

The basic interests of the American people and the people of Great Britain are one. Twice in less than 50 years the people of Britain have been first into the field in defense of liberty. The people of the United States have an intimate knowledge of liberty, for they too have fought for it, not only for themselves but for others.

This then is a time not to be standing upon ceremony but to be putting forward every effort to heal the wounds we each may have inflicted on the other.

The defense of the free world depends in the ultimate, not upon the relationships in the General Assembly, where voting blocs have been formed, not on principles, but on politics, not on justice but on geography.

The defense of the free world depends in the ultimate on the unimpaired association of the Great Powers of Western Europe and the greatest power in the world, the United States.

Surely, as at no other time, is the stage of history set for the appearance of a declaration from these nations' leaders to match the great declarations of the past—a declaration which will show that the cohesion of the past remains to meet the future, that they will work together in the continuing task of fighting together for true democracy.

With good will and understanding of this order the threat to democratic unity which exists at this very hour may be turned aside.

We are, all of us—you in the United States, we free peoples wherever we may be in the world—we are all of us deeply conscious of the great goodness of the American people and of the high ideals of the President of the United States—and who can doubt the belief in liberty and the will to peace of the ordinary people of Britain and France who stand now in the front line of any third and horrible war.

Let us draw upon these great reserves of strength and friendship now—whilst there is time.

Day Care Centers for Working Mothers

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. ALEXANDER WILEY

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Thursday, February 14, 1957

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, I was interested to note in the February 10 issue of the Milwaukee Journal, a most interesting article concerning the need

for improvement in day care centers operated for the benefit of working mothers of small youngsters.

As I have previously pointed out on the Senate floor, today, 5 million mothers of children under the age of 12 hold jobs outside their homes. Inevitably, increasing attention is being given to the need for improving the facilities which look after the youngsters, while mother is away at work.

This is, of course, a problem, basically, for the States and localities, in terms of encouraging the highest type of professional services by experts interested in proper centers.

I am pleased that the Child Welfare League of America, and other fine groups, are giving their earnest consideration to this matter.

I know it is a source of deep interest as well to the United States Children's Bureau, the United States Women's Bureau, and other Federal agencies having important responsibilities in this field.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the article be printed in the Appendix of the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DAYTIME CHILD CARE SERVICE MUST GROW—CONSULTANT HAS PRAISE FOR WORK OF TWO RED FEATHER AGENCIES VISITED HERE

The great and growing number of working mothers of small children is bringing mounting pressure for daytime child care, which each community will have to answer in some way, a national authority in this field said here Saturday. Miss Judith Cauman, New York City, field consultant on day care for the Child Welfare League of America, is making consultation visits here to two league member agencies, the Volunteers of America Day Nurseries and the Child Care Centers, Inc. Her week's stay will end Wednesday.

More than 5 million mothers of children under 12 already hold jobs outside their homes, Miss Cauman noted. Half of these mothers have children under 6 years old.

HIGH FEES A PROBLEM

No one knows how many children now get day care, but estimates say hundreds of thousands, Miss Cauman said. And many more who need it are going without. Unless services expand as mothers go to work, there will be an "explosion," she fears.

Most of the available service today is provided by commercial operators. One of the problems is that the fee charged for good day care is necessarily too high for many parents to pay. Subsidized services, supported through taxes or Community Chests or other private sources, are the other major resources.

State licensing procedures to assure minimum standards have in recent years brought needed protection to children placed in all kinds of day care agencies, she pointed out, but registration is still far from complete.

PRAISES AGENCIES HERE

Miss Cauman praised the high standards of the two Red Feather agencies she visited in Milwaukee, but found no room even here for complacency.

Where so much has been accomplished in meeting the visible needs of children—through good professional leadership, efforts to maintain qualified staff in the face of personnel shortages in education, social work, and health; in equipment and program—the next important step is harder to recognize and harder to interpret to the community, she said.

Yet without it, a day care center is "a gap that doesn't quite reach across the gap."

The next step is a staff large enough so that every child can develop a close relationship with an adult in the center during those long hours he lives apart from his mother.

YOUNG NEED ADULTS

"This is expensive in dollars," Miss Cauman conceded, "but failure to achieve it is terribly expensive in terms of personality development and future citizenship."

Little children are not "complete persons" until the age of 5 or 6, she explained. The need of very young children for adults has been known philosophically for thousands of years, she said. That knowledge has been confirmed by modern scientific research into child development.

"Few realize what it is that a little child goes through, separated from home for 8 to 10 hours a day," she said. "He needs a substitute relationship with an adult. It should be the same adult most of the day, and it should be an adult the child doesn't have to share with too many other children."

CHILD'S FUTURE AFFECTED

A child unable to form early and deep relationships with others, she said, cannot learn this important lesson later on. He may grow up unable to stick with a job or a marriage, however poised he may appear on the surface.

Just as lack of proper amounts and kinds of food during the day cannot be made up by feeding a child a big meal at night, so emotions must be fed continually, Miss Cauman said.

Before joining the league staff 4 years ago Miss Cauman was executive secretary of the Associated Day Care Services of Metropolitan Boston, a coordinating group for eight Red Feather centers. An educator with social work training, she has directed private schools in New York, supervised nursery school education and trained nursery school teachers.

Reunification of Germany

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. ALEXANDER WILEY

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Thursday, February 14, 1957

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Appendix of the RECORD a letter from Richard E. Sperber, managing editor of the *Abendpost-Sonntagpost* and *Milwaukee Deutsche Zeitung*, dated February 9, 1957, relating to the requested visit to Germany by Vice President Nixon in connection with the question of the reunification of Germany.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ABENDPOST-SONNTAGPOST,
MILWAUKEE DEUTSCHE ZEITUNG,
Milwaukee, Wis., February 9, 1957.
The Honorable ALEXANDER WILEY,
United States Senator, Senate Office
Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SENATOR: As chairman of the American Council for the Reunification of Germany, a private and independent organization of citizens and residents of the United States, I have the honor to inform you about the following resolution, which was unanimously adopted at our meeting on February 6, 1957:

"The American Council for the Reunification of Germany herewith requests the Chief Executive to dispatch Vice President RICHARD

M. NIXON to Germany (including western Berlin) at an early date for a personal study of the facts and preconditions for the reunification of Germany in peace and freedom.

"Mr. Nixon has demonstrated on his recent trip to Austria a remarkable ability to comprehend complex problems such as the Hungarian refugee problem and to recommend a proper course of action to the Government of the United States."

This resolution was mailed to President Eisenhower on February 7, 1957. We would appreciate your support for this suggestion.

Respectfully yours,

RICHARD E. SPERBER,

Managing editor.

Fifth Annual Dedicatory Prayer Breakfast at the Mayflower Hotel

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. FRANK CARLSON

OF KANSAS

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Thursday, February 14, 1957

Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, last Thursday morning 950 persons, including the Vice President, members of the Cabinet, the courts, Members of the Senate, Members of the House of Representatives, Government officials, delegates to the conference, and representatives of the Council of Christian Leadership Groups attended the Presidential prayer breakfast at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D. C. Conrad Hilton was host on the occasion.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Appendix of the RECORD a copy of the program and transcript of the proceedings of this service.

In my opinion, this prayer breakfast, attended by outstanding leaders in every field will add much to the religious life of our Nation.

There being no objection, the program and transcript of proceedings were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PROGRAM FOR PRESIDENTIAL BREAKFAST, MAYFLOWER HOTEL, FEBRUARY 7, 1957

Presiding: Hon. FRANK CARLSON, United States Senate, president, International Council for Christian Leadership.

Invocation: Mr. Richard Halverson, assistant executive secretary, International Christian Leadership.

Scripture lesson: Hon. BROOKS HAYS, Representative from Arkansas. (Isaiah 42: 1-4; Titus 2: 11-14.)

Message of welcome: Senator FRANK CARLSON.

Greetings from our host: Mr. Conrad Hilton.

Message: The Vice President of the United States, Hon. RICHARD NIXON.

Greetings from the House of Representatives Breakfast Prayer Group: Hon. JAMES B. UTT, of California.

Greetings from the Senate Breakfast Prayer Group: Hon. JOHN STENNIS, of Mississippi. Address: Christian Responsibility, Mr. Kenneth Keyes, Miami, Fla.

Prayer of dedication: Abraham Vereide, executive secretary of International Council of Christian Leadership.

The fifth annual prayer breakfast was opened by Senator FRANK CARLSON, president of the International Council of Christian Leadership.

FIFTH ANNUAL PRAYER BREAKFAST

Senator CARLSON. We are going to have the invocation this morning by Richard Halverson. Following that we will remain standing and have a verse from the President, a hymn led by Fague Springman, of the music department, University of Maryland.

Mr. HALVERSON. Let us unite together in prayer.

Our Heavenly Father, we gather together this morning in this comfortable fellowship knowing that there are millions of men and women who never know the comfort that we enjoy and who would never dare to meet in fellowship in the name of Jesus Christ.

We meet here in reflection and respect for our Government leaders, and there are millions who fear and hate those who are over them in rule and authority.

We meet here to enjoy good food and drink, and there are millions who never know the luxury of a full stomach.

Our Heavenly Father, deliver us from the complacency that would make us indifferent of these gifts that come so easily and grant as we gather here this morning in the name of Jesus Christ that this breakfast shall be a testimony to the fact that we take Christ seriously and we in America love God and believe that we are called of Him to serve Him. Use these blessings to Thy glory we pray in Christ's name. Amen.

(Solo.)

Senator CARLSON. We are going to enjoy the breakfast, but during this breakfast period I would like to announce that we are going to be favored by some music, songs, and a quartet. This quartet is known as the Visionaires and they have just flown over from Manila, the Philippine Islands, where they have concluded a very fine and effective evangelistic campaign.

We are going to be favored at this time with one number from the Visionaries quartet. And immediately following that number we will hear from the distinguished Congressman from the State of Arkansas [Brooks Hays], who will read the Scripture lesson, Isaiah 42: 1-4, Titus 2: 11-14.

We meet here this morning at a prayer breakfast. It was 23 years ago in Seattle, Wash., that a group of men met and organized the first laymen's breakfast prayer group. It also founded International Christian Leadership. This is in reality the annual meeting of these breakfasts. There are prayer groups all over this Nation. And it is also the first session of the International Christian Leadership.

Today there are hundreds of these prayer groups meeting in foreign countries as well as all over our Nation. It is a laymen's movement for spiritual deepening and for consideration of the practical problems which can be solved, we believe, through vital Christianity.

Membership in the United States is made up of all segments of our social and economic life—from commerce and industry, from government, the House and the Senate, labor, banking, all of the professions. Awakened and concerned laymen believe that the solution to this crisis lies in taking the initiative in practicing and promoting moral and spiritual principles in our daily lives. They believe the root of the American greatness is a Christian heritage. They believe that in these troubled and uncertain times we need and must rely on divine guidance.

It was St. Paul who wrote, "The effectual, fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much."

The theme for this meeting is mobilizing Christian men around the world to assume their responsibility in human affairs.

This session is the first session of the International Christian Leadership. We are going to have meetings for the next 3 days. While I am on my feet I want to announce a very important annual banquet dinner to-

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

175/11/20

19th February, 1957.

SECRET
FOR THE SECRETARY

EGYPT-ISRAEL

FILE

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This circular from Pearson goes back to mid-January, but it is interesting (page 3 and 4) as one of the few indications we have had of Egyptian thinking. It is always questionable, however, just how far Fawzi reflects Nasser on any occasion.

I shall pass this to Minister after you have seen it.

W
(J. C. G. KEVIN)
Assistant Secretary.

McKenney

JCGK/PF

Seen
Wish
20/2
57

McGardner

SECRET

See 2nd place before Minister

Talk 20/2

39/18

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MIDEAST

I had two hours with Charles Malik at lunch time today. He arrived yesterday from London and had not yet been able to inform himself of Mideast developments here. ^{In fact} /I was the first person, he said, whom he had seen as he had been trying to rest since arrival in order to recover from a very exhausting visit to various capitals since leaving Lebanon.

2. He told me very frankly about his seven hour visit with Nasser and his info tallied with that which Mr. Norman has reported. He fears Nasser's influence and his simple and puritanical fanaticism, and obviously hopes that Egyptian ambitions can be kept in check. He is also somewhat worried about USA plans and policies for the above purpose, and notwithstanding recent events regrets the weakening of British and French influence in the Mideast. He thinks that in the long run Western Europe and the Mideast can and should work together in a more friendly and effective way than the USA will be able to do

3. Malik was emphatic that Lebanon was now adopting for the first time, for ten years an independent foreign policy, and he hoped that this would make its influence with other Middle Eastern countries and with European countries a constructive one. While, of course, he is not perhaps rep. of majority Arab opinion, nevertheless his views are of some importance. He is not pessimistic about future developments, especially after his visit to Paris and London which he thought had been successful. He said that he was impressed both by Mallet and by President Cote, while he had had

a very good talk with Harold MacMillan.

4. Returning to the UN Force, he expressed the hope that he would be able to exercise a moderating influence in Arab Councils here, but he realized that there were difficult and extremist forces to contend with. I did not press him about current problems in regard to Israeli withdrawal and the control of the Canal because he had not had a chance to study them, but I begged him to do what he could to prevent hasty and unwise decisions, especially regarding Israel's delay in withdrawing from Sinai, and I emphasized that this withdrawal had to be linked up in some way, though not as a condition, with navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba, security on the border and Gaza.

5. Malik was brimming over with energy, confidence and good will, and highly complimentary about Canada's recent role in Middle Eastern affairs. He is anxious to visit Ottawa and we should now begin to make arrangements for that purpose.

6. I should have mentioned that in addition to the fear that Nasser's personality and policies aroused in him, he is very alarmed about the situation in Syria. He thinks that is the real focus of danger at the present time. He contrasted the political situation there very unfavourably with that in the Lebanon where the people are, he said, practically all behind the present policy of independence, moderation and accommodation to the greatest possible extent with the west; and even of a political settlement, if the atmosphere could be improved, with Israel.

7. After leaving Malik I spent an hour with Fawzi who was, as usual, very friendly, very plausible and, indeed, reassuring in his own careful and subtle way. I asked him to give me as frankly as possible his views on the two situations which will soon be confronting the Assembly, e.g., Israel's withdrawal and arrangements for the control of the Canal, which, he thinks, will be open for navigation within a month or so.

8. As to the first, he was adamant that the Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory must be unconditional and that they must not be permitted to benefit from their military action. I expressed agreement regarding conditions, but gave my view that withdrawal could not be separated from steps which should be taken for greater border security than had existed, and for freedom of access to the Gulf of Aqaba. Fawzi acknowledged the connection and said that if a withdrawal resolution were accepted by the Assembly this could be done on the understanding that the questions of first, the functioning of a UN force on the borders to prevent incidents, etc; second, freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba; and third, the situation in Gaza, would be discussed immediately afterwards and the Assembly could take any action it wished regarding them. So far as the first was concerned, they welcomed the acceptance by a UN force of certain responsibilities to keep the peace between the contending forces and would not object to a corridor being marked out for UN occupation for that purpose, some part of which, however, would be over the Israeli border. As to the second, the Assembly if it so desired could pass a resolution regarding freedom of navigation and authorize a UN contingent to be stationed at Sharm Al Shaikh or, and this would be in his opinion much preferable, the matter could be referred to the Permanent Court for an advisory opinion on the rights of Israeli shipping, which opinion the Egyptian Government would accept. In any event, he thought that the Gulf of Aqaba should be demilitarized. He stated that in point of fact 95 percent of the Israeli ships that had attempted to use the Suez Canal or the Gulf of Aqaba had done so without interference and that the 5 percent that were stopped were carrying armaments. I have heard this statement before and wonder if it is true. As to Gaza, the UN forces could move to the Israeli border and, indeed, UN officials could

move in along with Egyptian administrative officials as soon as the Israelis had withdrawn, pending a decision by the Assembly on the future status of the strip.

9. Fawzi then went on to discuss a regime of control for the Suez Canal. He did not think that there should be any effort to bring about an interim arrangement but that discussions should begin at once on the initiative of the Secretary General and through his instrumentality with 8 or 9 governments, individually or in small groups, as to what should be done to reconcile Egyptian control of operation with a legitimate international interest in freedom, level of tolls, etc. Fawzi said that the countries which he had in mind were Canada (though he may have mentioned this just to be polite) the U.S.A., U.K., France, USSR, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yugoslavia, India and Norway. He thought that if agreement in principle could be reached within this group, the Secretary General might set up a committee to translate that agreement into an international instrument which could then be submitted to an International Conference. However, pending such arrangements (and this is where the difficulty will occur) ships using the Canal should pay tolls to the Egyptian Company. So far as the Egyptian Government is concerned, they would accept an international arrangement by which their right to increase tolls and charges would be controlled and which would guarantee freedom of passage in an even more effective way than that guaranteed by the 1888 treaty. He said that they would be entirely reasonable in this matter because obviously it was in their interest to be so. After all, the users of the Canal would be their customers and if their customers were not satisfied Egypt would be the first to suffer. He thought that there should be no great difficulty about financing the clearance of the Canal as this could be done by a surcharge on vessels using it until the cost had been paid for.

10. All this sounds very reasonable, if and the "if" of course is overriding, you accept the position that pending the above arrangement the Egyptian Company is permitted to receive tolls. I asked Fawzi whether, in order to avoid this difficulty, there was any possibility, in his view, of an agreement being reached before the Canal was opened. He did not think so, but thought that it should be possible within a short time of that opening.

11. He emphasized to me that the Egyptian Government would be fair and reasonable in all these matters and was even willing to accept some responsibility for the recent unhappy events. He kept on repeating that the important thing now was to look ahead and not behind. Looking ahead, however, he expressed considerable worry about the trend of American policy. He accepted USA objectives and USA intentions, but he felt that Mr. Dulles in his statements before the Congressional Committees was putting those policies forward in terms that would not commend themselves to Arab public opinion in the sense that he was emphasizing too much the idea of a vacuum which had to be filled by somebody, and the "cold war" aspect of future American policy in the Mideast. I confess I found it hard to disagree with some of Fawzi's observations on this matter.

12. I told him before we parted that if an Arab-Asian resolution was put forward tomorrow in the terms of the draft which I had seen we would have to oppose it as we were not willing to penalize Israel for non compliance within 5 days. He assured me that the resolution would certainly be modified and made milder in tone and content. I then begged him to use his influence with the other Arab States so that the Assembly would not be asked to come to a hasty decision on a matter of such importance. Even if they put the resolution forward tomorrow we would need a good many days to consider it and its

implications. Fawzi agreed that there should be no undue haste in this matter. I reminded him that by showing some restraint last Autumn in regard to imposing a time limit on Franco-British withdrawal, that that matter had been satisfactorily settled in a way which would not have been possible otherwise, and I hoped that he and his friends would show the same restraint in regard to a resolution concerning the withdrawal of Israeli forces.

L.B. Pearson

21/1/57
175/11/20
AUSTONAT NEW YORK

REPEATED CROTONATE LONDON (For External)

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

For Spender from Casey.

Although time available to you was limited, I should be glad to know what reactions, if any, there were among other delegations to the suggestions contained in my telegram 38.

2. I am frankly disturbed by the present trend which, apart from reinforcing the double standards now obtaining, can only encourage Nasser in further intransigence, not merely in this context but in other aspects of the Middle East problem including particularly the future of the Canal which directly affects us. I feel, therefore, that it is essential that early action be taken to meet justifiable Israeli apprehensions about Egyptian intentions in the Gulf of Aqaba and Gaza. Our tactics will largely be governed by whether Israel decides to comply within the five-day period with the latest resolution passed by the General Assembly. If she does not comply and her refusal to do so is brought before the General Assembly in the form of a further resolution, I believe that we should be ready to come forward, even if in small company, with a concurrent resolution providing for:

- (a) U.N.E.F. occupation of Gaza and Sharm-El-Sheikh, such occupation to be maintained pending satisfactory settlement of the Gaza problem and a

/ satisfactory

21st January, 1957

satisfactory arrangement to ensure
freedom of passage through the Gulf
of Aqaba;

- (b) The Secretary-General to report on the
future of both areas and to present
proposals in regard to them.

3. I should appreciate your early comments on the above.
-

175/11/20

Unknown

MIDDLE EAST

The situation in the Middle East is still unstable. Before speaking about present problems, I should like to say something about the background to Colonel Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal and the Israeli attack on Egypt. These things have been said before but it may be useful to recall them.

Policies of Egypt

For many years now Egypt has aimed at establishing herself as leader of the Arab world. It is the practice of dictators to slough off domestic problems in favour of external policies, and Colonel Nasser is no exception.

In the foreign field, Egypt found a popular target in Israel. No Arab State, whatever its relation with Colonel Nasser, accepts the existence of Israel; no Arab state has been prepared to query any Egyptian action against Israel, however provocative or unjust. In the result Colonel Nasser was able to build up a substantial reputation for himself in the Arab world - a reputation which lasted until it was pricked by the Israeli attack last October.

Egypt's harassing of Israel took many forms. An economic blockade, in which other Arab states joined, denied Israel the logical and natural market for her exports, reducing still further her viability. Israeli shipping, and shipping bound for

/Israel, was

File

Israel, was prevented from using the Suez Canal; entry to the Gulf of Aqaba, at the head of which lies the Israeli port of Elath, was controlled by Egyptian shore batteries in the Straits of Tiran at the neck of the Gulf; Egyptian fedayeen raids were constantly made into Israeli territory (although it is fair to say that Israeli forces were also guilty of border violations), and incitement given to Jordan to make similar incursions.

This activity by Egypt was maintained despite the Armistice Agreement which ended the Palestine war in 1949. It is interesting to observe that although the present Egyptian position in Gaza rests entirely on this document, Egypt has consistently disregarded it in other respects. Under the Armistice Agreement between Israel and Egypt:-

- (a) both sides undertake to refrain from belligerent acts;
- (b) armistice demarcation lines were laid down;
- (c) Egypt was left in control, but did not acquire sovereignty over Gaza;
- (d) demilitarized zones were created at El Auja and at other points;
- (e) a Mixed Armistice Commission was set up under the chairmanship of the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization.

Russian Policy

In his campaign against Israel, Colonel Nasser has been supported by the Soviet Union. There are in fact two major problems in the Middle East - the Arab-Israeli dispute and, latterly, Russia's attempt to establish herself in the area. The problems are separate in origin and content but the Arab-Israeli dispute serves Russian aims in the sense that it creates regional instability which the Soviet Union can exploit for its own purposes.

Russian motives can be simply stated:

- (a) the traditional objective of Russian policy has been to secure control of the Dardanelles in the West and to extend hegemony as far as the Persian Gulf in the East;
- (b) the establishment of Russian influence in the Middle East would emasculate the Baghdad Pact and threaten the right flank of N.A.T.O.;
- (c) it would suit Russian global policies to develop in the Middle East another area of neutralism, which would be complementary to the area of neutralism which the Soviet Union is hoping to create in South and South East Asia;
- (d) the establishment of Russian influence in the Middle East would threaten the oil reserves upon which Western Europe so vitally depends. In peace time, sixty per cent of Western Europe's oil is drawn from the Middle East;

4/ its dependence

its dependence in time of war would of course be much greater;

- (e) in other ways the Middle East is an area of vital strategic importance which it would suit Russia to control. It is the focal point for communications between Europe and Asia, and between Asia and Africa;
- (f) if established in the Middle East, Russia would be placed in a position of vantage in relation to Africa, whose new political forces are emerging. The dependence of Eastern Europe upon the economic resources of Africa is considerable. In time of war Africa would provide essential defence in depth.

In pursuit of these aims, the Soviet Union began two years ago to mount a diplomatic, propaganda and trade offensive against the Middle East of considerable force and persistence. Particular attention has been given to Egypt, where Colonel Nasser maintains a close working partnership with the Soviet Union, and to Syria, whose politics are dominated by pro-Russian groups and whose policies are in consequence heavily weighted against the West.

The Soviet bloc has arranged substantial arms deals with both Egypt and Syria. | Trade agreements covering capital

5/ goods

XX

goods, and machinery, have been made by Egypt with the Russian satellites. The Soviet Union has offered to build an oil refinery in Syria and offered Egypt technical assistance and materials for the construction of the Aswan High Dam. Last year a Soviet trade mission to Khartoum offered technical aid to the Sudan by way of replacement for British aid. A treaty of friendship has been concluded with Yemen.

How successful has the Soviet Union been in the application of these policies? A balance sheet might be struck as follows:

- XXX
- (a) Russian policies have added to the turmoil of the area, thus sewing the first phase of the Soviet Union's programme;
 - (b) Soviet diplomacy has strengthened its foothold at least in Egypt and Syria; Soviet trade has gained entry into new Middle East markets; Soviet arms and equipment in large quantities have been supplied to some Arab armies and air forces; Soviet technicians and experts are in position at particular points;
 - (c) Soviet encouragement of Colonel Nasser was one factor leading to the collapse of Anglo-French intervention and thereafter to the weakened position of both countries in the Middle East.

greater awareness of
the dangers of international
communism and hence more
6. mistrust of Egypt.

As against this:-

- XXX
- (a) Soviet activity has been met by the Eisenhower Doctrine which commits the formidable strength of American military force to the defence of any country in the Middle East which is threatened by Soviet aggression, direct or indirect, and seeks help;
 - (b) in the face of growing Soviet intrusion, the Baghdad Pact countries which in addition to the United Kingdom comprise Pakistan, Turkey, Iraq and Iran have become more closely integrated and the organization of the pact stepped up.

(c) Saudi Arabia is showing a

Israeli-Egyptian Conflict

The bitter and deep-rooted conflict between Israel and the Arab States has been a great obstacle to stability in the Middle East. Some review of the events leading to the establishment of Israel is essential to a correct analysis of the current problem:-

- (a) In the Balfour Declaration of 1917 the United Kingdom proclaimed its intention of establishing Palestine as a national home for the Jews.
- (b) Subsequently the same principle was incorporated in a mandate over Palestine granted to the United Kingdom by the League of Nations.
- (c) The Arabs allege that the Allies gave them an undertaking

7/ that when liberated

that when liberated from Turkey, Palestine would be incorporated in an independent Arab State.

- (d) When the United Kingdom took over Palestine, it was an under-populated and neglected outpost. From 1920 until 1939 the United Kingdom permitted large-scale Jewish immigration into Palestine despite Arab opposition.
- (e) Following British reference of the Palestine problem to the United Nations, the General Assembly in 1947 adopted a resolution partitioning Palestine into Arab and Jewish states. The Jews were prepared to accept the resolution but the Arabs refused.
- (f) By the time of the withdrawal of British forces in 1948, a full scale war was being waged by Egypt, Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia against Israel. There is no doubt that this was begun by the Arabs in the belief that through the use of force the creation of a Jewish state would be made impossible.
- (g) United Nations efforts led to the negotiation of a truce but not before Israeli forces had occupied territory considerably in excess of that allotted to it under the United Nations partition plan.
- (h) In 1949 the truce was converted into a formal Armistice;
- (i) The Palestine war led to the creation of the Arab refugee problem.

8/ This historical

This historical background explains in part the present-day policies adopted by Israel and the Arab countries, as well as the differences lying behind those policies. These differences have been concerned with the resettlement of Arab refugees, Israel's borders, Arab infiltration into Israel, the Egyptian economic blockade and the status of Jerusalem.

Israel's principal objective has been to convert the Armistice Agreements of 1949 into formal peace treaties. Israel has felt impelled to do this because her only hope of economic viability lies in trade with her neighbours. Israel is not, however, prepared to achieve this end by compromising over the two major demands made by the Arabs:

- (a) withdrawal by Israel to the partition plan frontiers;
- (b) reception into Israel of the Arab refugees.

On the other hand, Arab policy is moved by a deep-seated feeling that Israel's existence is an historical wrong which must be redressed by every means. The Arabs have refused to consider a peace settlement except in the terms already mentioned - terms which if accepted by Israel would in her opinion mean the creation of a worse situation even than the present unsatisfactory one.

When there is added to this basic deadlock the substantial factor of Colonel Nasser's ambitions, the situation can be seen as even more impossible. To Egypt, Israel is a ready-made target, and

9/ nothing has been

nothing has been more calculated to enhance Colonel Nasser's position in the Arab world than his persistent propaganda attacks against Israel, his harnessing of Arab dislike of Israel through diplomatic effort and other means, his establishment of anti-Israeli military alliances, his misuse of the Suez Canal and of the Tiran Straits against Israeli trade, and his guerilla infiltrations into Israeli territory.

Role of the United States

United States concern with the position in the Middle East has now been confirmed in the Eisenhower Doctrine. Beforehand there were several expressions of American interest, notably:-

(i) with respect to Soviet expansionism

- (a) the Middle East Defence Organization proposals of 1951 were a United States initiative. They were rejected by Egypt;
- (b) The Baghdad Pact 1955, comprising Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and the United Kingdom, under which the parties agree to co-operate for their security and defence. This "northern tier" defence system, as Mr Dulles has described it, has been fully supported by the United States although they are not a member government. The United States is, however, a member of the Economic Committee of the Pact and United States

observers attend meetings of the Council.

(ii) with respect to Arab-Israeli problems

- (a) the United States participated with France and the United Kingdom in the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. Under the terms of this declaration the three Governments declared that should they find that either Israel or the Arab States were preparing to violate present Israeli frontiers they would immediately take action within or outside the United Nations to prevent such violation;
- (b) On 26th August, 1955, Mr Dulles made proposals, with which other countries subsequently associated themselves, to deal with the problems of Arab refugees, borders and the sense of insecurity engendered between Israel and her Arab neighbours. In Mr Dulles' view, if agreement could be reached on these three basic problems, it should prove possible to find a solution to other problems which were largely economic. He said that as regards refugees the United States would help financially in their resettlement; under the headings of compensation, water development and irrigation projects, to assist resettlement. He thought that solution of the refugee problem would assist in eliminating recurrent border incidents. As regards security, Mr Dulles said that if other related

11/ problems could be

problems could be solved the United States would join in formal treaty engagements to prevent the forcible alteration of boundaries by either side. As regards borders, Mr Dulles said that in spite of conflicting claims and sentiments it seemed possible to find a way of reconciling the interests of all parties and the United States would be willing to help find a solution.

Israeli and Arab reaction to the Dulles proposals varied. While questioning some of the points raised by Mr Dulles, Mr Ben Gurion expressed willingness to meet Colonel Nasser and other Arab leaders "to achieve a mutual settlement without prior conditions." Arab reactions were hard to pin down. No Arab Government took up a public position against the statement, but the Secretary-General of the Arab League said that no Arab leader with any pride would consent to meet or talk to Mr Ben Gurion.

Israel's Attack on Egypt

It was against this background that Israel launched her attack on Egypt on 29th October, 1956. Israel has been charged with aggression. Technically speaking, this may be correct, but in fairness Israel's action must be considered by reference to the history of her relations with the Arab States

and with Egypt in particular.

The Israeli attack must also be considered by reference to:-

- (a) constant provocation by Egypt which took the forms of propaganda, diplomatic action, economic blockade, economic pressures and constant border raids;
- (b) Egypt's refusal to recognise the existence of Israel and her constantly repeated theme that the Palestine problem can only be solved by the extermination of Israel;
- (c) Egypt's past insistence that the Armistice Agreement of 1949 did not deprive her of belligerent rights against Israel - this notwithstanding that the Armistice Agreement required both sides to abstain from belligerent acts, and notwithstanding that Egypt is now relying on the Armistice Agreement to justify her position in Gaza;
- (d) the organization by Egypt of fedayeen raids into Israel and her incitement to Jordan to organize similar raids;
- (e) Egypt's military alliances in 1955 with Syria and Saudi Arabia, which were directed against Israel and the appointment thereunder of an Egyptian Commander in Chief of the three armies;
- (f) Egypt's arms deal with the Soviet bloc in September, 1955, which upset the arms balance maintained by the three Western powers under the Tripartite Declaration 1950 and gave Egypt marked quantitative and qualitative superiority;

- (g) similar arms deals between the Soviet bloc and Syria, a partner in the Egyptian alliance against Israel and a country whose policies have been only slightly less provocative;
- (h) the increasing disposition on the part of Jordan to become involved in the Egyptian camp, culminating in Jordan's joining the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Arabian alliance and making her forces available to the Egyptian Commander in Chief. General Glubb had been dismissed from Jordan some months previously, and the Anglo-Jordan alliance was thereafter in jeopardy and became progressively weaker. Glubb's removal meant the lifting of restraint on the Jordanese army;
- (i) the cease-fire agreement negotiated by Mr Hammarskjöld in April, 1956, with both Egypt and Israel brought about only a precarious stalemate, and breaches of it by both sides began shortly after the conclusion of it.

Given the historical background and given the development just mentioned, particularly fedayeen raids into Israel from Egyptian positions held in depth, and Jordan's accession to the alliance, Israeli forces launched their penetration into Egypt. No doubt they were encouraged to choose this timing by the posture being adopted by Colonel Nasser in defiance of the Western powers following his unilateral seizure of the Suez Canal.

No doubt reasons for the
14/Israeli attack

Israeli attack are also to be found in the sheer frustration facing the Israeli people, and through them the Israeli Government, after prolonged attempts to gain acceptance by their Arab neighbours and, with it, viability.

Result of the Israeli Action

There is no need to recapitulate the progress of the Israeli advance, nor to describe the Anglo-French intervention. Both subjects have been dealt with in statements made last year by the Prime Minister. What we are now concerned with is the present situation and the future, both with respect to the Israeli-Egyptian problem and the separated problem of the Suez Canal.

Legal Position of Egypt

What might loosely be described as the legal position of Egypt is governed by a number of treaties, agreements, and resolutions all having international force and effect:-

- (a) the Constantinople Convention 1888 provides that the Suez Canal shall be available to the ships of all nations in peace as well as in war without any discrimination. Egypt is bound by this convention and her refusal of passage to Israeli shipping is in breach of it;
- (b) it can be maintained that Egypt is also bound by the Concessions granted during the last century to the Suez Canal Company, all of which have been breached by her

15/ seizure of the

seizure of the Canal;

- (c) Egypt is bound by the Armistice Agreement of 1949 with Israel, a description of which has already been given. This requires her to refrain from belligerency against Israel. Egypt has nevertheless consistently broken the agreement by military raids, by economic blockade and by interference with Israel-bound shipping;
- (d) Egypt is bound by, but has defied, the Security Council resolution of 1951 which confirmed Israel's freedom of passage through the Suez Canal;
- (e) in a formal notification to the United States, made in 1950, Egypt stated that her occupation of islands in the Tiran Straits was not designed for the purpose of obstructing free and innocent passage through those Straits. Nevertheless Egypt did obstruct Israeli shipping and there are reports that she claims to do so in the future. The sovereignty of the islands in question is in doubt.

United Nations Interest

The United Nations was already, before 31st October, heavily involved in the Middle East. It had, ever since it presided over the birth of Israel, a special responsibility in the area. It had evolved a partition plan for Palestine; thereafter when hostilities broke out between Israel and the Arab States over the

proclamation of the State of Israel, it negotiated the Armistice Agreement. Following the Armistice, the Security Council kept constant watch on incidents along Israel's borders with her Arab neighbours. A United Nations Truce Supervision Organization had been established to observe and report on events along those borders. The Secretary-General had visited the area, had discussions with the governments concerned and had recommended measures to lower tension.

For all this tension continued. Egypt remained in violation of the Security Council's resolution of 1951 regarding free passage through the Suez Canal. Egypt blockaded the Gulf of Aqaba against shipping going to Israel. Egypt maintained pressure against Israel in other ways that have been mentioned. Border incidents including raids from Gaza into Israel were frequent. Egypt seized the Canal.

Thus none of the problems which have recently exercised the General Assembly - the Canal, the Straits of Tiran, the Gaza strip, and security along the Egypt-Israel border generally, are new to the United Nations.

United Nations Resolution

Both the Suez Canal problem and the Israeli attack on Egypt have been the subject of a long series of United Nations resolutions, which are best taken chronologically:-

- (a) on 30th October, 1956, the Security Council rejected a United States resolution calling upon Israel and Egypt

17/ to cease fire

to cease fire, and for Israel to withdraw behind the Armistice lines. The veto was applied by United Kingdom and France;

- (b) on 30th October, 1956, the Security Council rejected a Russian resolution calling on Israel and Egypt to cease fire and for Israel to withdraw. The veto was applied by the United Kingdom and France;
- (c) on 31st October, 1956, the Security Council adopted a Yugoslav resolution calling for an emergency special session of the General Assembly,
- (d) on 2nd November, at the instance of the United States, the General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for a cease-fire, withdrawal of forces from Egypt and the speedy re-opening of the Suez Canal;
- (e) on 4th November the General Assembly adopted a Canadian resolution recommending the creation of a United Nations Emergency Force to supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with the resolution of 2nd November;
- (f) an Afro-Asian resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on 4th November. This requested Mr Hammarskjöld to report compliance with the cease-fire;
- (g) on 5th November, at the instance of Canada, Colombia and Norway, the General Assembly adopted a resolution to

18/ implement the

- implement the earlier Canadian resolution on the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force;
- (h) on 7th November, at the instance of Argentina, Burma, Ceylon, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia and Sweden, the General Assembly adopted a resolution approving Mr Hammarskjöld's report on the functions of the United Nations force and requesting immediate organization of it;
 - (i) on 7th November, the General Assembly passed an Afro-Asian resolution calling for immediate withdrawal of forces from Egypt;
 - (j) on 24th November an Afro-Asian resolution was adopted by the General Assembly calling for the immediate withdrawal of forces from Egypt;
 - (k) on 24th November, at the instance of Canada, Colombia, India, Norway, the United States and Yugoslavia, the General Assembly noted Mr Hammarskjöld's views on the presence and functioning of the United Nations Force. The same resolution authorized Mr Hammarskjöld to explore practical arrangements and negotiate agreements so that clearance of the Canal might be speedily undertaken;
 - (l) on 26th November the General Assembly adopted a resolution providing for funds for the United Nations Force. A resolution on this subject was also adopted by the General Assembly on 21st December;

- (m) a resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 19th January noted failure by Israel to withdraw and asked the Secretary-General to report on compliance within five days;
- (n) on 2nd February, at the instance of Brazil, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Norway, the United States and Yugoslavia, the General Assembly required complete withdrawal by Israel, required Israel and Egypt scrupulously to observe the Armistice Agreement of 1949 and -

"considers that after full withdrawal scrupulous maintenance of the Armistice Agreement requires placing of U.N.E.F. on the Egyptian-Israeli armistice line and the implementation of other measures proposed in the Secretary-General's report ... with a view to achieving situations conducive to maintenance of peaceful conditions,

"Requests Secretary-General to consult with both parties."

In the report abovementioned, Mr Hammarskjöld dealt with the placing of the United Nations Force in the Gulf of Aqaba region and in Gaza. Although he drew attention to legal considerations which sprang from the Armistice Agreement, the tenor of his report contemplated the stationing of the United Nations Force at both points.

20/ Effect of these

Effect of these Resolutions

In compliance with these various resolutions:-

- (a) a cease-fire holds;
- (b) Israeli forces have withdrawn from Gaza and the Gulf of Aqaba area;
- (c) the United Nations Force is deployed on the Gulf of Aqaba, and in Gaza;

In disregard of one resolution, Egypt until very recently held up the speedy re-opening of the Canal which the resolution called for.

Weaknesses in United Nations Treatment

Beyond the foregoing it has so far not been possible to secure in the United Nations the agreement which would be necessary to any further progress towards a lasting settlement of the Israeli-Egyptian problem or that of the Suez Canal. The reasons are:-

- (a) inability to find common ground among the members of the United Nations;
- (b) the intractable nature of the Israeli-Arab problem, and the difficulty of solving it by the mere application of votes;
- (c) ~~the veto in the Security Council;~~
- (d) ~~the limitations on the General Assembly's power to enforce solutions.~~

~~This is tantamount to saying that~~ the United Nations can only proceed to the extent to which widespread agreement among its members is possible. In the present instance, many pressures extraneous to the actual issues came into play, and have retarded the early settlement which under a perfect system might have been possible.

The Problems Outstanding

Treatment of the Israeli-Egyptian problem is still deficient in the following respects:-

- (a) the position of U.N.E.F. both in Gaza and in the Gulf of Aqaba regions is tenuous. Egypt holds that the United Nations Force can remain in Egypt only with Egyptian consent. As against this, it can be claimed that the United Nations Force has entered Egyptian territory under the authority of a General Assembly resolution and should remain there until the purposes of that resolution are fulfilled. The maintenance of the United Nations Force in Egypt is one of the assumptions upon which Israel agreed to withdraw her forces.
- (b) there is uncertainty regarding the future administration of Gaza. It is the expectation of United Nations members, and it was an assumption upon which Israel withdrew her forces that the United Nations would exclusively administer Gaza. Egypt has made moves which may mean that she contests

22/ this position

this position, basing her attitude on the fact that the Armistice Agreement left her with control over Gaza.

At the same time Egypt refuses to give any assurance of non-belligerency against Israel - an obligation imposed on her by the same Armistice Agreement;

- (c) future Egyptian intentions in regard to the Straits of Tiran are obscure. Declarations upholding the principle of free passage have been made in the General Assembly by several maritime nations including the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, and these provided one of the assumptions upon which the Israeli-Egyptian forces were withdrawn. Egyptian intentions are, however, obscure and there have been reports from Cairo that Egypt may contest the principle of free passage.

Suez Canal

The problem of the Suez Canal is separate from the broad problem of Israeli-Egyptian relations, although no doubt each problem has its effect on the other, and of course in the forefront of each is the figure of Colonel Nasser.

Unfortunately we have come a long way from the integrated system established for the Canal by the Constantinople Convention 1888 and the Concessions granted during the last century to the Suez Canal Company. The Constantinople Convention remains and is accepted by Egypt but the Concessions, which filled in the skeleton framework of the Convention, were discarded by Colonel Nasser when he seized the Canal. We have also come some distance from the 18-Power proposals which, at the London conference last year, were accepted as providing a suitable basis for a substitute regime. It cannot be said that Colonel Nasser ever showed much readiness to accept the 18-power proposals, and the international system of Canal operation which they contemplated.

Thereafter, expectations regarding future regime of the Canal rested on:-

- (a) the Six Principles adopted by the Security Council on 13th October, 1956. (These provide for free and open transit through the Canal without discrimination; respect for Egyptian sovereignty; insulation of the Canal from national politics; tolls and charges to be fixed by

agreement between Egypt and the users; allocation of a proportion of dues to Canal development; and arbitration of unresolved disputes).

- (b) Correspondence which took place last year between Mr Hammarskjöld and the Egyptian Foreign Minister in regard to implementation of the Six Principles.

The Six Principles, read with the Constantinople Convention, provide rudimentary safeguards for users but despite Mr Hammarskjöld's talks with Dr Fawzi it has been extraordinarily difficult to pin Colonel Nasser down to any defined position. In fact, one of the exasperating features of dealing with Colonel Nasser is the impossibility of getting a clear direct response from him on any issue. Where responses have been unequivocal, they have usually been given obliquely, in some way which enables him to disclaim them if this suits him. Thus it has been difficult to know how far Dr Fawzi would be supported by his Government, how genuinely Colonel Nasser would hold himself committed to the Six Principles and how far even Egypt would in the final analysis respect the Constantinople Convention.

Following withdrawal of the United Kingdom and French forces from Egypt shortly before Christmas, Mr Hammarskjöld made repeated efforts to have discussions commenced on the future of the Canal. The United Kingdom and France have been ready at all times

to resume negotiations with Egypt. Colonel Nasser on the other hand has been quite unco-operative.

Some five weeks ago, in view of the imminence of the re-opening of the Canal, the United Kingdom, the United States, France and Norway proposed to Egypt, through Mr Hammarskjöld, interim arrangements under which the Canal might be re-opened pending a final settlement. These arrangements would provide that:-

- (a) Egypt should operate the Canal in accordance with the Constantinople Convention and the Six Principles;
- (b) dues should be paid to the United Nations or the International Bank as a neutral agent; this agent would pay 50% of the dues to Egypt for operating the Canal and hold 50% of the dues pending a settlement.

Egypt made no formal reply to these proposals. Instead, an Egyptian memorandum was distributed to foreign diplomatic missions in Cairo. This claimed that all tolls must be paid to Egypt or its nominees. Reasonably enough, the distribution of this document caused some disquiet in other capitals including Washington. The actual Egyptian position is being discussed by Mr Hammarskjöld in Cairo at the present time.

Australian Policy

In broad terms Australian policy must work towards lasting and equitable solutions of the basic problems which have caused the upheavals of the past twelve months:-

- (a) This means that the long-standing Arab-Israeli problem must be solved under United Nations auspices. To this end belligerency by either side must be controlled. Raiding by Egypt, Jordan and Syria, and retaliation by Israel must be stopped, whether by U.N.E.F. or other means. Solution of the problem of Palestine refugees must be sought by resettlement and repatriation. Developmental projects, especially irrigation water projects should be undertaken; they will help substantially towards the solution of the refugee problem. Israel's right to free passage through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran must be respected. Israel's existence must be recognised. Egyptian ambitions and Egyptian mischief must be curbed.
- (b) The future of the Suez Canal must be settled on a basis reasonable to both the users and Egypt. Together with the Constantinople Convention 1863, the Six Principles adopted by the Security Council provide a basis. The rights of the international community with respect to this international waterway must be

respected as well as Egypt's special position.

- (c) The long-range problem is that of countering Communist penetration of the Middle East. To this end, the Baghdad Pact should be strengthened in all possible ways, including the accession to it of new members. The Eisenhower Doctrine is a considerable step forward in the common defence against Communism; the Doctrine does not purport to be a comprehensive answer to the many difficulties that beset the Middle East but within the framework of the doctrine action can be taken in both the political and economic fields which should go a long way towards arresting the spread of Soviet power.

Rider "A"

Australian policy has held that it was not sufficient to force Israel to return to the status quo when Egypt was a persistent violator of the Armistice Agreement. We have seen the need for an Egyptian declaration of non-belligerency. We have seen the justice of Israel's claim for security. We have seen the injustice and futility of sanctions. We have supported the establishment of the U.N.E.F. in Gaza, and the Gulf of Aqaba, and the right of free and innocent passage through the Tiran Straits into the Gulf of Aqaba. We have said all these things publicly. Throughout we have observed the Egyptian refusal to disclose its hand and urged the Secretary-General to establish Egyptian intentions. We have counselled Israel to be patient while Egyptian intentions in Gaza are clarified.



COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

A.H. Tange, Esq., C.B.E.

Red arrow pointing up and to the right

Handwritten signature

With
Mr. R. G. Casey's
Compliments

To see and pass to the
Section principally concerned. *plus*

→ M.E.
[Signature]

[Signature]
[Signature]

COMMONWEALTH OFFICES
TREASURY GARDENS
MELBOURNE, C.2

12/2/1957.

175/11/20

PERSONAL

Commonwealth Offices,
Treasury Place,
MELBOURNE, C.2.

12th February, 1956.

Many thanks for your kind note of January 26th which I have just had - with copy of "Arab Independence and Unity".

It is very good of you to have pursued this - and I would be grateful if you would give Nuri my sincere thanks - and reciprocate his kind good wishes.

Yes, even at this distance, I have realised that Nuri - and the King and the Crown Prince - have proved themselves once again good friends and people of character and intelligence. Perhaps you might find some occasion to tell Nuri that my thoughts have been with him a lot in the recent turgid and difficult six months.

R. G. CASEY

His Excellency Sir Michael Wright, KCMG,
Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador to Iraq,
British Embassy,
BAGDAD. IRAQ.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

BAGDAD.

January 26, 1957.

It was a great pleasure to get your letter of January 4. I have told Nuri that I have heard from you. He has asked me to send you his best wishes and remembrances, and at the same time to thank you for the photograph which I passed on to him from you a short time ago.

I send you herewith a copy of the book you mention, with his compliments.

Esther joins in warmest messages to both of you. We have been having a sticky three months here, as you may well imagine. Nuri, and behind him the King and the Crown Prince, have been beyond praise. I only hope that as time goes by we shall all be able to repay even in a small measure something of their courage and loyalty.

Yours,

(Sgd.) Michael Wright

The Right Honourable Richard Casey, P.C., C.H., D.S.O., M.C.,
Minister for External Affairs,
Commonwealth Offices,
Treasury Place,
Melbourne, C.2.,
Australia.



DEPARTMENT OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

20 FEB 1957

175/11/20
CANBERRA

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,
TEL AVIV.

12th February, 1957.

230.18

In reply quote No.....

Memo. No. 55/57

The Secretary,
Dept. of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE

Your Memo. No. 11 of 21st January, 1957
(175/11/20)

With reference to paragraph 2 of your memorandum, you will now have my Memorandum No. 37 of 29th January, the enclosure to which, put out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is to the same effect as paragraph 2 of the Aide-Memoire.

2. It would appear from the enclosure to my Memorandum No. 430 of 19th September, 1955, that the occasion on which the United States Ambassador at Cairo made his enquiries was shortly after the Egyptian occupation of the islands of Tiran and Sanafir.

3. This is all the information which is available here. It is possible that the matter might have been dealt with in a communication from Cairo about that time?

B.C. Ballard

(B.C. Ballard)
Minister.

F

GR

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

File No. 175/11/20

Date 12th February, 1957

SUBJECT

THE EL AUJA DEMILITARIZED ZONE

FOR MR. KEVIN

LOCATION

The El Auja area is a triangle approximately thirty miles south of the Mediterranean on the Israeli side of the border with Egypt. It is strategically important as it is on the main road from Beersheba to Ismailia and also has road links with El Arish and Gaza.

ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

2. The Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement of 1949 provided that the village of El Auja and vicinity shall be demilitarized and both Egyptian and Israeli armed forces shall be excluded therefrom. In addition Egypt was prohibited from maintaining defensive positions closer to El Auja than El Quseima and Abu Aweigela, that is, within approximately five miles of the border, although check points were permitted. The Armistice Agreement also named El Auja as the headquarters of the Mixed Armistice Committee.

ISRAELI DEVELOPMENT

3. In September, 1953, the Israelis established a kibbutz (communal settlement) in the area, and have continued to develop it to the exclusion of the old Bedouin inhabitants. The area is non-viable, proof that the reasons for the establishment of the kibbutz were political and military rather than economic.

EGYPTIAN COMPLAINTS

4. The Egyptians hold that Israeli actions are a breach of that Article of the General Armistice Agreement which provides that neither party should gain political or military advantage under the truce. They have contended that the Israelis have introduced military forces into the area, although until November, 1955, the Israelis claimed that they had only a police force for the protection of the settlement: this claim was probably no more than technically correct.

5. The area has been the scene of frequent border clashes and a major one took place in 1955 after the Egyptians had occupied positions in the demilitarized zone. The Israelis ejected them and in doing so inflicted severe casualties and themselves violated the demarcation line.

6. Since this incident Israeli forces have continued to occupy the demilitarized zone and movements of United Nations military observers in the Zone have been restricted. In addition, Israel has refused to permit meeting of the Mixed Armistice Committee at El Auja.

7. General Burns has protested against these breaches of the General Armistice Agreement, but Israel has adopted the stand (the last approach was made in September, 1956) that she is not bound by Article VIII of the Agreement (which establishes the demilitarized zone) so long as Egypt

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/ did not

Secretary

Minister of
List to sec.

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It would be hard
for Israel to justify
this.

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- 2 -

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did not implement Article I which prohibits all aggressive action by the armed forces of both parties to the Agreement.

8. Israel has, however, recently hinted that she would not oppose the entry of U.N.E.F. into El Auja provided Egypt states her intention not to exercise belligerent rights.

H.D.W.
(H.D. WHITE)

8. The present position regarding El Auja is not clear. In his report of 25th Jan. 4 the Secretary General suggested that implementation of the Armistice Agreement would permit deployment of U.N.E.F. in El Auja. However Israel has since made it clear that she would not permit this.

CONFIDENTIAL

175/11/20/

Role of the United Nations

I should like to end this review of the Middle East with a few words about the role played by United Nations. This might best be described by this series of propositions:-

- (1) If its handling of the Middle East situation is any guide, the General Assembly cannot be counted upon to reach objective and just conclusions on a situation upon which emotional pressures and bloc groupings are brought to bear.
- (2) If the Charter were given honest expression, it would be eminently reasonable that the comity of nations should bring its judgment to bear on any dispute before the United Nations. But the General Assembly too often serves as the vehicle of rivalries and special interests unrelated to the problems before it.
- (3) The General Assembly has shown up other imperfections. The fact that it exists has been seized upon by countries, which would have been powerless without it, as a lever to discipline a small state of whose actions, it might be remarked, the Assembly has been also the prosecutor and judge.
- (4) The so-called uncommitted countries represent an obvious outlet for Russian power politics. The Soviet bloc vote added to their own has made it almost impossible, even after many months, to accomplish much in the way of real settlement.
- (5) The handling of the Middle East situation by General Assembly has removed a curb which might otherwise have impressed Egypt with some sense of responsibility. For as long as they have the backing of a strong partisan element in the General Assembly, for so long will the Egyptian Government be tempted to evade, equivocate, provoke and defy.

July

- (6) The Security Council was intended by the Charter to acknowledge the responsibilities of Great Powers. It was never envisaged that these responsibilities should be submerged in the voting of eighty countries in the General Assembly.
- (7) The temptation must be avoided of believing that taking issues to the United Nations is itself a substantive foreign policy. Likewise the temptation to believe that the United Nations will automatically provide a just and effective solution to situations caused by a country which persistently violates international law and ignores the vital interests of others.
- (8) The Secretary General has had imposed upon him by the General Assembly, the most burdensome responsibilities to which he has sought to bear all his capacities and ability. At the same time we do not believe that the founders of the United Nations Charter contemplated a situation in which the General Assembly would assume legislative functions and impose upon the Secretary General the duty of becoming the executor of them.

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

175/11/20

BH:

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM 0.2051

Sent: 8th February, 1957.
1815

TO:

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

113. RESTRICTED.

Your 380. Palestine Refugees.

We wonder whether the references in the introduction to Agent General's report to helping requite the longing of the refugees for their homeland are wise at this stage. Assembly should not emphasise repatriation at this stage.

2. The Agent General requests direction on certain points (paragraph 105). The activities of the Agency resulted in financial loss last year. Assembly should therefore be cautious about decisions which may increase expenditure. Without financial commitment the delegation may support the Agent General's appeal for funds. Our comments on matters on which the Agent General requests guidance are:-

- (a) Standard of relief services. Agree provided funds available.
- (b) Secondary school students. We doubt wisdom of Agency's expanding educational activities in view of financial limitations.
- (c) Refugee students. Agency cannot cover and in our view should not be called upon to cover full educational costs of refugees.
- (d) Public works in Gaza strip. This proposal may need revision in the light of existing political considerations. The answer is left to your discretion in light of discussions with other delegations.
- (e) Economic development in host countries. Apart from financial objections which are probably decisive proposals appear nebulous.
- (f) Expansion of rolls. Government of Jordan should be urged to co-operate in removal of those who are not eligible. Bona fide Palestine refugees who did not apply for assistance on establishment of U.N.R.W.A. because they had sufficient resources should now be admitted to rolls.

5. We are disturbed by the unsatisfactory relationships between Agency and host governments as revealed in Section III of report. We doubt whether the proposals under paragraph 84 can be followed up.

Min. & Dept. E.A.
" " " Immigration.
P.M.'s.

Cost - £33.10.0.

11th February, 1957.

RESTRICTED

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EAF&ME E AF&ME INF DL C&P MT

F
[Signature]

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

175/11/20

THE MINISTER

Draft reply to Dr. Evatt

..... submitted herewith. I do not think
that you should go beyond a simple
acknowledgment.

PLEASE SEE PAPER
FOR SIGNATURE OR
APPROVAL
B E L O W

hcl
(J.C.G. KEVIN)

7th February, 1957.

Mr Renny

FM

COPY FOR MINISTER'S OFFICE

JCGK/RON

⁸
7th February, 1957

Thank you for your letter of
31st January enclosing copies of telegrams
from and to yourself concerning the Middle
East situation.

• (Sgd.) RGC

The Rt. Hon. H.V. Evatt, Q.C., M.P.,
Leader of the Opposition,
Federal Members' Rooms,
SYDNEY. N.S.W.

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

175/11/20

BGH:AS

0.2280.

Sent: 13th February, 1957.
1745.

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

124. RESTRICTED.

Your 407.

Palestine Refugees.

U.N.R.W.A. is the body best able to provide the necessities of life for the refugees, and it should therefore have Assembly's backing in continued exercise of operational responsibility in host countries.

If, as is probable, funds are not forthcoming for the whole proposed programme, it is for the Director to recommend where economies can be made.

Please consult other delegations, especially United States and United Kingdom on Gaza Strip operations. Our view is that in view of uncertainty of the situation, U.N.R.W.A. should continue such relief activities as it may be able to provide without raising political issues.

MIN&DEPT EA
P.M'S

(Cost £15/-/-)
14th February, 1957.

SEC A/Ss UN ER PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.AF&ME
E AF&ME INF C&P
G

Handwritten signature/initials

LEGATION OF ISRAEL

0573/236



ל י ר ו ת י ש ר א ל

8 February, 1956.

I am most grateful to you for sending me, with your letter of 5 February, the text of your statement of the previous day, in which you comment so pungently yet constructively, upon the two Resolutions adopted in the General Assembly last Saturday concerning the Egypt - Israel issues. It is a grand statement and will do hearts good in Israel: it is a further firmly-administered reminder by yourself, and that is to say by Australia, to the world in general, and to certain jaundiced Member-States of UN in particular, that in our stand there is the truth and reason of bitter experience. I have cabled the substance of it to Jerusalem.

Sir, you are doing famously in showing up Egypt's long-term deceit and disobedience for what they are. I entreat you, in trust and thankfulness, to pursue your staunch and realistic course. And allow me to hope that the directive given to your Delegation for last Saturday's voting in the General Assembly, definitely to resist sanctions upon Israel, will be renewed and reinforced in the contingency of any attempt by the Afro-Asian bloc to move the Assembly to penalise Israel, because it declines to commit national harakiri, with a harshness never once, as you yourself point out, invoked against Egypt.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

For your information.

R. H. Gardner

(R.H. Gardner)
Private Secretary

13.2.57.

Pls file 175/11/20/7
[Signature]

CR



8 February, 1956.

May I add a final word about the stationing of UN contingents within Israel, about which I argued briefly to you on 15 January? This, I believe I can best do by quoting our Prime Minister's reply to a question by The New York Times in regard to the presence of a UN Force in Sharm el Sheikh and in Nitzana, which is, as you know, a highly sensitive demilitarized zone within Israel:

'Israel does not claim rights of belligerency against Egypt. All we ask is that Egypt should leave us in peace. There is no justification in law or fact for stationing such troops in Israel territory, and there are very serious practical objections against it. Israel is a small country, of 8,000 square miles, about the size of Massachusetts. The stationing of foreign forces in any part of our country would be felt everywhere in it. It would be a constant irritant and their presence would be rightly resented - just as it would be in any country in similar circumstances.

As to stationing such a Force at Sharm-el-Sheikh, there is an essential distinction in that it would be separated there by hundreds of kilometres from Egypt's settled areas. But this proposal too would disappear from the agenda if Egypt agrees to end its practice of belligerency. Only let Egypt abandon its policy of belligerency and blockade and there will be no reason for a United Nations Force to remain at Sharm el Sheikh. Egypt could do this by signing an agreement on freedom of passage with Israel and the other States bordering on the Gulf of Aqaba.'

The Right Honourable R.G. Casey, PC, CH, MP,
Minister for External Affairs,
Federal Members Rooms,
MELBOURNE, VICTORIA.

LEGATION OF ISRAEL

0573/236



ל י ר ו ת י ש ר א ל

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(R.H. Gardner)
Private Secretary

13.2.57.

Pls. file 175/11/20/7
[Signature]



צ'רית ישראל

LEGATION OF ISRAEL

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The Right Honourable R.G. Casey, PC, CH, MP,
Minister for External Affairs,
Federal Members Rooms,
MELBOURNE, VICTORIA.

W:MB

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

EA REP.

175/11/10

The ~~Australian High Commission,~~
LONDON.

105

4th February, 1957.

The Australian Mission to the
United Nations,
NEW YORK.

55

The Australian Legation,
TEL AVIV.

16.

Arab Israel Dispute

....

Attached is a copy of a record of
conversation between the Israeli Minister and
Mr. Plimsoll.

(A.P. Renouf)
for the Acting Secretary.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

White *AKW*
CONFIDENTIAL

175/11/20

NOTE FOR FILE

ISRAEL

Sir Percy Spender rang Mr Casey from New York on the morning of 3rd February about the position in the United Nations General Assembly which was discussing the Middle East question. The following is an account of the conversation given to me immediately afterwards by Mr Casey, who said that the line was very bad and that it was therefore impossible to enter into any nuances during his talk with Spender.

2. Spender said that the situation in the Assembly was becoming very confused, with various people popping up and giving their interpretations of the second resolution before the Assembly. Different people were interpreting it in a variety of ways. The Russians were moving that the first resolution be voted on now but not the second.

3. Mr Casey told Sir Percy Spender that he had complete discretion to vote for or against or to abstain but that, whatever he decided to do in view of our relations with our friends, Mr Casey's own inclination was to be on the tough side vis-a-vis Egypt.

4. Mr Casey also asked Sir Percy Spender to send a telegram immediately after the vote giving the lines of a public statement that might be made by him (Mr Casey) here in Australia.

J. Plimsoll
(J. Plimsoll)

JP/JK

3rd February, 1957

Distribution

U.N.
Middle East

Mr. Renan
W.C. 1/2

CONFIDENTIAL

172/11/20

31st January, 1957.

Dear Mr. Dover,

During his visit yesterday, Mr. Nurock asked whether we could return to him the original of the Legation's note on Gaza.

Unfortunately we could not locate it before Mr. Nurock left, but I am now enclosing it with this letter.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely yours,

(D.J. BILLINGTON)

Z. Dover, Esq.,
Legation of Israel,
Room 403,
84 Pitt Street,
SYDNEY. N.S.W.

dated
18/1/57

[Handwritten mark]

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

175/11/20

THE THE MINISTER

In connection with your minute
of 31st January.

PLEASE SEE PAPER
FOR SIGNATURE OR
APPROVAL
B E L O W

(J.C.G.K.)

Ma Kottu

Mr. Kunt ✓
Mr. White & W. Lib. ?

Parliament House,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

5th February, 1957.

Many thanks for your letter of 29th January and for your kindness in arranging for me to receive a copy of Mr. Shumsky's book. I shall read this with interest.

No doubt you will receive through the normal channel a press statement which I made yesterday on latest developments at New York, but for ready reference, you may like to have the enclosed copy.

(Sgd.) R. G. Casey

His Excellency,
Mr. N. Nurock,
Minister for Israel,
84 Pitt Street,
SYDNEY. N.S.W.

Mr Kevin
for draft of reply



COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

J. Plimsoll, Esq. C.B.E.

Seen
Plimsoll
5/2/57

With
Mr. R. G. Casey's
Compliments

I will have to write
back to him on this.
What do you suggest
that I say?

[Signature]

31.1.1957.



LEGATION OF ISRAEL

משרד החוץ
ישראל

29 January, 1956.

Dear Mr. Casey,

I still bear in mind your interest in the communal diversity of Jewry, and so, having noticed the review, in an American magazine, of a new book on that subject: 'The Clash of Cultures in Israel', by Abraham Shumsky, I wrote to the Editor, Dr. Trude Weiss-Rosmarin, whom I know, and she at once sent her personal copy of the book to be presented by me to you with respectful compliments.

It is on its way to you now, under separate cover, and I hope that it will prove informative to you.

The vote on 19 January in the General Assembly came as a shock to me, especially after your wonderful statement on the previous day, of which you so kindly sent me a personal copy: but I hold fast to the belief that, at the crucial ballot, Australia will go on historical record as voting positively against the perpetuation in UN of differential criteria of right and redress as between a blockaded, boycotted and molested Israel and a defiant and vindictive Egypt.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) M. Nurock

The Right Honourable R.G. Casey, CH, PC, MP,
Federal Members Rooms,
Parliament House,
MELBOURNE, VICTORIA.



LEGATION OF ISRAEL

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Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) M. Nurock

The Right Honourable R.G. Casey, CH, PC, MP,
Federal Members Rooms,
Parliament House,
MELBOURNE, VICTORIA.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD TELETYPE MESSAGE.

MESSAGE NUMBER 181

30.1.57

TO MINISTER MELBOURNE

FROM KEVIN CANBERRA

MR NUROCK HAS SENT US THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE:-

BEGINS

I HAVE BEEN REQUESTED BY MR BEN GURION, PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL WHO IS NOW ALSO ACTING AS PRIME MINISTER (PRESUMABLY HE MEANS FOREIGN MINISTER) TO CONVEY TO MR CASEY HIS FRIENDLIEST GREETINGS AND CONGRATULATIONS ON THE OCCASION OF AUSTRALIA DAY 1957. MAY I AT THE SAME TIME EXPRESS MY OWN PERSONAL GOOD WISHES AND APPRECIATION.

ENDS.

2. I SUGGEST WE SEND NUROCK A REPLY ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:-

BEGINS

MR CASEY HAS ASKED ME TO THANK YOU FOR THE AUSTRALIA DAY MESSAGE YOU SENT ON BEHALF OF MR BEN GURION AND TO EXPRESS HIS APPRECIATION OF THE MESSAGE, PARTICULARLY WHEN MR BEN GURION MUST BE PREOCCUPIED WITH THE DIFFICULT TIMES THROUGH WHICH YOUR COUNTRY IS NOW PASSING.

THE MINISTER HAS ALSO ASKED THAT YOU INFORM MR BEN GURION THAT HE RECIPROCATES HIS GREETINGS AS HE DOES YOUR OWN PERSONAL WISHES

ENDS

MESSAGE ENDS

PMCC

McKenay

*Did this for
Did Minister inform*

OK 4/2

RESTRICTED

175/11/20

30th January, 1957

RESTRICTED

24 45
Australian Embassy, The Hague.
Australian Mission to United Nations, New York.

EGYPT-ISRAEL

.....

Forwarded herewith for your information is
a Record of Conversation with Mr. Fack of The Netherlands
Embassy on the above subject.

(A.P. RENOUF)
for Acting Secretary

RESTRICTED

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

File No.....

Date...29th January, 1957.

SUBJECT

U.N.E.F.

FOR THE SECRETARY

COMPOSITION AND STRENGTH

Egypt's view has consistently been that she has at least the right to be consulted about the component contingents of U.N.E.F.

2. The Secretary-General's view is that he can take account of Egypt's attitude but that he is the determining authority. However, he may in practice have given this position away to some extent as he has followed the policy of negotiating with Egypt over each national contingent.

3. Despite objections by some countries on the ground that Egypt should have no say in the composition of U.N.E.F. (e.g. Canada), the Assembly has been content to leave the determination of the composition of U.N.E.F. in the hands of the Secretary-General.

4. The exact strength and composition of U.N.E.F. at the moment is not very clear. As at 29th November the Secretary-General had accepted 4,500 men from eight of the twenty-three Members who had offered contingents. The Secretary-General then expected that by 14th December there would be 4,100 men in Egypt and 300 at Naples.

5. The original target strength of U.N.E.F. was two combat brigades (about 6,000 men) but early in December Burns was reported as favouring a reduction to 4,000 men. Burns was again reported (7th January) as saying U.N.E.F. was almost complete at 4,500 men. We had a report recently saying that the target (we do not know which one) had been reached. However, on 8th January Cordier told the Mission that Nasser "had accepted an addition to the strength of U.N.E.F. - a Brazilian battalion."

6. The principal components of U.N.E.F. seem to be a Yugoslav battalion, an Indian battalion and the Canadian contingent of about 1,000 technical personnel (signals, engineers, transport, air communications and observation.) (Burns never requested Canadian infantry and is reported as unlikely to do so "as the balance of national forces might be disturbed.") Another important component is three companies of Indonesians who should be arriving in Egypt about this time. We have no recent information upon a Pakistan contingent, the contribution of which seems to have dropped out of the picture - at least for the time being.

DISPOSITION OF U.N.E.F.

7. We have no complete picture of the disposition of U.N.E.F. at the present time. All we know is that some components are being used to guard the units of the United Kingdom salvage fleet in Port Said and that the Yugoslav contingent is following the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai.

THE FUTURE

CONFIDENTIAL

THE FUTURE OF U.N.E.F.

8. The future of U.N.E.F. is one of the immediate problems of the moment. Its area of operations and its duration are both involved.

9. U.N.E.F.'s functions as at present defined are:-

"In the General Assembly resolution the terms of reference are, as already stated, "to secure the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms" of the resolution of 2nd November, 1956. This resolution urges that "all parties now involved in hostilities in the area agree to an immediate cease-fire and as part thereof halt the movement of military forces and arms into the area;" and also "urges the parties to the Armistice Agreements promptly to withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines, to desist from raids across the armistice lines into neighbouring territory, and to observe scrupulously the provisions of the Armistice Agreements." These two provisions combined indicate that the functions of the United Nations force would be, when a cease-fire is being established, to enter Egyptian territory with the consent of the Egyptian Government, in order to help maintain quiet during and after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian troops, and to secure compliance with the other terms established in the resolution of 2nd November, 1956. The force obviously should have no rights other than those necessary for the execution of its functions, in co-operating with local authorities. It would be more than an observers' corps, but in no way a military force temporarily controlling the territory in which it is stationed; nor, moreover, should the force have military functions exceeding those necessary to secure peaceful conditions on the assumption that the parties to the conflict take all necessary steps for compliance with the recommendations of the General Assembly. Its functions can, on this basis, be assumed to cover an area extending roughly from the Suez Canal to the armistice demarcation lines, established in the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel."

10. This definition covers the area of operation of U.N.E.F. but does not delimit the area clearly. It does not make clear whether U.N.E.F.'s authorized area of operation includes one of the two parts of Egyptian territory which Israel up to now has said she will not vacate (unconditionally) - the area adjoining the Gulf of Aqaba. It seems a moot question whether this part of Egyptian territory is included or not. The general purpose of U.N.E.F. (to supervise the cessation of hostilities) suggests the Gulf of Aqaba area is covered; however, the area is well distant of the Armistice lines. There is little doubt, on the other hand, that the definition does cover the other area that Israel is retaining at the moment - the Gaza strip.

11. These particular questions of the area of operation of U.N.E.F. will be resolved if the draft resolution upon which the United States, United Kingdom and Canada are now working in New York is adopted. This would specifically authorize the Secretary-General to move U.N.E.F. into the Gulf of Aqaba area and into the Gaza armistice line region (on both sides).

12. There is, however, one difficulty still to be overcome even if the resolution is adopted. That difficulty is that the Secretary-General seems to have inclined to the view in the past and may continue to hold the view that the exact disposition of U.N.E.F. in Egyptian territory is subject to the agreement of Egypt. Thus, the Secretary-General appears to have accepted in the past contentions by Egypt that:-

(a) U.N.E.F. would have no function in Port Said and the Canal area after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian forces;

(Canada agrees with this view but some time ago the Secretary-General seemed to think that a firm base on the Canal was essential.)

(b) the area that U.N.E.F. will occupy on the Armistice Demarcation Line after the withdrawal of Israeli forces would be subject to agreement; and

(c) the question of appropriate staging areas for U.N.E.F. would be subject to agreement.

It may be, therefore, that even if the latest resolution is adopted, Egypt will not agree to the entry of U.N.E.F. into Sharm-el-Sheikh. Politically, however, to take such a step would be a wrong move by Egypt for she would then appear to be obstructing progress by the Assembly. Another complication is that Israel has not agreed - so far - to the entry of U.N.E.F. into her territory.

13. The duration of U.N.E.F. is a question upon which there are few recent developments and which is still "up in the air." Egypt's attitude presumably still remains that as U.N.E.F. entered Egyptian territory with Egypt's consent, U.N.E.F. cannot stay there unless Egypt continues to consent. The Secretary-General's attitude is that U.N.E.F. should not be withdrawn until the Assembly has decided that it has fulfilled its function. This question is complicated by the fact that according to Canada, India and Yugoslavia are prepared to withdraw their contingents on Egypt's request. At the official level, Canada (9th January) was thinking in terms of a further twelve months as the duration of U.N.E.F.

EXPENSES OF U.N.E.F.

14. On 20th December the Fifth Committee of the Assembly decided 57-8 (Soviet) - 9 (United Kingdom, Israel, Egypt) that:-

(a) the expenses of U.N.E.F. up to \$10 million, other than those items furnished free by Members, should be apportioned among Members in accordance with the scale of assessments to the regular budget for 1957;

(b) a committee should be set up to examine the apportionment of the expenses beyond \$10 million.

The members of the committee are:

Canada	Ceylon	Chile
El Salvador	India	Liberia
Sweden	U.S.S.R.	U.S.A.

15. This resolution was a compromise between the views of the Secretary-General and the United States on the one hand (all the expenses should be apportioned in accordance with contributions to the regular budget) and the views of a number of small Members and the U.S.S.R. that some other means of payment should be found (e.g. Israel, the United Kingdom and France should pay.)

16. Apparently the committee set up has not yet met. The Mission reported on 12th January that as it seemed the cost of U.N.E.F. would exceed \$10 before the next regular session of the Assembly, the Secretary-General planned to convene the committee shortly.

TK
(J.C.G. KEVIN)
Assistant Secretary

MR
A.P. Renouf/E.A. & M.E.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

DW:AS

O.1438.

Sent: 29th January, 1957.
1815.

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

81. UNCLASSIFIED.

U.N.E.F.

Please advise present strength, composition
and disposition of U.N.E.F.

2. Has Committee on apportionment of expenses (set
up by Resolution of 21st December) met yet?

MIN&DEPT EA (854/10/13/4/3)
MIN&DEPT DEFENCE
P.M'S

(Cost £2/6/-)
31st January, 1957.

SEC A/Ss L&T(DIV5) UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA
E.AF&ME E AF&ME INF DL MT C&P
G

175/11/20

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

UNCLASSIFIED
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

WW.LMc

0.1390

Sent: 25th January 1957
1130

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

72. UNCLASSIFIED.

Israeli Withdrawal.

Please cable immediately salient features of
Secretary-General's report.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s.

(COST £1.8.0)
29th January, 1957.

SEC A/Ss UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.AF&ME
E AF&ME INF DL INT C&P
G

F
M

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM UNCLASSIFIED

...:VA

O. 1365/66/67/68

Press

Sent: 25th January, 1957
2015

TO:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.....248. (For External).

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.....67. (Pass to Washington 62 and Ottawa 57).

UNCLASSIFIED.

The Minister for External Affairs, Mr. R.G. Casey, made the following statement tonight:

I've had many questions lately about the Israel-Egypt situation. I do not think any quick and easy solution is in sight. It's not one problem, but many problems, some of which are of long standing.

The difficulties include:-

- Arab recognition of Israel as a State.
- The final determination of Israel's borders.
- The problem of refugees from the Palestine war.
- Freedom of passage through the Tiran Straits at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba.
- The future of the Gaza Strip.
- Blockade of Israel.

The overall problem has of course been aggravated by the Suez Canal question which likewise, awaits settlement.

These difficulties have for many years defied all efforts to solve them. The basic obstacle is the traditional dislike and mutual suspicion between Egypt and Israel which recent events have increased.

It seems to me that the only practicable way is to tackle the problem piecemeal and from small beginnings try to reach a final overall settlement. But even before we can make these small beginnings, you have to have a political climate in which Egypt and Israel can learn by experience that it is possible for them to exist side by side in peace -- and that, in fact, there is no other way of existing.

From the reports coming in I see some slight chance of such a climate being created. For example the idea of a demilitarized or buffer zone between Israel and Egypt appears to be gaining some ground. This would prevent raids into one another's territory which in the past have kept the pot on the boil. When there had been no such raids for a few months the atmosphere of tension would be appreciably reduced.

... /2.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

O. 1365/66/67/68

2.

As regards the long-term settlement between Egypt and Israel, one school of thought favours a round table conference between the two countries at which everything is thrown on the table in the hope that a settlement would be reached by a process of give and take. I doubt whether this is a practical proposition given the present tensions and the existing Egyptian and Arab refusal to recognize the very existence of Israel.

If there is to be a piecemeal approach, after a buffer zone is created, Gaza might be taken as the starting point. I choose Gaza only because I believe neither side really wants this small strip of the former mandate of Palestine. The aim of Egypt and of Israel seems to be merely to deny it to the other.

One solution for Gaza which might be examined in some sort of United Nations administration. If a start could be made there, then at the same time, or subsequently, an agreement might be attempted with respect to the rehabilitation and resettlement of the Arab refugees, some 200,000 of whom are in the Gaza Strip.

Two years ago Mr. Dulles suggested an international loan for this purpose to which the United States would be prepared to contribute. Resettlement of the refugees, or some of them, might be linked with the Johnston Plan for irrigating and developing the Jordan Valley, a sort of Tennessee Valley Authority plan for the Jordan River, which separates Israel and Jordan.

As for the Aqaba question, even if a final settlement cannot be reached at this stage, it seems to me that Israel and indeed other states are entitled to guarantees of free passage through the Tiran Straits, which are so important to the Israeli economy and which should not be subject to the control of any one country any more than the Suez Canal should be the subject of any such control. In the final analysis some sort of international regime may have to be established for them.

These small beginnings presuppose some readiness on both sides to entertain the notion of agreement, even within a small compass. First must come the buffer between Egypt and Israel. Perhaps something could be constructed out of the presence of the United Nations emergency force. The effort should be to encourage agreement on the small issues. Then and only then is there likely to be some real prospect of overall settlement.

I strike no note of easy optimism but we cannot be either complacent or inactive. There is a lot of work and thought ahead before peace and quiet in the Middle East can be assured. The responsibility lies not only upon the parties themselves but squarely on the United Nations, which has assumed charge of so many of the basic issues in this troubled area.

As I've said before, it's no use papering over the cracks. There's no statesmanship in the United Nations passing resolutions that take into account only the events of recent months. The Egypt-Israel problem will only be solved by taking into account the events of many years past.

... /3.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM. UNCLASSIFIED

O. 1365/66/67/68

3.

Israel's move into Egypt in October didn't come out of a clear sky. It was a desperate kick-back in retaliation for years of slow-motion physical and economic aggression by Egypt.

In other words, Israel compliance with recent United Nations resolutions to withdraw entirely from Gaza and the Gulf of Aqaba must be accompanied by guarantees that all this won't happen again at some time in the future.

Anything less than this would only mean that we would be back where we were three months ago and that we would have learnt nothing and done nothing to guard against the repetition of past disturbances.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M's.

29th January, 1957.

SEC A/Ss L&T(DIV.5) UN ER CR PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA SA
SEA EAF&ME E AF&ME INF DL C&P MT

G

MR. GOSS



Commonwealth Offices,
Treasury Place,
MELBOURNE. C.2.

24th January, 1957.

Dear Mrs. Keyes,

Thank you for your letter, which I
have just received.

You can imagine that almost my whole
attention, as Minister for External Affairs, has
been devoted to the Suez Canal and the Middle East
generally over the past six months.

I have not seen the "Daily Express"
article you mention - by Mr. Stanley Evans, but I
think my Department and I can claim to be tolerably
well informed on United States policy and objectives
in the Middle East. I do not share your own
appreciation of the motives behind American policy,
but I do agree that, if we are all to survive, the
great English-speaking nations must be and remain
friends.

I am,

Yours sincerely,

R. G. CASEY

(R.G. CASEY)

Mrs. K. Keyes,
81 A Edward Road,
Christchurch, Hants.
England.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs.

For your information.

R. H. Gardner
(R.H. Gardner)
Private Secretary.

24.1.1957.

GR

COPY

81 A Edward Road,
Christchurch, Hants.
England.

Hello down under
Australian Foreign Minister
Mr. Casey.

Dear Sir,

As a very ordinary Briton, and I'm proud of it, I congratulate you on your tireless efforts to find a solution to the Suez crisis, and to encourage Britain and America to pull together.

The fact is we should never have left the Suez on which we've spent millions, to a man like Nasser.

But besides Russia wooing him, the American Republics, have also backed Nasser from the start, which goes back at least 2½ years, that's why he has had so much to say and felt so confident in his every rotten, move.

The American Republic, oil men big business, have put this, before their British friends. I accuse the U.S.A. for the loss of life of the beloved sons of Briton who have and are dying in Egypt and Cyprus.

You can take it from me that the average Briton, and they still have hearts of oak, are for a strong foreign policy, and less of the retreating, before Russian threats and American blackmail.

I have worked in factories in many parts of Britain so I ought to know what the ordinary folks are thinking. By the way I would like you to get a clear picture of what the U.S.A. republican party have done during their reign, who better to tell you than one of our own M.P.'s who resigned his seat because he didn't agree with his party's Suez Policy.

Better still perhaps read the article he wrote in the Daily Express date 27.11.56. Mr. Stanley Evans is the man you ought to speak to he will put you wise to the plot to burst the sterling area wide open. Don't forget, read all about it.

Sincerely,

(Sgd) K. Keyes (Mrs)

MR KEVIN

17/5/11/20

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD TELETYPE MESSAGE.

MESSAGE NO MINS 146 24.1.1957

FOR: MR. WILSON CANBERRA

FROM MISS HAUSER, MELBOURNE

Handwritten signature
24.1.57

Mr Bellin
24.1.57

YOUR 147. YES MINISTER HAS APPROVED DRAFT TELEGRAM TO
SPENDER CONCERNING VOTING ON ISRAEL - TELEPRINTER MESSAGE

141.

MESSAGE ENDS

Handwritten mark

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD TELETYPE MESSAGE.

MESSAGE NUMBER 147 1744 24/1/57

TO: MISS HAUSER, MINISTERS OFFICE, MELBOURNE

FROM: WILSON, E A, CANBERRA

OUR 141.

MR. PLIMSOLL WOULD LIKE TO KNOW URGENTLY IF MINISTER HAS

APPROVED DRAFT TELEGRAM TO SPENDER CONCERNING VOTING ON ISRAEL.

MESSAGE ENDS AS 1745

175/11/20

MINISTER, MELBOURNE

KEVIN, CANBERRA

Following is suggested text:-

BEGINS

I have been giving much thought to the Arab-Israeli situation as it stands today. I do not think the problem is capable of any immediate solution, if only because of the complexity and number of outstanding difficulties between Israel and her Arab neighbours. ^{including Eg. - particularly} These difficulties include:-

- Recognition of Israel ^{as a State} by the Arab countries;
- The final determination of Israel's borders;
- The problem of refugees from the Palestine war;
- Freedom of passage through the Tiran Straits at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba;
- The future of the Gaza strip.

The overall problem has, of course, been aggravated by the Suez Canal question which, likewise, awaits settlement.

~~All~~ These difficulties have for many years defied all efforts made to resolve them. The basic obstacle is the traditional dislike and mutual suspicion which each side feels for the other. This will take ^{TIME} many years to eradicate. We have only to recall the efforts made by the Big Powers in the Middle East over the last few years to realise how involved the situation is and how unwise it would be to expect an early ^{and comprehensive} settlement.

24/1/57

[Handwritten signature]

It seems to me that the only way in which we are going to find a solution is to tackle the problem piecemeal, and from small beginnings move towards a final overall settlement. But even before we can make these small beginnings I think we must try to create a political climate in which these countries of the Middle East can learn by experience that it is possible for them to exist side by side in peace.

From the reports coming in to me I see a slight - a very slight - chance of such a climate being created. ^{For example,} The idea of a cordon sanitaire or buffer zone between Israel and her Arab neighbours, particularly Egypt, appears to be gaining some ground. This would be designed to prevent or hamper raids and incursions into one another's territory. The best prospect, I think, probably lies in letting this idea develop. ~~and all of us should give it every encouragement we can.~~

As regards the long-term settlement between Egypt and Israel, ~~there is~~ one school of thought ~~which~~ favours a round table conference between the two countries at which everything is thrown on to the table and settlement reached by a process of give and take. I doubt whether this is a practical proposition given the present tensions, the immediate background and Arab refusal to recognise the existence of Israel.

/ Another ...

Another school of thought favours the piecemeal approach, tackling each question separately. ~~As I have said I see some merit in this way of tackling the problem for, if agreement can be reached on small beginnings, each side, Israeli and Arab, may gradually feel strong enough, if it wins domestic support for its policy on these small matters, to approach the larger issues.~~

If there is to be a piecemeal approach, after a buffer zone is created, Gaza could possibly be taken as one starting point. I choose Gaza only because I believe neither side really wants this small strip of the former Mandate of Palestine: their aim appears to be merely to deny it to the other side. One solution for Gaza which might be acceptable to both sides is some sort of United Nations administration. If a start could be made there, then at the same time, or subsequently, a package deal might be attempted with respect to the dispersal and settlement of Arab refugees, some 200,000 of whom are in the Gaza strip. ~~Israel and the Arab States might each be asked to absorb a quota of these refugees, perhaps along the lines suggested by Mr. Dulles in August 1955 when he suggested an international loan for this purpose to which the United States would be prepared to contribute. Resettlement of the refugees, or some of~~

/ them

them, might be linked with the Johnston Plan for irrigating and developing the Jordan Valley, a sort of Middle East T.V.A. Plan ~~which~~ *for the Jordan River.* ~~would benefit both Israel and the Arab States, particularly Syria and Jordan.~~

As for the Aqaba question, even if a final settlement cannot be achieved at this stage, it seems to me that Israel, and indeed, other ~~maritime~~ *maritime* States, are entitled to ~~immediate~~ assurances of free ~~which~~ *which* are so important to the Israeli economy and passage through the Tiran Straits/which should not be subject to the control of any one country *any more than the Suez Canal should be subject to its control.*

These small beginnings presuppose some willingness on the part of both sides to entertain the notion of agreement, even within a small compass. ~~This will be politically difficult for the Israeli and Arab Governments alike.~~ *Egypt.* I feel that the first objective must be the buffer zone between Egypt and Israel. Perhaps something could be constructed out of the presence of the U.N.E.F. The effort should be ~~quietly and patiently~~ to encourage agreement on the small issues. Then and only then is there likely to be a real prospect of an overall settlement.

I strike no note of optimism, but I do not think that anybody can afford to be complacent. ~~I am happy to say that some~~

5.
- 4 -

There is a lot of work ahead before tranquility in the Middle East can be assured. The responsibility lies not only upon the parties themselves, but squarely upon the United Nations which has many of the basic issues before it at this moment.

24/1/57

ARTICLE ON SOLUTION OF EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI SITUATION

I have recently been giving some thought as to how we can tackle the Egyptian-Israeli situation as it stands to-day. But let me first say this: I do not think the problem is capable of any immediate solution. It is only one part of the overall Middle East situation which is made up of a number of problems. These include the future of the Suez Canal, recognition of the State of Israel by the Arab countries, the final determination of Israel's borders, the problem of the refugees from the Palestine War, freedom of passage through the Tiran Straits at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, and the future of the Gaza strip. We have only to recall the efforts of the Big Powers over the last few years to realise that here we are faced with a complex problem fed by traditional hatreds and mutual suspicion which it is taking many years to eradicate. Indeed, the problem, as we know it in its modern idiom, goes back further than that to the days of the Balfour Declaration and Lawrence of Arabia.

It seems to me that the only way in which we are going to find a solution is to tackle the problem piecemeal and from small beginnings move towards a final overall settlement. But even before we can make these small beginnings I think we must try to create a political climate in which these countries of the Middle East ^{can} learn by experience that it is possible for them to exist side by side in peace.

From the reports coming in to me I see a slight - a very slight - chance of such a climate being created. The idea of a cordon sanitaire or buffer zone between Israel and her Arab neighbours, particularly Egypt, appears to be gaining some ground. The best prospect, I think, probably lies in letting this idea develop and all of us should give it every encouragement we can.

As regards the long-term settlement between Egypt and Israel, there is one school of thought which favours a round table

conference between the two countries at which everything is thrown in and settlement reached by a process of give and take. I doubt, however, whether this is a practical proposition given the present tensions, the immediate background and Arab refusal to recognise the existence of Israel.

Another school of thought favours the piece-meal approach, tackling each problem separately. As I have said I see some merit in this way of tackling the problem for, if agreement can be reached on small beginnings, each side, Israeli and Arab, may gradually feel strong enough, if it wins domestic support for its policy on these small matters, to approach the larger issues.

If there is to be a piece-meal approach I suggest that Gaza could possibly be taken as a starting point. I choose Gaza only because both sides have said that they do not want this small strip of the former Mandate of Palestine - their aim appears to be merely to deny it to the other side. If we could start there, then we might at the same time, or subsequently, attempt a package deal on the dispersal and settlement of refugees, some 200,000 of whom are in the Gaza strip. It would be my hope that Israel and the Arab States would each agree to absorb a quota, probably along the lines suggested by Mr. Dulles 1

refugees, or some of them, might be linked with the Johnston Plan for developing the Jordan Valley, a sort of Middle East T.V.A. Plan which would benefit both Israel and the Arab States, particularly Syria and Jordan. As for the Aqaba question, it is a more complex problem involving the Arab economic blockade of Israel. A final settlement may have to be deferred to some later stage, until, say, the final overall settlement and a peace treaty between the two sides. What does seem to me necessary is some form of international agreement guaranteeing for all States freedom of passage through the Tiran Straits.

/ Even these

Even these small beginnings presuppose some willingness on the part of both sides to agree and this will be politically difficult for the Israeli and Arab Governments alike. I feel that we must first work for the buffer zone - perhaps we could construct something out of the U.N.E.F. - and then quietly and patiently encourage agreement on the small issues. Then and only then might we attempt the overall settlement. Whilst, therefore, I strike no note of optimism, I do not think we can afford to be complacent. I am happy to say that there is some awareness developping that the United Nations can no longer evade its responsibilities in this unhappy region. But we have a lot of work ahead of us and I would like to see many more countries facing up to their responsibilities in this matter.

24th January, 1957

DRAFT TELEPRINT.

SECRET.

TO: The Minister, Melbourne.

FROM: Plimsoll, Canberra.

telegraphic *has Egypt Israel* *request*
 Your 124 about the article for Geoffrey Tebbutt

~~on how the Egyptian-Israeli situation might be tackled.~~

2. We are inclined to agree that this is not the time publicly to come forward with any long-term ideas for a solution. The position is still too fluid ~~as the~~

following shows
 (3) ~~The~~ *some* idea of a cordon sanitaire appears to be gaining ground. For instance, Nasser is supposed to have told Cordier (U.N. Secretariat) during the latter's visit to Cairo in the first week of January that he (Nasser) would like to see a buffer zone between Israel and Egypt, that he was in no hurry to see U.N.E.F. leave, that he would welcome a period of absence of Israeli-Egyptian tension and that he sees U.N.E.F. as a means of accomplishing this. The U.N. Secretariat draw the conclusion that Nasser would apparently accept a U.N.E.F. zone along the whole frontier. It is doubtful, however, whether Nasser could publicly express such hopes or take the initiative. The best prospects *idea* probably lie in letting the ~~cordon sanitaire~~ develop gradually and not as the result of any cut-and-dried plan, although we should give it every encouragement we can.

between Egypt Israel
 (4) ~~As regards long-term settlement, there are two views. The one, favoured by the Israelis, is that there should be a round table conference at which everything is thrown in and settlement reached by a process of give and take. We see some merit in this idea for it would allow of greater flexibility in negotiation but we do not see that these traditional enemies agreeing to meet, not at least until there has been a considerable period of incidents between them.~~ *between the two countries* *free*

the United States *regards former Middle East settlement, the*
 (5) The other view, which the Americans appear to favour, is the piece-meal approach, tackling each problem separately. *this* It may appear unrealistic to try to treat each

one of whom does not recognize the legal existence of the other

to regard short term adjustments between Egypt & Israel

but doubts whether this is a practicable proposition under present tensions & the immediate background, & Egypt that requires to recognize the existence of Israel

~~facet of the Arab-Israeli problem in isolation but~~ ^{used} the argument ^{can} is that if agreement ^{by this stage} could be reached on small beginnings ^{yet some} each side ^{A Israeli Arab} may gradually feel strong enough, having ^{domestic support} won support on the home front for its policy on these small matters, to approach the larger issues.

6. ^{If there is the present approach, Gaza could be one starting point} A possible programme might be first to approach the Gaza question. Both sides have said that they do not want the Gaza Strip, ^{and this is a starting point} Might we not canvass the idea of creating a trust territory with, say, the United States as the administering authority (this would be a real test of the 'Eisenhower Doctrine' or some European power like Italy). ^{If Gaza could be settled, it might be a package deal on the dispersal and settlement of refugees, both} From here we might lead into a package deal on the dispersal and settlement of refugees, ^{each Arab} a number of countries, including Israel and each of the Arab States, ^{each Arab} agreeing to take a quota. This could ^{should} conceivably be linked with the Jordan Waters Development Scheme (Johnston Plan) which benefits both Israel and at least Syria and Jordan. For Aqaba, ^{are as likely to} it is doubtful whether the Israelis will agree to anything short of an international convention guaranteeing free passage through the Tiran Straits ^{but} but the Egyptians will probably regard this as one of the major issues.

A settlement of the Aqaba question ^{may} may, therefore, have to be deferred to some later stage. ^{In any final settlement}

7. Even these small beginnings presuppose some willingness on the part of both sides to agree and this will be politically difficult for the Israeli and the Arab Governments alike; I think, therefore, we must first work for the buffer zone, building on the beginnings made by U.N.E.F. and then by quiet diplomacy encourage agreement on the small issues before we attempt the overall settlement. For these reasons, we agree that it might not be appropriate at this moment to reveal our thinking ^{to the press}.

DJB.
Middle East Section.
23.1.57.

145/11/20

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

24th January, 1957

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S IDEAS ON THE PROBLEMS OF THE
EGYPT-ISRAEL BORDER AND THE STRAITS OF TIRAN

MR. KEVIN

Reference the attached copy of C.R.O. telegram

W.109.

1. Hammarskjöld's ideas on the problem of the border seem sound and do not call for comment.

2. His ideas on the problem of the Straits are not very clear. The argument apparently is:-

(a) It is doubtful whether the Straits are an international waterway. If U.N.E.F. is sent in, there will presumably be freedom of navigation whether U.N.E.F. is told to secure it or not. This would prejudice the issue; U.N.E.F. could therefore not be used.

(b) U.N.E.F.'s function is to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities; if it is to be used to secure freedom of navigation through the Straits (apparently directly or indirectly), new authority would be needed from the Assembly; this would probably not be granted.

(c) The solution is for Egypt to allow U.N.E.F. to occupy Sharm El Sheikh "as a matter of course."

3. This argument can be demolished by the simple expedient of sending in U.N.E.F. without giving it a mandate to secure freedom of navigation through the Straits and merely as a normal step of carrying out its task of supervising the cessation of hostilities. In fact, U.N.E.F. would then secure freedom of navigation through the Straits, but this would be an incidental (only) effect of carrying out the task given to it by the Assembly and would not prejudice anything. This may be what Hammarskjöld's simplest solution (point (a)) above amounts to, but why then all the prior useless "waffling"?

4. If you agree with the above, a draft telegram to New York is attached for your consideration.

Mr. Rénouf!
Doesn't this cut across
our last telg. to N.Y.?
Is there a mandate for a U.N.E.F.
contingent to occupy a position
100 miles from the boundary as a
matter of course.

(A.P. RENOUF)
E.A. & M.E.

CONFIDENTIAL

*Mr White's position is admittedly vague but
Sharm etc. is a point of belligerency M 25*

AUSTUNAT NEW YORK

REPEATED: AUSTEMBA WASHINGTON

(New York to pass to Washington)

CONFIDENTIAL

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1. C.R.O. advises Secretary-General's tentative ideas on two immediate problems are:

- (a) Egypt/Israel Border. Key to progress would be Israeli agreement that UNEF should be stationed on both sides of Armistice lines. UNEF might occupy Gaza and El Arijah and patrol Armistice line from these bases relieving UNTSO of responsibility in these areas.

- (b) Straits of Tiran. As legal position was dubious UNEF could not be used to support one interpretation of it. In any case New Assembly Resolution would be needed and such Resolution would probably not be carried. Simplest solution would be for Egyptians to accept presence of UNEF in Sharm El Sheikh as matter of course.

2. We have difficulty in making much sense out of Hammarskjöld's argument about the Straits. The argument seems to us to collapse if UNEF occupies Sharm El Sheikh simply pursuant to its mandate of supervising the cessation of hostilities. This would have the effect of securing - temporarily - freedom of navigation of the Straits but only incidentally and without prejudice to a determination of the legal issue.

CONFIDENTIAL

24th January, 1957.

CONFIDENTIAL:

ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

Text of Commonwealth Relations Office telegram Circular W.109 dated 21st. January, 1957.

My telegram Circular W.95.

Hammaraskjolds tentative ideas on two immediate problems are :

- (A) Egypt/Israel Border. Key to progress would be Israeli agreement that UNEF should be stationed on both sides of Armistice line. UNEF might occupy Gaze and El Arija and patrol Armistice line from these bases relieving UNTSO of responsibility in these areas.
- (B) Straits of Tiran. As legal position was dubious UNEF could not be used to support one interpretation of it. In any case New Assembly Resolution would be needed and such Resolution would probably not be carried. Simplest solution would be for Egyptians to accept presence of UNEF in Sharm El Sheikh as matter of course.

17/5/11/20.

Mr. Kinn

This is the full text of the news item as received by the A.B.C. Only the redelivered portion was actually broadcast:-

"In the United Nations Political Committee yesterday, Iraq suggested that Israel be offered the protection of United Nations armed forces pending an overall solution ~~in the Middle East~~ to the Palestine problem.

The Iraq delegate called upon the Western powers to stop sending arms and aid to Israel in order to avoid further conflagration in the Middle East.

He said that Israel's arms made her invade Egypt."

.....

A.B.C. will not disclose source of message.

L. & C. King
L.H.
23.1.57

Mr. Kinn

→ Mr. Kington

File No. 175/11/20EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

T elephone
Record of Conversation with Mrs. Robey (?), Secretary of the Australian Council
on 23rd January, 1957. of Jewry.
Officers Present Mr. Sellars

MAIN SUBJECT(S):

Mrs. Robey rang to say that the Council intended to send an appeal through the American Embassy in Canberra to President Eisenhower to assist Israel in its present position. She wished to know whether such an approach should be forwarded through the Department. I informed Mrs. Robey that communications between the Department and foreign missions were concerned only with official matters and that the message which the Council had in mind could not appropriately be sent through the Department. The Council will presumably send any communication direct to the Embassy.

DISTRIBUTION :

Minister. A/S G.R.
Secretary. A/S Admin.
A/S U.N. L. & T. Div.

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U.N. Branch.
E.R. Branch.

E. & T.A. Br.
C. & P. Br.
C'wealth. Rels.

Admin. Branch.
Antarctic Div.
Melbourne Office.
Sydney Office.

FOLLOWING POST(S):Report prepared by Mr. SellarsACTION :

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD TELETYPE MESSAGE

MESSAGE NO 124

22.1.57

TO MR PLIMSOLL EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CANBERRA
FROM MINISTER MELBOURNE

GEOFFREY TEBBUTT (MELBOURNE HERALD) ASKED

ED ME IF I

WOULD LIKE TO DO A SHORT ARTICLE INCORPORATING ANY IDEAS WE HAVE ABOUT HOW THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI SITUATION MIGHT BE TACKLED. I TOLD HIM PRIVATELY THAT I DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE TIME WAS APPROPRIATE TO VENTILATE ANY POSITIVE IDEAS. A CORDON SAINTAIRE OR DEMILITARISED ZONE AROUND THE ISRAELI BORDERS, POLICED OR OCCUPIED BY UNEF, MIGHT BE A GUARANTEE AGAINST RAIDING OR AGGRESSION IF THIS WERE TO BE MAINTAINED FOR SAY SIX MONTHS, THE PRESENT HIGH STATE OF TENSION MIGHT DIE DOWN. HOWEVER THIS WOULD NOT SOLVE THE EXISTING AND FORMIDABLE PROBLEMS OF THE FUTURE OF THE GAZA AND OF THE AKABA GULF.

I'D BE GLAD TO KNOW IF YOU THINK WE HAVE SUFFICIENT ARGUMENT OF A POSITIVE NATURE TO COBBLE TOGETHER INTO SOMETHING WORTH SAYING, BEARING IN MIND WHAT SPENDER AND/OR WALKER HAVE SAID (AND HOW WE HAVE VOY

TED

XXX

XXXXXXXXXX HAVE VOTED) IN 7

XX

HOW WE HAVE VOTED) IN U.N.

MESSAGE ENDS

Mr Kevin

DJB/VMH

175/11/20

67

22nd January, 1957.

External Affairs Office,
Australia House,
LONDON. U.K.

Tiran Islands

We would be grateful for any background information you can obtain about Tiran and Sinafir Islands at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, including size, what country claims sovereign rights over them and the basis of its claim.

(A.P. Renouf)
for the Acting Secretary.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

175/11/20.

HMC:HP

O.1010-14

Sent: 21st January, 1957.
1810

TO:

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.....46. (New York pass to Washington
 and Ottawa).

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.....49.

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA.....33.

REPEATED TO:

Australian High Commission,
L O N D O N.....177. (For External).

Australian High Commission,
WELLINGTON.....13.

SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

For Spender from Casey.

I am frankly disturbed by the present trend which is encouraging Nasser in further intransigence in all aspects of the Middle East problem including the future of the Canal which directly affects us. Danger is that very soon we may be back where we were without any advantage having been gained by presence of United Nations forces. Up to now Nasser has made no commitments.

2. I feel, therefore, that early action needs to be taken to meet justifiable Israeli apprehensions about Egyptian intentions in the Gulf of Aqaba and Gaza. Our tactics will largely be governed by whether Israel decides to comply within the five-day period with the latest resolution passed by the General Assembly, also by form of report made by Secretary-General. If Israel does not comply and her refusal to do so is brought before the General Assembly in the form of a further resolution, I believe that we should be ready to come forward, even if in small company, with a concurrent resolution. Such a resolution might provide for:

- (a) Prompt U.N.E.F. occupation of Gaza and Sharm-El-Sheikh, such occupation to be maintained pending satisfactory settlement of the Gaza problem and a satisfactory arrangement to ensure freedom of passage through the Gulf of Aqaba;
- (b) some United Nations machinery to present proposals regarding the future of both areas.

3. I should appreciate your early comment on the above and also on any reactions you found on my telegram No.38.

9-----

Min. & Dept. External Affairs.
 " " " Defence. P.M.'s.

Cost - £60.4.2.
 22nd January, 1957.

SECRET

SEC A/Ss UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.AF&ME E AF&ME INF
 DL C&P
 G

Mr. Halliday room 7
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

145/11/20

OUTWARD SAVINGRAM. 0.958

Sent: 21st January, 1957
0900

TO:-

All Posts.

SAVINGRAM. GUIDANCE NO. 3. CONFIDENTIAL.

Australian Contribution towards cost of clearing Suez

Canal.

The Government has decided to make available to the United Nations a loan of one million dollars in convertible currency towards the initial expenses of clearing the Suez Canal. Following is background:

Cost of Clearance:

2. The United Nations is working on the estimate that the total cost of clearance will be between 25 million and 30 million dollars. This estimate covers the cost of removing obstructions, restoring electrical, lighting and communication systems, partial repair of workshops and replacement of some other Canal equipment.

United Nations Resolutions:

3. The General Assembly's resolution of 2nd November, 1956, urged that steps be taken to reopen the Canal. A further resolution of 24th November authorised the Secretary-General to "proceed with the exploration of practical arrangements and the negotiation of agreement so that clearing operations may speedily and effectively be undertaken".

4. Acting on this authority, the Secretary-General has let contracts to a number of private firms to assist in clearing the Canal. However, he has yet to give the General Assembly his estimate of the total cost and to indicate how he proposes the cost should be shared.

Request for Temporary Finance:

5. McCloy (Chase-Manhattan Bank) who is assisting Hammarskjöld on financial matters connected with the Suez Canal, recently approached nine countries, including Australia, for contributions by way of loan before 1st January, 1957, to an emergency fund of between 10 and 15 million dollars to enable the United Nations to make initial payments to contractors engaged on initial clearance. The United States was asked for a contribution of between three and five million dollars, Canada for one to two million dollars, Australia, Denmark, Italy, Norway, Netherlands, Sweden and West Germany for one million dollars each. (The United Kingdom, France, Egypt and Russia were not asked to contribute.)

6. Under McCloy's scheme, any moneys contributed to the emergency fund are to be without prejudice to the nature and extent of the lending Government's participation in the final overall financial settlement yet to be worked out and agreed upon, presumably by the United Nations. An agency agreement has been worked out between the International Bank and the United Nations under which the Bank will receive contributions and will pay out sums against

CONFIDENTIAL

F
145/11/20

-2- 0.958

OUTWARD SAVINGRAM.

certificates from Hammarskjöld that the monies have been expended to enable the Canal to be re-opened to traffic.

7. Formal confirmation of McCloy's approach was made on 27th December by Hammarskjöld in a Note sent to all members of the United Nations in which he asked for advances to the emergency fund. Our advice is that this note was designed largely as a cover for McCloy's approach.

Response of other countries:

8. It now seems fairly certain that all nine countries approached by McCloy will be making some contribution. The United States have already paid 5 million dollars into the emergency fund and Canada, Norway, Western Germany and The Netherlands have each decided to contribute one million dollars. There are also indications that contributions will be forthcoming from Sweden, Denmark and Italy. The conditions on which they will do so vary. In addition to the countries approached by McCloy, Ceylon has offered and the Secretary-General has agreed to accept, an advance in Egyptian currency the amount of which has not been specified but which is expected to be small.

9. The United States made their contribution on the following understandings:-

- (i) that the maximum number of countries should contribute;
- (ii) that their contribution should be regarded as an advance and not as a grant;
- (iii) that the International Bank should act as fiscal agent for the United Nations;
- (iv) that the Secretary-General should use his best efforts to obtain assurances from the United Kingdom, France and Egypt of full cooperation in clearance, in working for an ultimate Suez Canal settlement and in undertaking interim negotiations on the basis of the six principles endorsed by the Security Council.

Long Term Finance of Canal Clearance.

10. It is being generally recognised that McCloy's scheme will have to be absorbed in the long-term arrangements for meeting the cost of rehabilitating the Canal. The United States, for instance, have paid their advance to the Emergency Fund on the understanding that repayment shall be included in the overall financial arrangements.

Australian Contribution:

11. The Australian Government informed the Secretary-General on 17th January that Australia is prepared to make available in convertible currency a loan of one million dollars. In making this offer to the Secretary-General, the following points have been stressed:-

- (a) this contribution is a loan to the United Nations to help the Secretary-General meet immediate commitments to the contractors already engaged in Canal clearance;
- (b) the loan is to be repaid by the United Nations;
- (c) the loan does not in itself commit Australia to any further advances;

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

OUTWARD SAVINGRAM.

- (d) the loan does not carry any implication that Australia accepts any obligation to share in the final allocation of the cost of making good the damage done by Egypt;
- (e) should any Australian contribution be made to the final and overall cost of clearing and rehabilitating the Canal, this present loan will be offset against it;
- (f) the loan is being made on our understanding which has been expressed to Hammarskjöld:
- (i) that negotiations for a Suez Canal settlement will be undertaken without delay with the United Kingdom, France and Egypt;
 - (ii) that the provisions of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 particularly those relating to freedom of passage of all countries without discrimination, will be strictly observed when the Canal cleared, and that assurances shall meanwhile be given to this effect.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
TREASURER & TREASURY
MIN. & DEPT. TRADE (C)
P.M.'S.

21st January, 1957.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

175/11/20

21st January, 1957

CONFIDENTIAL

Sent to:

New York 28
Washington 57
London 54
Tel Aviv //

ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE

....

Attached is a copy of a letter to the Minister from the Israeli Minister and of the accompanying Aide Memoire. Also attached is a copy of the record of the Minister's conversation with Mr. Nurock.

2. We should be glad of any information you can obtain relating to para. 2 of the Aide Memoire, that is, the Egyptian affirmation of freedom of passage in the Gulf of Aqaba made on 28th January, 1950.

(H.D. WHITE)
for Acting Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

JP/SCB

CONFIDENTIAL

175/11/20

21st January, 1957


Memo. No. ¹²

The Australian Legation,
TEL AVIV

ISRAEL

....

Attached for your information is a record of a conversation on 18th January, 1957 between the Israeli Minister and the Acting Secretary of the Department of External Affairs.


(J. Plimsoll)
Acting Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

175/1420

AUSTUNAT NEW YORK (DRAFT)

REPEATED CROTONATE LONDON (For External)

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

For Spender from Casey.

Although time available to you was limited, I should be glad to know what reactions, if any, there were among other delegations to the suggestions contained in my telegram 38.

2. I am frankly disturbed by the present trend which, apart from reinforcing the double standards now obtaining, can only encourage Nasser in further intransigence, not merely in this context but in other aspects of the Middle East problem including particularly the future of the Canal which directly affects us. I feel, therefore, that it is essential that early action be taken to meet justifiable Israeli apprehensions about Egyptian intentions in the Gulf of Aqaba and Gaza. Our tactics will largely be governed by whether Israel decides to comply within the five-day period with the latest resolution passed by the General Assembly. If she does not comply and her refusal to do so is brought before the General Assembly in the form of a further resolution, I believe that we should be ready to come forward, even if in small company, with a concurrent resolution providing for:

- (a) U.N.E.F. occupation of Gaza and Sharm-El-Sheikh, such occupation to be maintained pending satisfactory settlement of the Gaza problem and a

/ satisfactory

21st January, 1957

11

satisfactory arrangement to ensure
freedom of passage through the Gulf
of Aqaba;

- (b) The Secretary-General to report on the
future of both areas and to present
proposals in regard to them.

3. I should appreciate your early comments on the above.

175/11/20

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.Record of Conversation with the Israeli Minister (Mr. Nurock)on 18th January, 1957Officers Present Acting Secretary (Mr. Plimsoll)MAIN SUBJECT(S):ISRAEL

1. Mr. Nurock called on me to make some representations about the handling in the United Nations General Assembly of the question of the withdrawal of Israeli forces. He left with me two aides memoire covering, among other things, the Gulf of Aqaba and the Gaza strip.

2. I gave Mr. Nurock a copy of Mr. Casey's press release of today - "Israel Entitled to U.N. Assurances". I told him also that Spender had been instructed to try and avoid the debate or the vote in the General Assembly from becoming a straight-out one of whether Israeli forces should withdraw. Spender had been asked to try and inject into the debate other questions such as freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba and the checking of raids across the border between Israel and Egypt. He was asked to see whether further discussion in the United Nations could be moved from the Plenary to the First Committee where there would be more time and a better atmosphere for seeking a constructive approach. Mr. Nurock professed to be well satisfied with this.

DISTRIBUTION:

* Atg. Minister.
Secretary.
A/S U.N.

A/S G.R.
* A/S Adm. (4)
L. & T. Div.

Central Br.
Pacific Br.
Western Br.

* EAME Bch.
D.L. & P.I. Br.
* U.N. Branch.
E.R. Branch.

* Inf. Bch.
E. & T.A. Br.
C. & P. Br.
C'wealth. Rels.

Admin. Branch.
Antarctic Div.
Melbourne Office.
Sydney Office.

FOLLOWING POST(S):


Tel Aviv

Report prepared by (J. Plimsoll)ACTION:

→ Mr White
F. Plimsoll

Mr. Billington

FOR THE PRESS



175/11/20
163/4/7/3/3

42.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CANBERRA.

PR 17.

18th January, 1957.

ISRAEL ENTITLED TO U.N. ASSURANCES

The following statement on the Middle East situation was issued to-day by the Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Casey:

The Middle East situation is by no means solved. The Egypt-Israel matter is again being debated in the United Nations.

Whilst neither party is without guilt, Israel has suffered very much more over the years at the hands of Egypt than Egypt at the hands of Israel.

The events of the last few months cannot, in fairness, be treated in isolation. It should be remembered that, in defiance of the will of the United Nations, Egypt has persistently declared publicly that the State of Israel must be destroyed and has done everything possible to this end for many years.

The State of Israel was created by resolution of the United Nations on 29th November, 1947. Egypt has conducted commando raids into Israel for years, killing many Israeli civilians. She has also denied Israel the use of the Suez Canal in the face of the United Nations Resolution directing that Israel should have the same use of the Canal as all countries are entitled to under the 1888 Convention.

Egypt now poses as the injured party - whereas she has defied the expressed will of the world for many years. All that Israel seeks is that the United Nations shall create conditions under which Egypt will not be able to harm and to harry Israel in the future as she has done in the past.

/ In discussing

In discussing the situation, it is to be hoped that the United Nations will keep in mind the events of recent years and not only of recent months. There should be hindsight as well as foresight.

A major problem is posed by the fact that Israel still has some forces in the Sinai Peninsula. While Israel is required by the United Nations General Assembly's resolution of 2nd November, 1956, to withdraw these forces, she has understandable apprehensions about Egyptian intentions.

For example, Egypt has used islands in the Gulf of Aqaba and a fortress on the Egyptian coast to block the passage of Israeli shipping up that Gulf. The Israeli port of Elath, which is at the head of the Gulf, is of considerable importance to Israel.

It is reasonable for Israel to expect the United Nations to provide assurances that after Israeli forces withdraw the Egyptian will not be left by the United Nations to resume a blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba in violation of international practice.

Israel is also entitled to some firm assurances that Egypt will not resume raids across the border between the two countries.

/ The other

The other big current problem in the Middle East is that of clearing the Suez Canal. The starting of this essential task was delayed by set purpose by Egypt for over a month, at vast cost to the trading nations of the world. Now a start has been made, to which Australia is to contribute one million dollars.

The latest indication is that a channel will be cleared by early March, which will allow the passage through the Canal of ships of up to 10,000 tons. To achieve this, some of the wrecks will have to be no more than pushed aside and will have to be properly cleared later. A lot of work remains to be done before larger ships can get through, and this task may not be completed by May.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

175/11/20

FEL:AS

P R E S S

0.897-902

Sent: 18th January, 1957.
1420

TO:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.....163.
(Pass airmail to European Posts)

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.....39.

(Pass to:
Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.....43).

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA.....31.

Australian Legation,
TEL AVIV.....10.

Australian High Commission,
WELLINGTON.....12.

U N C L A S S I F I E D.

Israel Entitled to U.N. Assurances.

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"The Middle East situation is by no means solved. The Egypt-Israel matter is again being debated in the United Nations."

"Whilst neither party is without guilt, Israel has suffered very much more over the years at the hands of Egypt than Egypt at the hands of Israel."

"The events of the last few months cannot, in fairness, be treated in isolation. It should be remembered that, in defiance of the will of the United Nations, Egypt has persistently declared publicly that the State of Israel must be destroyed and has done everything possible to this end for many years."

"The State of Israel was created by resolution of the United Nations on 29th November, 1947. Egypt has conducted commando raids into Israel for years, killing many Israeli civilians. She has also denied Israel the use of the Suez Canal in the face of the United Nations Resolution directing that Israel should have the same use of the Canal as all countries are entitled to under the 1888 Convention."

"Egypt now poses as the injured party - whereas she has defied the expressed will of the world for many years. All that Israel seeks is that the United Nations shall create conditions under which Egypt will not be able to harm and to harry Israel in the future as she has done in the past."

175

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

-2-

O.897-902

"In discussing the situation, it is to be hoped that the United Nations will keep in mind the events of recent years and not only of recent months. There should be hindsight as well as foresight.

"A major problem is posed by the fact that Israel still has some forces in the Sinai Peninsula. While Israel is required by the United Nations General Assembly's resolution of 2nd November, 1956, to withdraw these forces, she has understandable apprehensions about Egyptian intentions.

"For example, Egypt has used islands in the Gulf of Aqaba and a fortress on the Egyptian coast to block the passage of Israeli shipping up that Gulf. The Israeli port of Elath, which is at the head of the Gulf, is of considerable importance to Israel.

"It is reasonable for Israel to expect the United Nations to provide assurances that after Israeli forces withdraw the Egyptians will not be left by the United Nations to resume a blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba in violation of international practice.

"Israel is also entitled to some firm assurances that Egypt will not resume raids across the border between the two countries.

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MIN&DEPT EA
P.M'S

21st January, 1957.
(Cost £23/9/7)

SEC	A/Ss	L&T(DIV5)	UN	ER	CR	PAC&AM	AM&SP	S&SEA
SA	SEA	E.AF&ME	AF&ME	INF	DL	C&P	MT	

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

175/11/20

HP:ABK.

0.852/3.

Sent: 17th January, 1957.
2135.

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK....38.

REPEATED:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON...159. (For External).

SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

For Spender from Casey.

If vote is taken on Afro-Asian Resolution calling for Israeli withdrawal, we would not want to be alone with Israel, or in a very small minority, in opposing. Best tactic seems to be to avoid outright vote by having an amendment introduced. We would like you to explore possibilities of this. For example, using Secretary-General's latest report as justification, amendment could call for machinery to be established to work out arrangements to guarantee free passage in gulf of Aqaba and perhaps also to create a demilitarised zone. We could join some other countries in sponsoring such an amendment. Would it be possible to have plenary refer whole question of Israeli withdrawal and guarantees etc to First Committee where there would be more time and better atmosphere to make constructive approach.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M.'S.

18th January, 1957.

SEC A/Ss I&T(DIV.5) UN@ CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.AF&ME
E AF&ME INF DL C&P MT.
G.

SECRET

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

DEPARTMENT OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1957/1/20

18 JAN 1957

Min. DOBSON
(Mr. Desmond)

For your information.

Parliament House,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

16th January, 1957.

My dear Senator,

In reply to your enquiry of the 4th January concerning the Suez situation, the August, September, October, November and December issues of "Current Notes on International Affairs" contain a considerable amount of chronological data concerning this dispute. In this respect you will find particularly useful the Middle East section of the Diary of Events in each issue of "Current Notes" and the special documentary sections on the Middle East in each of the above-mentioned issues. (The December issue is not out yet, but will be with the printer within a week).

I am forwarding the following texts:-

Statement in House of Commons by the United Kingdom Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, 30th October, 1956.

Statement in the House of Commons by the United Kingdom Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, 1st November, 1956.

Extracts from a Broadcast to the Nation by the United Kingdom Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, 3rd November, 1956. (See also "Current Notes" Vol.27 No.11).

Statement in the House of Commons by the United Kingdom Foreign Minister, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, 5th November, 1956.

Statement in the House of Representatives by the Prime Minister, Mr. R.G. Menzies, 8th November, 1956. (See also "Current Notes" Vol.27 No.11).

The texts of the United States statements made before the United Nations which you have requested will be forwarded to you direct as soon as copies are available.

The footnote to your letter raised a complex series of questions, some of which you will find answered, at least in part, in the documents enclosed.

I am,

Yours sincerely,

R. G. CASEY
(R.G. CASEY).

OR
Senator R.C. Wright.

INWARD TELETYPE MESSAGE.

MESSAGE NO 93

18.1.57

TO MR PLIMSOLL EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CANBERRA
FROM MR CASEY MELBOURNE

YOUR TELETYPE NO.78 OF YESTERDAY WAS NOT QUITE WHAT I HAD IN MIND. I HAVE HURRIEDLY DICTATED THE FOLLOWING WHICH I HAVE NOT CHECKED IN TYPE. I WILL DISCUSS WITH YOU ON TELEPHONE LATER THIS MORNING.

2.

DRAFT IS AS FOLLOWS:

*Mr Casey said today that*THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION ^{was} ~~is~~ BY NO MEANS SOLVED.

THE EGYPT-ISRAEL MATTER IS AGAIN BEING DEBATED IN THE UNITED NATIONS. WHILST NEITHER PARTY IS WITHOUT GUILT, ISRAEL HAS SUFFERED VERY MUCH MORE OVER THE YEARS AT THE HANDS OF EGYPT THAN EGYPT AT THE HANDS OF ISRAEL. THE EVENTS OF THE LAST FEW MONTHS CANNOT, WITH FAIRNESS, BE TREATED ^{as} ~~with~~ ISOLATION. IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT, IN DEFIANCE OF THE WILL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, EGYPT HAS PERSISTENTLY DECLARED PUBLICLY THAT THE STATE OF ISRAEL MUST BE DESTROYED AND HAS DONE EVERYTHING POSSIBLE ^{to} ~~at~~ THIS END FOR MANY YEARS. THE STATE OF ISRAEL WAS CREATED BY RESOLUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN *29th Nov, 1947*. EGYPT HAS CONDUCTED COMMANDO RAIDS INTO ISRAEL FOR YEARS, KILLING ^{many} MANY ISRAELI CIVILIANS. SHE HAS ALSO DENIED ISRAEL THE USE OF THE SUEZ CANAL IN THE FACE OF THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION DIRECTING THAT ISRAEL SHOULD HAVE THE SAME USE OF THE CANAL AS ALL COUNTRIES ARE ENTITLED TO UNDER THE 1888 CONVENTION.

[Mr Casey went on to say that Egypt now~~NOW ISRAEL~~ POSES AS THE INJURED PARTY- WHEREAS SHE

HAS DEFIED THE EXPRESSED WILL OF THE WORLD FOR MANY YEARS. ALL THAT ISRAEL SEEKS IS THAT THE UNITED NATIONS SHALL CREATE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH EGYPT WILL NOT BE ABLE TO HARM AND TO HARRY ISRAEL IN THE FUTURE *as she has done in the past.*

IN DISCUSSING THE SITUATION, IT IS TO BE HOPED THAT THE UNITED NATIONS WILL KEEP IN MIND THE EVENTS OF RECENT YEARS AND NOT ONLY OF RECENT MONTHS. *There should be hindsight as well as foresight.*

→ [^A

THE OTHER BIG CURRENT PROBLEM IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS THAT OF CLEARING THE SUEZ CANAL. THE STARTING OF THIS ESSENTIAL TASK WAS DELAYED BY SET PURPOSE ^{by} ~~of~~ EGYPT FOR OVER A MONTH, AT VAST COST TO THE TRADING NATIONS OF THE WORLD. NOW A START IS BEING MADE, TO WHICH AUSTRALIA IS TO CONTRIBUTE ONE MILLION DOLLARS. ^{by} ~~THE~~ LATEST INDICATION IS THAT A CHANNEL WILL BE CLEARED BY EARLY MARCH, WHICH WILL ALLOW THE PASSAGE THROUGH THE CANAL OF SHIPS ^{up} ~~to~~ TEN THOUSAND TONS. TO ACHIEVE THIS SOME OF THE WRECKS WILL HAVE TO BE NO MORE THAN PUSHED ASIDE AND WILL HAVE TO BE PROPERLY CLEARED LATER. A LOT OF WORK REMAINS TO BE DONE BEFORE LARGER SHIPS CAN GET THROUGH, ~~AND THIS~~ ^{may be} COMPLETED ^{by} ~~BEFORE~~ MAY.

MESSAGE ENDS

ALTERATION TO MESSAGE NO 93

IN SECOND LAST LINE AT END SHOULD READ AND THIS TASK MAY NOT BE

*file**FM*

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD TELETYPE MESSAGE

MESSAGE NUMBER 78

1725

17.1.57

TO MINISTER MELBOURNE
FROM PLIMSOLL

=====

FOLLOWING IS DRAFT PRESS RELEASE
BEGINS -

THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN GIVING ATTENTION TO THREE BIG PROBLEMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST - CLEARING THE SUEZ CANAL SO THAT TRAFFIC CAN MOVE THROUGH IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, ASSURING THE FUTURE OPERATION OF THE CANAL UNDER PROPER CONDITIONS., AND ~~WORKING~~ AVOIDING THE OUTBREAK OF FURTHER INCIDENTS AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE REMAINING ISRAELI FORCES.

PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN CLEARING THE CANAL, THOUGH NOT AS MUCH AS WOULD HAVE OCCURRED IF EGYPT HAD AGREED TO THE USE OF THE ANGLO-FRENCH SALVAGE FLEET THAT WAS AVAILABLE ON THE SPOT. THE LATEST INDICATION IS THAT A CHANNEL WILL BE CLEARED BY EARLY MARCH, WHICH WILL ALLOW THE PASSAGE THROUGH THE CANAL OF SHIPS OF UP TO 10,000 TONS. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS SOME OF THE WRECKS WILL HAVE BEEN PUSHED ASIDE AND WILL HAVE TO BE CLEARED SUBSEQUENTLY. A LOT OF WORK REMAINS TO BE ~~SOMEWHERE~~ DONE BEFORE LARGER SHIPS CAN PASS THROUGH, AND THIS TASK MAY NOT BE COMPLETED BEFORE MAY.

THE INITIAL WORK OF CLEARANCE IS AT PRESENT BEING FINANCED THROUGH LOANS FROM SEVERAL GOVERNMENTS TO THE UNITED NATIONS. AS I ANNOUNCED ^{on Wednesday} YESTERDAY, THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT HAS MADE A LOAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS OF 1,000,000 DOLLARS FOR THIS WORK.

ON THE LONGER-TERM QUESTION OF ASSURING THE FUTURE USE OF THE CANAL, THERE HAS BEEN MUCH LESS PROGRESS. QUITE FRANKLY, THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT IS NOT SATISFIED WITH THE POSITION. THE KEY OBJECTIVE MUST BE TO ASSURE THAT, AS THE CONSTANTINOPLE CONVENTION OF 1888 ENVISAGES, SHIPS OF ALL NATIONS ARE ALLOWED TO USE THE CANAL WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION, UNDER REASONABLE CONDITIONS, AND WITH PROPER SAFEGUARDS. EGYPT WAS VIOLATING THIS CONVENTION FOR SOME YEARS BEFORE IT NATIONALIZED THE CANAL. FOR EXAMPLE, THE SHIPPING OF ISRAEL WAS BLOCKED. THAT SORT OF THING MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO HAPPEN AGAIN IN RELATION TO THE SHIPS OF ANY COUNTRY.

IT IS IMPLICIT IN THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT'S LOAN

ENLARGE OBSERVATION OF THE COUNTRY UNDER EXISTING CONDITIONS AND
INVALID COUNTRY WOULD INCREASE IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. REGARDING THE
BIG PROBLEMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST - STEERING THE COUNTRY SO THAT
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS BEEN STANDING VIGILANT TO THESE
BEGINNING -

FOLOWING IS DEVAL PRESS REFERENCE

TOWARDS THE COST OF INITIAL CLEARANCE THAT NEGOTIATIONS WITH
BRITAIN, FRANCE AND EGYPT WILL PROCEED IMMEDIATELY WITH A
VIEW TO REACHING A SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT. THE
AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT IS PERTURBED AT THE ATMOSPHERE OF
DRIFT THAT IT DISCERNES IN THE HANDLING OF THIS PROBLEM.

"A"

ANOTHER MAJOR PROBLEM IS POSED BY THE
FACT THAT ISRAEL STILL HAS SOME FORCES IN THE SINAI
PENINSULA. WHILE ISRAEL IS REQUIRED BY THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL
ASSEMBLY'S RESOLUTION OF 2ND NOVEMBER 1956 TO WITHDRAW THESE
FORCES, SHE HAS UNDERSTANDABLE APPREHENSIONS ABOUT EGYPTIAN
INTENTIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, EGYPT HAS USED ISLANDS IN
THE GULF OF AQABA AND A FORTRESS ON THE EGYPTIAN COAST
TO BLOCK THE PASSAGE OF ISRAELI SHIPPING UP THAT GULF. THE
ISRAEL PORT OF ELATH, WHICH IS AT THE HEAD OF THE GULF, IS OF
CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO ISRAEL. IT IS REASONABLE FOR ISRAEL
TO EXPECT THE UNITED NATIONS TO PROVIDE ASSURANCES THAT AFTER
ISRAEL FORCES WITHDRAW THE EGYPTIANS WILL NOT BE LEFT BY THE
UNITED NATIONS TO RESUME A BLOCKADE OF THE GULF OF AQABA IN
VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL ^{practice} LAW. ISRAEL IS ALSO ENTITLED TO SOME
FIRM ASSURANCES THAT EGYPT WILL NOT RESUME RAIDS ACROSS THE
BORDER BETWEEN THE COUNTRY TWO COUNTRIES. X

THESE ARE THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS. WHILE IT IS IMPORTANT
TO ISRAEL THAT ITS EXISTENCE SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED BY ITS ARAB
NEIGHBOURS, IT IS LIKEWISE IMPORTANT TO THE ARAB STATES TO HAVE
THEIR FEARS OF ISRAEL ALLAYED. A WIDER SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE
EAST, ~~WHICH~~ WHICH MUST BE OUR ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE, WOULD GIVE
CONFIDENCE AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO BOTH ISRAEL AND THE ARAB
STATES. IT IS IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL PEOPLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST,
AND OF THE WORLD AS A WHOLE, TO WORK TO THIS GOAL.

MESSAGE ENDS

MMC

175/11/20

DRAFT PRESS RELEASE

The Minister for External Affairs, Mr. R.G. Casey, to-day warned that the quieter atmosphere in recent weeks in regard to the Suez Canal, where clearance operations were now at last under way, should not divert attention from other difficult problems in the Middle East. The overriding problem of the area was instability, and there could be little doubt that a major cause of this was the continuing dispute between Israel and the Arab States. This problem had now been in the forefront of the minds of the world's statesmen for nine years, but appeared to be little nearer to final solution.

Mr. Casey said that in his view what was needed was the creation of a climate favourable to a final settlement. This could only be achieved if each country felt secure. The presence of U.N.E.F. might temporarily contribute to a sense of security, but this was not enough. For instance, it was important to Israel that its existence should be recognised by its Arab neighbours and that it be entitled to exercise its sovereign rights like any other nation. It was likewise important to the Arab States to have their fears of Israeli expansion allayed.

There are, of course, other problems in the Middle East besides the Arab-Israeli dispute, but these either stem from the major one or are exacerbated by it. The most obvious question is that of the future regime for the Suez Canal. Over two months have now passed since the end of military action, and although a slow start has been made at undoing Egypt's act of sabotage in blocking the Canal, we still await an unequivocal assurance that the rights of all countries to freedom of passage without discrimination will be respected by Egypt when the Canal is again put into use.

Mr. Casey said that much has already been said about this major problem of the Suez Canal; what he wanted to emphasise to-day was that Nasser's ambitions were misleading other countries

in the Middle East, who were failing to realise where their real interests lie. Following Egypt's lead, and despite the warnings of their real friends, some Arab States, notably Syria and Jordan, were so obsessed with their quarrel with Israel and with an unreasoning nationalism, that they failed to see other dangers to the sovereign independence they so loudly claimed. Syria, for instance, was foolishly courting the Communists in the mistaken belief that she was hurting the Western world: she might soon realise the cost to herself. She had blown up oil pipelines to prevent Persian Gulf oil flowing to the Mediterranean, but she was finding the loss of revenue was more than she could afford. Jordan was flirting with anti-Western elements, but Jordan could not stand on its own feet, and was still drawing economic assistance from the United Kingdom. Another instance is the Yemen, where the pathetic campaign to use the current Middle East situation for an ostensibly "anti-imperialist" campaign against the British Protectorate of Aden is symptomatic of the same malaise.

It is to meet this situation that President Eisenhower made his latest proposals which I so warmly welcomed the other day. This is one development which gives hope for the future. One likes to believe that leaders in the Arab world will appreciate the worth of the proposals. There is at least evidence that those States which are members of the Baghdad Pact have a proper realisation of the dangers facing them, and that they will join closer together in accepting assistance to combat them.

The principal danger facing Middle East countries is Soviet penetration. But they also face the possibility that Nasser will again attempt to expand Egypt's influence and impress his own leadership on the Arab world. Egypt's ambitions are latent for the moment owing to the action taken by Israel in the Sinai Peninsula, but it may be too much to hope that they will not express themselves again when

current question connected with the Suez Canal problem are settled.

One fears that in some quarters there is a disposition to believe that Nasser can be reformed. Mr. Casey said he could feel no such confidence. It would be folly to believe that Egypt will not continue to attempt to play off the Communist bloc against the Western democracies. He hoped there would be a general recognition that in addition to the danger of Communist subversion in the Middle East, there is also the prospect of renewed Egyptian mischief on an increased scale.

17th January, 1957.

175/11/20

CABLEGRAM FOR DESPATCH.

ADDRESS

AUSTUNAT NEW YORK (Repeated Austemba Washington)

CROTONATE LONDON (For External)

Serial No. Classification SECRET IMMEDIATE

From Casey for Spender.

ISRAEL-EGYPT.

Your telegrams 51 and 46 from Washington.

In the absence of any clear indication as to the form a resolution on Israeli withdrawal may take it is difficult to give precise instructions. In general, however, our position is as follows:-

If the resolution were a simple request for withdrawal, it would be difficult for us not to support it in view of our vote in Security Council on 30th October. On the other hand, if the resolution included condemnation of Israel or sanctions against her, we would not want to support it in view of our past statements in General Assembly. In either event your vote should be accompanied by explanation which included some reference to Israeli anxieties, and the grounds that exist for them.

2. I told Israeli Minister today that we would give them all the support we could in private with the Americans and with some others in the United Nations in respect of their (Israeli) security problem, but that I had not yet had time to decide what public support we would be able to give them in forthcoming United

/ Nations

AUTHORIZED BY

E.A. FILE NO. DATE 16th January, 1957.

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SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

Nations discussions. Please advise me urgently whether, in the event of a resolution on Israeli withdrawal coming forward, Australia might usefully take steps, preferably in association with other sponsors, to raise simultaneously in the General Assembly the question of securing guarantees for freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba. There is evidence that such a resolution would receive fairly wide support including that of the United States.

SECRET

Handed to Minister by Nurock 15/1/57



LEGATION OF ISRAEL

צִירֹת יִשְׂרָאֵל

Sydney, 15 January, 1957.

Sir,

On the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to present to you the ^{accompanying} ~~following~~ statement of the situation existing in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran, and of the circumstances which led up to it.

The Government of Israel feels that this statement demonstrates the urgent necessity for instituting international safeguards of the freedom of passage for ships and cargos of all nations in those waters. It believes that the Government of Australia recognizes the significance of ~~the~~ that freedom not only to Israel but also to all nations whose economy is based upon the inviolability of international communications by land, air and sea, and it hopes that the Government of Australia will accordingly instruct its Ambassador in Washington, by representations to the United States Government, and its Delegation at the United Nations, in contact with the Israel Delegation, by representations within the membership of the General Assembly and during the relevant discussions, to strive towards the procurement of the essential guarantees.

Yours faithfully,

Mordekhai Nurock

The Right Honourable R.G. Casey,
CH, MC,
Minister for External Affairs.

Mordekhai Nurock,
Minister of Israel.



LEGATION OF ISRAEL

צִירֹת יִשְׂרָאֵל

Aide Memoire

In the first days of 1950, Egypt occupied the uninhabited islands of Tiran and Sanafir at the mouth of the Gulf, and installed a battery of guns on the shore of the Sinai Desert opposite them, thereby securing control over the entrance to the Gulf.

This action having raised doubts regarding Egypt's intention, the American Ambassador at Cairo made inquiries and, in reply, received on 28 January, 1950, an aide-memoire from the Egyptian Foreign Minister, affirming that the occupation of the islands was not intended to place obstacles in the way of innocent passage through the maritime straits separating the islands from the Egyptian coast of Sinai, and consequently that this passage, the only practicable one, would remain free, as in the past, and in conformity with international practice and the recognised principles of international law.

Despite this undertaking, Egypt at once instituted a strict system of blockade measures against ships of any flag seeking passage through the straits bound for Elath, the Israel port on the Gulf, as well as measures of control applicable to all vessels passing through the straits, regardless of their destination. Apart from the actual instances of the application of armed force against vessels innocently entering the straits, many more vessels were deterred by this situation from attempting passage through the straits at all.

Egypt's blockade measures were maintained without remission until the gun positions controlling the straits were dislodged by the Israel Defence Forces early in November, 1956. As a result, the ships of all nations ^{are} ~~were~~ now free, for the first time for seven years, to pass through the straits in both directions and sail the Gulf without being exposed to the menace of Egyptian interference.

The ^R~~R~~esolution adopted by the General Assembly on 2 November, 1956, urged Israel to withdraw her forces from territory which included the former Egyptian gun positions on the Sinai coast. The withdrawal of Israel forces is proceeding in accordance with arrangements made with the United Nations and has not yet affected the forces holding positions on



LEGATION OF ISRAEL

צִירֹת יִשְׂרָאֵל

the straits. It is the presence there of these Israel forces which today ensures free navigation to all shipping in the Gulf.

Under the present pattern, Israel forces withdrawing from the Sinai Desert are replaced by units of the UN Emergency Force. This, however, is a temporary force, and operates only by consent of the Egyptian Government. It follows that when that consent is cancelled, as it may be at any time, the Force must be removed, leaving the whole of Sinai, including the entrance to the Gulf, free for re-occupation by the armed forces of Egypt. This would mean, in effect, the reimposition of the illegal blockade measures and the renewal of Egyptian interference with shipping in the Straits.

It is not conceivable that the General Assembly, in adopting its Resolution, desired to re-create conditions for the resumption of illegal blockade measures, with all the dangers inherent therein.

The Gulf is an international waterway, and the straits are international straits. There never has been any basis in international law for the blockade measures enforced by Egypt.

Freedom of navigation in the Gulf is of prime importance for Israel. This importance is enhanced by the fact that Egypt has kept the Suez Canal barred to Israel shipping since 1948, and has indicated its intention, despite paragraph 4 of the General Assembly's Resolution of 2 November, 1956, of keeping it barred even after the Canal is cleared.

The Gulf offers Israel its only practical outlet to East Africa, Asia and Australasia. As long as the Gulf remained under blockade, the development of Elath was held up and, with it, the development of the entire south of the country.

For other countries, too, freedom of passage through the straits is of major importance. It constitutes the only alternative to the Suez Canal. Were the Gulf to be closed again, Egypt could, by blockading the Canal too, exercise a stranglehold on the commerce and industry of Europe and Asia.



LEGATION OF ISRAEL

צירות ישראל

The main^tenance of free passage through the Gulf is ~~of~~ the surest guarantee against any future closing of the Canal by arbitrary action on the part of Egypt, since the closing of the Canal could then not serve any significant purpose.

It is, therefore, essential to institute firm international guarantees and effective practical measures for assuring permanent freedom of passage for the ships and cargos ~~f~~ of all nations through the straits and in the Gulf. Moreover, it is indispensable that such guarantees and measures should be established before any change is made in the present situation, under which free navigation for all is effectively assured.

Legation of Israel,
Sydney.

15 January, 1957.

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

175/11/20

Mr. Plimsoll
16/1/57

RECORD OF CONVERSATION WITH MR. NUROCK, ISRAELI MINISTER,
ON TUESDAY, 15th JANUARY, 1957.

We talked for three quarters of an hour, at the end of which Mr. Nurock handed me an Aide Memoire and a note from himself which I have passed to Mr. Plimsoll.

2. I asked Mr. Nurock if his Government had made representations to the United States Government in Washington about the guarantees that Israel sought from the United States. He said that he did not know if this had been done direct, but he seemed to have the idea that it was probably done through the "friends of Israel" - he mentioned the U.K., Canada and some other Commonwealth countries.

3. I suggested that, rather than the Israeli request coming at second hand to the United States through Australia and other countries, it might be better for the representations to be made direct to the United States Government.

4. I reminded Mr. Nurock that a fairly immediate problem for Israel might be the insistence of the United States and other countries in the United Nations, ~~when that~~ Israel carries out the United Nations resolution of 2nd November, to withdraw their forces behind their own frontiers.

5. I said that we would give them all the support we could in private with the Americans and with some others in the United Nations in respect of their (Israeli) security problem - but that I had not yet had time to make up my mind as to what public support we would be able to give them in forthcoming discussions in the United Nations. I said that my own instinct would be very sympathetic with the Israeli situation - but that I was not yet sure how far we could go in public support of them. I reminded him that it was not much use Israel being subject to another 65-5 vote in the United Nations. They need more people on their side than U.K., France, Australia and New Zealand.

6. Nurock said that Israel had no desire to permanently occupy any territory outside Israel. All they wanted to do was to stop Egyptian raiding of Israeli territories, and to ensure a free waterway up the Gulf of Aqaba.

7. He spoke about a demilitarised zone - he mentioned 25 kilometres wide on the Egyptian border on Sinai. I said that I thought their case would be strengthened if Israel were willing to have a certain part of this demilitarised zone, (say 5 kilometres or even 1 kilometre) carved out of Israel territory - and the rest carved out of Israel territory in Sinai. I said that I thought this would get Egypt some support for this project which would not otherwise be forthcoming.

See Plimsoll 16/1/57

Logan?

Israel?

Already done.

175/22/1.

File

Mr White

Mr. Nurock

*Is this a relevant
pts also to Ballant. As
repeat Ballant by relevant
telegram for Spence eg. his
statement*

CONFIDENTIAL

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2.

8. Nurock said that they did not want the Egyptians back in the Gaza strip. Israel did not want it - but they did not want the Egyptians to have it.

9. Nurock said that Israel expected that the U.K. and France and, he said, "all Commonwealth countries" sympathized with Israel's insistence on "perpetual freedom" in the Aqaba Gulf - although he said that the representatives of these countries, (he did not say where) "were awaiting formal instructions from their governments".

10. Nurock said that Israel was proposing to lay an oil pipe line - I think he said from Aqaba through the Negev to Beersheba, for their own domestic oil needs and that they would extend it to an oil anchorage on the Mediterranean for oil to Britain and Europe. He said that this could be done quite reasonably quickly. It would provide an alternative supply of oil other than through the Suez Canal - he thought that it would be important to Britain and Europe. The value of this would of course be dependent on freedom of navigation from the Persian Gulf and though the Gulf of Aqaba.

11. Nurock said that Israel could not be asked to get out of Egypt and then to trust the U.N. to protect them from a repetition of Egyptian belligerency. He said - "it cannot be allowed to happen again".

12. Nurock asked if I would instruct Spender and Walker to try to mobilize all the support they could for the Israeli attitude in the corridors of the United Nations.

Canberra.
15th January, 1957.

R.G.C.
(R.G. CASEY).

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

SECRET

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File No.....

Date.....15th January, 1957

SUBJECT

ISRAELI REQUEST FOR GUARANTEES BEFORE WITHDRAWAL

FOR THE MINISTER

Mr. Nurock has asked to see you about the need for adequate guarantees of Israel's security before Israel withdraws from Sinai.

2. Similar approaches have been made in London and Washington and to the New Zealand Government. The Israelis are clearly endeavouring to muster support in the face of pressure on them from Mr. Hammarskjöld to comply with the General Assembly's withdrawal resolutions and particularly that of 2nd November which:

"Urges the parties to the Armistice Agreements promptly to withdraw all forces behind the Armistice lines, to desist from raids across the Armistice lines into neighbouring territory and to observe scrupulously the provisions of the Armistice Agreements."

3. A number of factors indicate that the General Assembly cannot much longer postpone examination of Israel's compliance with this resolution: the Afro-Asians are preparing to raise the question in the General Assembly, Egypt has complained to the Assembly that Israel's failure to comply can only lead to further deterioration of the situation and Jordan has alleged in the Assembly that Israeli forces are concentrating in large numbers on the Israeli/Jordanian border.

ISRAELI ATTITUDE:

4. Mr. Nurock has already on two occasions presented his Government's views and it is expected that on this occasion he may press for some indication of what stand Australia proposes to take, at least in the immediate future.

Israeli Note of 27th December:

5. On 27th December Mr. Nurock, on the instructions of the Israeli Government, sent a Note describing recent examples of alleged Egyptian "belligerency" and saying that Israel felt entitled to the following "binding guarantees":

- (i) that hostile acts by Egypt shall not be renewed;
- (ii) that access by sea to Israel via the Gulf of Aqaba shall remain free;
- (iii) that the Suez Canal shall be open to Israeli shipping.

The Israeli Government therefore asked the Australian Government "to take such measures as may seem proper to it, in the United Nations and through diplomatic channels generally, to bring about the instant cessation of Egypt's open contempt for the Resolution passed by the General Assembly on 2nd November and at last to secure for Israel the protection and freedoms which are its right."

6. The Gaza strip was significantly not mentioned in this note. The Israelis are establishing an effective

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- 2 -

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civil administration throughout the area and are permitting, if not encouraging, intercourse with Israel proper. It may well be their intention to continue strengthening their hold of the area and to enhance their negotiating position when the future status is being decided.

7. It is also to be noted that although the Suez Canal was mentioned, little emphasis was placed on the need for free Israeli passage nor has it been emphasised since. It seems that for the moment the Israelis are prepared to leave this question to the principal users and to concentrate on freedom of passage through the Aqaba Gulf.

Oral Representations:

8. On 3rd January, Mr. Nurock called on the Department of External Affairs at his request and said that, on instructions, he was asking that the Australian Government, through its representatives in Washington and New York, should seek to influence the United States, acting through the United Nations, to provide guarantees against future Egyptian belligerency.

9. At first Mr. Nurock did not formulate these guarantees with any precision but after some questioning he narrowed down his approach in the following way:

- (i) the Israeli Government desires guarantees as a prior condition to their withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula; the presence of U.N.E.F. is not a sufficient guarantee as it can only remain in Sinai with Egyptian consent;
- (ii) these guarantees to be in respect of the Sinai border and the town of Sharm-El-Sheikh which controls the Aqaba islands of Tiran and Sinafir; Israel did not wish to include Gaza nor the Jordanian border in this request;
- (iii) he did not define the form which the guarantees might take, although it was clear he had in mind a United States sponsored declaration of some kind which would warn off the Egyptians.

Mr. Nurock agreed that in effect the Israeli Government was asking that a prior condition be satisfied before Israel conformed to the 2nd November resolution.

10. As a result of this approach, we sought the views of the State Department and the Foreign Office.

UNITED KINGDOM ATTITUDE:

11. At an early stage the United Kingdom Government made it clear that they would not agree to continued Israeli occupation of conquered territory, but they have lately tried to develop constructive ideas that would at least avoid a return to the status quo ante. However, they feel that they cannot take the initiative in any such proposals for fear of appearing the champions of the Israelis.

12. They support the idea of demilitarizing the Sinai border and on the more specific questions of Gaza and the Aqaba Gulf their views are:-

/ Gaza

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- 3 -

SECRET

Gaza:

13. The idea of United Nations administration should be promoted. Of the possible alternatives, the United Kingdom favours the idea of the area being run by a United Nations administrator, appointed by the General Assembly, with the aid of local authorities. (Whether the local authorities are to be Egyptian or Israeli is not stated). It is suggested that at a later stage some arrangement might arise for a buffer zone along the border of Egypt and Israel policed by United Nations troops. Later still United Nations forces might be extended to Israel's other frontiers.

Gulf of Aqaba:

14. The United Kingdom feels that the United Nations ought to work for the removal of all static military installations and a guarantee of free access to the head of the Gulf to all ships regardless of flag. They suggest three ways in which this might be done:-

- (i) A Convention by which riparian states and any other state which wishes to adhere would pledge themselves to respect continued demilitarisation of Straits and right of all nations to free passage for their ships and aircraft through and over them.
- (ii) Declarations by riparian states or at least by Egypt and Israel that their intention is as stated under (i) above.
- (iii) A United Nations Resolution calling upon all concerned to act as under (i). In all this there is danger that Egypt might give necessary assurances but would nullify them by insisting that state of war allowed her to discriminate against Israel.

UNITED STATES ATTITUDE:

15. The United States has adopted the moral tone that Israel is bound by the General Assembly resolution of 2nd November and cannot impose any pre-conditions for complete withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula including the Gaza strip. They favour establishment of a buffer zone and setting up a United Nations force to police it, but do not wish to canvass such possibilities until the United Nations Secretary-General has made a report to the General Assembly. On the specific questions mentioned above their tentative views are:-

Gaza:

16. They do not approve of a United Nations administration since such an arrangement was likely to become permanent. They stress the non-viability of the area. In the short term they would expect the U.N.E.F. to move in, which could be done under existing General Assembly resolutions. However, they feel it is inevitable that Egyptian administration would return, although they would look with disfavour on re-entry of Egyptian military forces.

/ 17. They

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- 4 -

17. They consider that the ultimate disposal of Gaza must be decided in the context of an overall solution of the Palestine question.

Gulf of Aqaba:

18. The United States considers that previous Egyptian action in preventing free passage was a clear violation of international law. They would therefore study urgently the problem of how to get a vote for a United Nations guarantee of future freedom of passage.

19. The United States is apparently aware of the need for constructive proposals, but, having none of their own, will probably stress the need for them in the forthcoming debate.

AUSTRALIAN POSITION:

20. Following Mr. Nurock's visit to the Department we formed the view that there was merit in:-

- (a) internationalising Gaza and neutralising Egyptian control of the Gulf of Aqaba;
- (b) demilitarising the Sinai border;
- (c) the provision of physical deterrent to renewed penetration from either side of the Sinai border.

21. The immediate question for Australia is the attitude to be adopted in the debate on Israeli compliance with the withdrawal resolution which is expected to take place within the next day or two.

(Sir Percy Spender has already requested instructions.)

We sympathise with Israeli desires for guarantees; we share their doubts on the adequacy of U.N.E.F.; and we do not think the General Assembly should be used as an instrument for restoring the Egyptian blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. Nevertheless, it is felt that by too openly supporting the Israeli claim to impose pre-conditions we would alienate opinion in Asian and Moslem countries. In any event, we have already voted in favour of the Security Council resolution of 30th October calling for Israeli withdrawal behind the Armistice lines, and so could not easily oppose a similar resolution. We would hope, however, for the emergence of a constructive resolution which, while insisting on complete withdrawal, would at the same time (or by a parallel resolution) give Israel guarantees against renewed Egyptian belligerency and assure her freedom of passage in the Gulf of Aqaba.

22. A draft telegram to Sir Percy Spender is attached.

....

(A.H. TANGE)
Secretary

HDW/DJB

Middle East Section

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM FOR DESPATCH.

ADDRESS

AUSTUNAT NEW YORK

AUSTEMBA WASHINGTON

CROTONATE LONDON (For External)

SECRET

Serial No. Classification SECRET IMMEDIATE

For Spender from Casey.

ISRAEL-EGYPT.

Your telegrams 51 and 46 from Washington.

In the absence of any clear indication of the form a resolution may take it is difficult to give precise instructions.

2. We still adhere to the views set out in para. 5 and 6 of our telegram 15 and are in broad agreement with those advanced in paras. 3-6 of Washington's 46. However by too openly supporting Israeli desire to impose pre-conditions for withdrawal we would alienate opinion in Asian and Moslem countries.

3. If the resolution were an uncomplicated request for withdrawal it would be difficult not to support it in view of our vote in the Security Council on 30th October. On the other hand, if the resolution were a strongly worded condemnation of Israel we could not support it in view of our statements in the General Assembly. In either case your views above-mentioned could be given as explanation of vote.

4. However, we would hope that some constructive resolution might emerge in such a form that we could give it unreserved support.

/ 5. Would there ...

AUTHORIZED BY

E.A. FILE NO. DATE 15th January, 1957

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- 2 -

SECRET

5. Would there be any possibility of having the Assembly in the one resolution (on Israeli withdrawal) or in a parallel resolution express the views that -

(a) freedom of navigation in Gulf of Aqaba should be guaranteed - in the short term this could be achieved by prompt occupation of Sharm-El-Sheikh by U.N.E.F.

(b) measures should be taken to demilitarize the Gaza strip and Sinai border and to place them under United Nations administration. (It might be argued that Egypt is in breach of the resolution of 2nd November because of fedayeen raids although it might be difficult to prove Egyptian complicity in raids from Jordan.)

6. We appreciate that these measures represent only a short term approach to the overall problem, but by giving the Israelis a sense of security they could serve to develop a climate favourable to a permanent settlement.

175/11/20

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO. 27

C A B I N E T M I N U T E

Canberra, 15th January, 1957.

Decision No. 601

Submission No. 506 - Arab-Israeli Dispute and Suez Canal Settlement.

Cabinet noted the contents of the submission.

Certified true copy.

A. B. Brown

Secretary to Cabinet.

Asst. Sec (Div IV) M

Mr. [Signature]

[Signature]

*Sec. [Signature]
17/1/57*

17/11/20.

An White

14th January, 1957

was 14/1

MR. WILSON

Mr. Dover, First Secretary of the Legation rang to say that the Israeli Minister wished to see Mr. Casey as a matter of urgency. Mr. Nurock could fly to Canberra tomorrow if the Minister could see him. Mr. Nurock wishes to explain to Mr. Casey the Israeli attitude on withdrawal and possible moves in the United Nations to introduce a further resolution on this subject.

2. I told Mr. Dover that I did not know whether the Minister would be able to see him, but that I would find out and let him know this afternoon.

(W.G.A. LANDALE)
E.A. & M.E.

Mr White
Mr Billington

Urgent

once we get rid of
the cabinet submissions
we ought to prepare ^{urgently} a
brief for New York so that
they will be able to deal
with any resolution (see
the attached ~~telegram~~ ^{telegram})
which is introduced into
the assembly demanding
Israel's compliance with
previous resolutions ^{now withdrawn}. Our
attitude, I think, can
be summed up as follows:-
We believe that Israel
has the right to demand
guarantees against
future belligerency and
we feel that there is a

not to be said for (i) the
internationalisation of
Gaza & The Agaba islands
(ii) a buffer zone & (iii)
a UN police force (all this
is in the telegram we
sent to Washington & London
based on Newrock's
representations)

but
we do not wish to support
Israel too openly for
fear of alienating Arab
opinion. Presumably we
should abstain on any
resolution (Please see para 11
of the information submission
to Cabinet)

wsol 13/1

NB

UN should be consulted
all along the line

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

175/11/20
RESTRICTED

I.590

OA/BH

Sent: 11th January, 1957.
0745
Rec'd: 12th January, 1957.
0830

FROM:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

92. RESTRICTED.

Repeated: Australian Embassy Washington Une. 40
Australian High Commission, London (For External)
Cable 8 and Australian High Commission, Ottawa Sav.
23.

Commonwealth Meeting.

1. Meeting opened with Noble in the Chair, and outlined position regarding disarmament debate (as already reported). Dixon ran over plenary agenda noting that 3 items on expansion of Security Council, ECO.SOC and I.C.J. were set down to follow present debate on Hungary. He said United Kingdom had had no warning that these items would come up, and was unprepared to discuss them today.

2. I asked Lall about reports that Afro-Asian group was preparing to raise question of Israeli withdrawal from Sinai in Assembly soon. Lall said group was preparing draft resolution on matter, but no move would be made until Secretary-General issued his next report on compliance which Lall understood would be ready by Tuesday or Wednesday of next week. Israel was under heavy pressure to give Secretary-General affirmative reply in the next 2 or 3 days. I then asked whether it would be possible for Israeli apprehensions about future of Islands at mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba to be met in some way, e.g. statement by Egypt in the Assembly. Lall replied that Israel must withdraw from Islands, but he could not speak for Egypt. It was possible that U.N.E.F. could, as it had done in other parts of Sinai, move into Islands temporarily. Dixon thought it would be desirable, in the interests of stability, to establish some certainty of free passage for shipping in and out of the Gulf. I then attempted to draw Lall into some discussion of the future of the Gaza strip, but he would say nothing more than India stands by Israel's complete withdrawal from the Gaza strip before any discussion of Israeli apprehensions can take place.

Spender.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M.'S.

12th January, 1957. F

SEC A/Ss L&T(Div5) PAC&AM UN@ AM&SP S&SEA EAF&ME E
INF DL MT C&P SA AF&ME
G.

RESTRICTED

CONFIDENTIAL

163/4/7/3/3.

Memo No.21

10th January, 1957

Australian Embassy,
T O K Y O.

....

Forwarded herewith is a Record of Conversation
held with Mr. Uyama, Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy, on
8th January, 1957.

(W.G.A. LANDALE)
for Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

SECRET

File No. 175/1/20.

Date 10th January, 1957

1302/55.

SUBJECT : Future of the Gaza Strip.

FOR Mr. Landale.

Present Status.

The General Armistice Agreement signed by Egypt and Israel on 24th February, 1949, at the end of the Palestine War recognised the area as being under Egyptian control. In the intervening years Egypt has not formally annexed the territory but has administered it as "a part of Palestine" under the control of Egyptian forces and "outside the borders of Egypt". The total strip is now occupied by Israeli forces and an effective Israeli civil administration is being established. A considerable degree of intercourse with Israel proper is being permitted, if not encouraged.

ISRAELI VIEWS.

2. A number of views as to the possible fate of the strip have been expressed by Israeli spokesmen:

- (a) Mrs. Meir told the Minister in New York on 19th November that Israel must retain the islands in the Gulf of Aqaba but she was less specific about the Gaza Strip, evincing some concern about the Arab refugee problem there. On the other hand she was reported as saying to Mr. Lester Pearson on 15th November that the Gaza Strip must become part of Israel.
- (b) On 18th December, Ben-Gurion in a press interview said that there were different views among Israelis about the Gaza Strip. Some believed that the United Nations should administer it. Others believed that a United Nations administration would not be able to prevent Gaza being used as a base for fedayeen operations against Israel. For his part, Ben-Gurion thought that there should be a United Nations "High Commissioner" in Gaza.
- (c) On 19th December in a written Parliamentary reply, Ben-Gurion said that "Israel will in no circumstances whatsoever agree to the return of the Egyptian invader to the Gaza Strip".
- (d) On 21st December New York reported Comay of the Israeli Delegation as having said that he did not think Israel was very anxious to hold on to the Gaza Strip. It was poor in resources and more likely to be a liability than an asset. It was not however viable as a separate unit any more than Jerusalem would be viable as a separate unit. It was a creation of the United Nations and should be the responsibility of the United Nations.

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- (e) A statement on the "Status of the Gaza Strip" prepared by the Israeli Legation in December, concludes: "Israel will not and cannot permit the Strip to become again an Egyptian springboard for attacks deep into Israeli territory, aimed at Israel's destruction."
- (f) Mr. Nurock, in his discussions with the Secretary on 3rd January, claimed that Israel was under no obligation to do more than withdraw from Egyptian territory which did not include Gaza (In point of fact the U.N. Resolutions of 2nd and 4th November speak of withdrawal "behind the Armistice lines" which would presumably include withdrawal from Gaza). Subsequent to this interview, Mr. Nurock told Mr. Peterson that Israel's policy towards the Gaza strip was "still in the process of formulation".
- (g) On 1st January in Toronto, the Israeli Minister for Social Affairs is reported as having said that the people of Israel would prefer another shooting war to the withdrawal of their troops from the Gaza Strip.
- (h) The Israelis are in the process of drawing up an agreed aide memoire with Hammarskjöld on the withdrawal of their troops from Egypt. As far as Gaza is concerned the aide memoire will merely record that the Israelis express their readiness to consult on the future of the area with the United Nations.

UNITED KINGDOM VIEWS:

3. On 4th December, Selwyn Lloyd said in the Commons that "Israel should withdraw from Egyptian territory" and that "with regard to the Gaza Strip it is our view that Israel should withdraw from that also and that the strip should be made a United Nations responsibility."

4.5 Beeley at the Foreign Office told McIntyre on 16th November that the United Kingdom was unlikely to depart from the viewpoint that the Israelis must withdraw to the armistice lines and "even get out of Gaza". He added that the United Kingdom would not feel disposed to support the continued occupation or control of any territory gained by conquest.

5. According to Nurock, the Foreign Office has informed the Israeli Government that the United Kingdom supports the idea of internationalising the Gaza Strip but that the Foreign Office does not wish to take any initiative or give the impression that in supporting this concept they were acting in alliance with Israel.

UNITED STATES VIEWS:

6. Bergus at the State Department said on 17th December that he thought there was a good chance that Gaza might come under some kind of United Nations

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control in cooperation with local authorities. He thought that the Egyptians would probably not be anxious to return to Gaza as it had been a constant source of trouble to them, financially and from the point of view of a fairly hostile refugee population. On the other hand the Israelis already had done a good job in the short time they had been there.

7. On 21st December Washington reported that the State Department appeared to be envisaging some form of U.N. authority in Gaza with the establishment of a U.N. force between Egypt and Israel on both sides of the demarcation line.

FRENCH VIEWS:

8. According to Nurock the French Prime Minister has told the Israeli Ambassador in Paris that the French Government is in agreement with the idea of internationalising the Gaza Strip.

CONCLUSION:

9. The sum total of these views seems to be that support is developing for some form of internationalisation of the Gaza Strip under the United Nations. The advantages of internationalisation would be:

(a) To Israel

- (i) it would deny the area to Egypt as a base for fedayeen activity against Israel.
- (ii) It would relieve Israel as the present occupying power of the considerable refugee problem.

(b) To Egypt

- (i) It would relieve Egypt of the responsibility of administering the area which it has never welcomed.
- (ii) it would deny to Israel an area which Israel now occupies by right of conquest.
- (iii) it could be used by Egypt as an effective bargaining point in the overall negotiations.

Europe, Africa and Middle East Branch.
DJB:JS

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

RESTRICTED

172/11/20

ABK:HP

0.386
Sent: 9th January, 1957.
1645

TO:

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

12. RESTRICTED.

U.N.E.F. costs.

Please find out from Secretariat latest estimate of U.N.E.F. costs. We are particularly interested in costs which will be passed on to United Nations members, that is, not directly borne by countries contributing forces or offering free transport etc. Estimate of total cost would however be useful.

Min. & Dept. E.A.(852/10/13/4/3)
" " " Defence.
" " " Trade(C.)(Mr. Phillip)
Treasurer & Treasury.
P.M.'s.

Cost - £6.10.0.

10th January, 1957.

SEC A/Ss L&T(Div.5) UN ER CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA
E.AF&ME E AF&ME INF DL C&P MT

F

SECRET

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

ABK:SHA

O.400/1/2/3/6/7/8/9.

Dated: 9th January, 1957.
2048.

TO:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON....22 (pass to New York 15)

REPEATED TO:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON....68 (for External)Australian High Commission,
WELLINGTON....SAV.1SECRET.

From Casey.

Israeli Minister under instructions has asked us to influence the United States to guarantee Israel against future Egyptian belligerency. It is not easy to discern what guarantees Israel wants and what form would be acceptable. Insofar as we can define their position, it is as follows:-

- (a) they want the United States guarantee through the United Nations;
- (b) they want it as a prior condition to their withdrawal from Sinai;
- (c) it should cover the Sinai border between Egypt and Israel and extend to the town of Sharm-El-Sheikh which controls the Aqaba islands; they do not want the Sinai border or Sharm-El-Sheikh to be accessible to Egyptian raiding expeditions;
- (d) they do not include Gaza in their request;
- (e) guarantee of Israel's borders with Jordan is not sought;
- (f) the U.N.E.F. does not meet requirement because its presence rests on Egyptian consent.

2. Nurock said United Kingdom Foreign Office had informed his Government of their support for the idea of demilitarising the Sinai border and internationalising the Gaza strip and the Aqaba Gulf islands. The United Kingdom did not, however, wish to take any initiative or give any impression that in supporting this concept they were acting in alliance with Israel. The Israeli Minister said that the French Government also supported this idea. We get the impression that the Israelis themselves are placing main emphasis on a United States sponsored international guarantee of freedom of navigation into and through the Gulf of Aqaba.

3. As regards the guarantee (to which Israeli representations are confined) we note from New York's 26:

- (a) that there is some doubt whether the United States is, in fact, pressing Israel to withdraw from Sinai;

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OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

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- 2 -

- (b) that the Israelis claim to have already agreed with Hammarskjöld that Israeli occupation of the Egyptian base on the Gulf of Aqaba (presumably Sharm-El-Sheikh) will continue until freedom of navigation is guaranteed; and that Israel will express readiness to consult with the United Nations on future of Gaza.

4. It is also noted that in the agreed aide memoire which they hope to conclude with Hammarskjöld, the Israelis want a provision that after their withdrawal behind Armistice lines (excepting Gaza and the Gulf of Aqaba) United Nations forces will, for the time being, remain in the Sinai area; that complete assurance will be given against repetition of fedayeen raids; and that the future role of U.N.E.F. in Sinai should be determined by General Assembly.

5. These attitudes suggest time is opportune for exploring the feasibility of some United Nations arrangement, sponsored by the United States, which will give the Israelis the sense of security which they want. We ourselves can see some merit in:

- (a) internationalising Gaza and neutralising Egyptian control of the Gulf of Aqaba;
- (b) demilitarising the Sinai border (we understand that Nasser recently told Cordier that he favoured a buffer several miles wide all around Israel, i.e., not merely along the Israel-Egypt border; Hammarskjöld thought that though the Israelis objected strongly to neutral zone, buffer zone in form of perhaps one mile within Israeli territory and two miles within Arab territory might be acceptable to them);
- (c) the provision of physical deterrent to renewed penetration from either side of the Sinai border.

6. As we see it, mere existence of a so-called demilitarised zone may not satisfy Israel unless there is automatic enforcement machinery to deal with breaches and unless the United States is involved more directly than under previous concepts such as Tripartite Declaration. Consideration might be given to an international police with powers to use force to control transit, with right of search, etc. in the zone. United Nations might be afforded automatic right to station forces in the zone at will. These powers could only be derived from treaty entered into by Egypt (and by Israel if Israeli territory were included in the zone). We have not examined implications of cost.

7. Please discuss with the State Department/Foreign Office and inform them of Israeli request and informally canvass ideas in paragraphs 5 and 6. Please ascertain what position the United States is going to take in the General Assembly, in face of Israeli request for prior guarantees, when it reverts to discussion of the November 2nd requirement of unconditional Israeli withdrawal behind the Armistice lines. You should say

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

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that it is our view that the Assembly should not be an instrument for restoring the Egyptian blockade of Gulf of Aqaba and that Israel's request for more enduring guarantees than U.N.E.F. is well founded.

Cost £156/11/4

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M.'s

10th January, 1957.

SEC A/Ss UN ER CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF&ME INF DL
C&P MT

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175/11/20

Memo No.

4th January, 1957

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EA- LONDON 11 6.
JN- WASHINGTON 4.
NEW YORK 5.
PARIS 1.
TEL AVIV

ISRAEL-EGYPT

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Forwarded herewith for your information are
two Records of Conversation with the Israeli Minister,
Mr. Nurock, held on 3rd and 4th January, 1957.

(J.C.G. KEVIN)
Assistant Secretary

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Record of Telephone Conversation with: ISRAELI MINISTER
On: 4th January, 1957.
Officer Present: J.C.G. Kevin
Main Subjects: ISRAEL-EGYPT

Following his call at the Department yesterday, the Israeli Minister telephoned me from Sydney to say:-

- (a) that the firm position of the Israeli Government is that they "will never agree to Egypt going back to the Gaza strip;"
- (b) that the French Prime Minister has told the Israeli Ambassador in Paris that the French Government is in agreement with the idea of demilitarising the Sinai border between Israel and Egypt and internationalising Gaza and the Aqaba islands.

Report prepared by J.C.G. KEVIN

Distribution

Minister
Secretary
Mr. Plimsoll
E.A. & M.E.

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Record of Conversation with: ISRAELI MINISTER
On: 3rd January, 1957.
Officers Present: Secretary
J.C.G. Kevin
Main Subjects: ISRAEL-EGYPT

ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM EGYPT

The Israeli Minister (Mr. Nurock) called this morning at his request. He began by saying that the United Kingdom Foreign Office had informed his Government of their support for the idea of demilitarising the frontier between Egypt and Israel in eastern Sinai and internationalising the Gaza strip and the Aqaba Gulf islands. The United Kingdom Foreign Office did not, however, wish to take any initiative or give any impression that in supporting this concept they were acting in alliance with Israel.

2. Mr. Nurock said that he was under instructions to ask that the Australian Government, through Sir Percy Spender in Washington and our representatives in New York, should seek to influence the United States, acting through the United Nations, to provide guarantees against future Egyptian belligerency. It was not easy from Mr. Nurock's remarks to discern just what guarantees the Israeli Government is seeking, and he himself was not very precise. At first he related his request to a guarantee against Egyptian raids, the protection of the proposed Israeli pipeline from Elath and the economic blockade of Israel. After some questioning, he narrowed down his approach in the following way:

- (a) the Israeli Government desires guarantees as a prior condition to their withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula;
- (b) it wants the guarantees to cover the Sinai border between Egypt and Israel and to extend to the town of Sharm-El-Sheikh which controls the Aqaba islands; it does not want the Sinai border or Sharm-El-Sheikh to be used by or left accessible to Egyptian raiding expeditions;
- (c) Israel does not wish to include Gaza in its request.

Mr. Nurock was at some pains to make this clear, claiming that Israel's obligation under the United Nations resolution of 2nd November was to withdraw from Egyptian territory which, he said, did not include Gaza. In fact the United Nations resolutions of 2nd and 4th November speak of withdrawal "behind the Armistice lines" which would presumably include withdrawal from Gaza. Without commenting on the merits, we suggested to Mr. Nurock that if Israel was seeking a United Nations guarantee its prospects might be prejudiced if, at the same time, it rejected withdrawal from Gaza. (Mr. Nurock told the United States Charge d'Affaires, after calling at the Department, that Israel's policy towards the Gaza strip was "still in process of formulation.");

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/ (d) the

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- (d) the Israeli Government does not ask that the guarantee should cover Israel's borders with Jordan.

(This is an interesting omission in view of the Israeli Note of 27th December complaining of Fedayeen raids, prompted by Egypt, into Israel from Jordan);

- (e) the Israeli Government is not concerned in the first phase to obtain a guarantee against economic blockade and in favour of unimpeded transit through the Suez Canal.

Mr. Nurock said, without explanation, that this could be raised later. (It is to be noted from New York's Savingram 36 of 21st December that according to Comay (Israel) freedom of navigation through Suez is not of such importance if the Gulf of Aqaba is kept open to Israeli shipping.)

- (f) Mr. Nurock did not define the form which the guarantees might take, although it was clear that he has in mind an American sponsored declaration of some kind which would warn off the Egyptians.

3. Mr. Nurock was told that his Government's request would be studied and placed before Mr. Casey. Ministers were dispersed at the moment, but he would be informed of the result as soon as possible. The Secretary observed, and Mr. Nurock agreed, that the Israeli Government was asking that a prior condition be satisfied before Israel conformed to the 2nd November resolution. Australia was being asked to support this in the United Nations. The situation in New York was still obscure. But it seemed likely that there would shortly be a discussion on conformity to the 2nd November resolution. It would be easier to get consideration of prior conditions for Israeli compliance if, by that time, Assembly discussion was directed towards settling the wider issues in Israel-Arab relations. We were not, however, aware of any initiative being taken. Australia wanted this subject taken up without delay. We looked to Washington to give a lead. We hoped that Israel would not merely look to Washington to provide a military guarantee of frontiers but also to give a lead in the direction of settling Israel-Arab issues. Mr. Nurock commented that he had no confidence in the prospects of a general settlement.

4. The Secretary said that it would be helpful to Australia and to others to whom representations were being made to qualify the 2nd November resolution, if Israel could specify more clearly what sort of "guarantee" would satisfy her.

5. The Secretary referred to Ben Gurion's speech declaring the Armistice lines to be defunct. Would Eban declare in the United Nations that, in the event of a guarantee being provided, Israel would withdraw from Egypt? Nurock said he would do so.

ISRAELI PENETRATION INTO EGYPT

6. Mr. Nurock made one or two general remarks under this heading. He thought that no Western country privately condemned the Israeli action. It had been checkmated by Russian reactions and the strength of the Afro Asian vote in the United Nations. He compared United Nations condemnation of Britain, France and Israel with United Nations failure to do anything about the Soviet in regard to Hungary, quoting

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from the "Sydney Morning Herald" to make the point that, because they practised democratic systems, the former had to give way, while the Soviet had been exempted from United Nations action. Israel, too, was a democracy. He spoke about the United Nations resolutions of 2nd and 4th November, saying that, in breach of those resolutions, raids were still being made into Israeli territory and Soviet arms introduced into the Middle East area; the United Nations had been ready enough to criticise Israel but were doing nothing about Egypt.

MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT

7. Mr. Nurock welcomed the Eisenhower declaration for its limited purpose of helping to contain Soviet penetration and as providing economic aid for the area. In answer to a question, he thought personally that if the Soviet claimed to participate in a Middle East settlement this would not be opposed by Israel. His remarks on either score were not, however, very interested, and it is clear that he remains attached to direct talks between Israel and Egypt. He brought this up in conversation with the Secretary and afterwards, while waiting for his car, he reverted to Ben Gurion's readiness to hold conversations with Nasser. Asked what the agenda for any such talks might be, he said that there should be no agenda. Asked what Israel had to give in any such negotiations, he said that Israel had nothing to give, adding as an afterthought that there might be some minor frontier rectification. Asked what Ben Gurion and Nasser could talk about, he mentioned refugees, water and "rights-of-way" between Egypt and other Arab States. When it was suggested to him that, since these matters were of general Arab concern, direct talks might be taken to mean that Israel was publicly acknowledging Nasser as leader of the Arab world, he said that other Arab States could join in if they wanted to. He thought that Ben Gurion and Nasser were of much the same type and that if they could get together something would result, although in this, as in other respects, he was anything but specific.

Report prepared by J.C.G. KEVIN

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Minister
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LEGATION OF ISRAEL

ל י ש ר א ל י ר ד נ

28 December, 1956.

My dear Mr. Casey,

I was happy to get your letter of 7 December and am grateful to you for sending me copies of speeches that you made in the General Assembly, and of your statement to the Press when you arrived back in Sydney. All these were of profound interest and satisfaction to me, and I have sent them on to our Foreign Office.

What you say about my own Minister and her entourage in New York is also pleasant reading.

I have now received from Israel, and am despatching to you, a book entitled 'Israel between East and West' by Raphael Patai, which is a scientific and somewhat formidably utilitarian account of the two different strata in the Jewish population in Israel today, roughly known as Ashkenazim and Sephardim. It is in the main sociological, demographic and cultural; you may find time to browse through it, for it is yours for the keeping and I have so dedicated it. For a summary account of the origins of these two divisions, I would refer you again to the article on pages ten, eleven, twelve and thirteen of the South African periodical 'Lantern' of July-September, 1956, of which I am sending you a second copy.



LEGATION OF ISRAEL

מִיִּירוּשָׁלַיִם יִשְׂרָאֵל

28 December, 1956.

Concerning your enquiry of Nuri Said's pronouncement regarding the Arab-Israel problem, I am afraid that our Foreign Office cannot trace any brochure or pamphlet of that kind. Perhaps you were thinking of the 'Blue Book', which Nuri presented to you in 1942 when you were British Minister of State in Cairo? In that, I am given to understand, a solution was propounded within the concept of the Fertile Crescent, promising the Jews of Palestine some form of local autonomy inside an amalgamated Arab State so designated.

However, even in regard to the 'Blue Book', I fear that my people will be unable to produce anything more definite than this recollection.

With all my best wishes for the New Year, and my prayers that Australia will take the lead in demanding of the Great Powers that they do not let this wonderful opportunity in the Middle East go sour upon them, but see to it that the security of Israel is henceforth guaranteed and the freedom of international waterways are irrevocably established for us, as for all maritime nations.

Yours

Mordechai Ezer,
Minister of Israel.

The Right Honourable E.G. Casey,
PC, CH,
Minister for External Affairs,
Commonwealth Offices, Treasury Gardens,
MELBOURNE, C.2.



LEGATION OF ISRAEL

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Yours

Mordechai Nurock,
Minister of Israel.

The Right Honourable R.G. Casey,
PC, CH,
Minister for External Affairs,
Commonwealth Offices, Treasury Gardens,
MELBOURNE, C.2.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Record of Conversation with Mr M. Pisa, Second Secretary, Italian Legation
 on 5th January, 1957
 Officers Present Mr J. Plimsoll

MAIN SUBJECT(S):

TREATMENT OF JEWS IN EGYPT

In the course of conversation on 5th January Mr Pisa referred to the large number of Italian nationals in Egypt and of Italy's concern that they should not be ill treated. I asked Pisa if there had been any ill treatment up to date of Italian jews resident in Egypt. He replied that a number of them had been forced to leave Egypt, taking only £20 with them. In reply to my question as to what he meant by "forced", he said that in one sense they could be said to have left of their own accord, but the fact was that various things had happened to make them apprehensive as to the safety of their own persons or their property and that consequently many of them were getting out of Egypt.

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FOLLOWING POST(S):ACTION:Report prepared by *J. Plimsoll*

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File No. 172/11/50

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Record of Conversation with the PAKISTAN HIGH COMMISSIONER (GENERAL YOUSUF)
 on 4th January, 1957
 Officers Present THE SECRETARY

MAIN SUBJECT(S):(1) KASHMIR; (2) MIDDLE EAST

1. The newly-appointed High Commissioner (General Yousuf) made his first call on me.

2. He soon got on to Kashmir. I told him of our doubts about the feasibility of getting a resolution past a Russian veto; and of getting the United Nations to face up to the costs and other implications of a police force. I also asked him whether Pakistan took the view that units should come from small countries in order to exclude the Russians. He said that it took the Middle East crisis to galvanize the United Nations into mobilizing a police force: he hoped they would do likewise in Kashmir. He said the Prime Minister had told him that Australia would support Pakistan but that he was sceptical of the likelihood of the United Nations doing anything effective. I said the world was now getting many lessons that the United Nations was becoming the passive agent of Powers bent upon expansion. Unable itself to mobilize resistance to expansion - whether because of the veto or otherwise - the United Nations imposed a blanket injunction against the use of force to correct an injustice or trespass upon any country's interests.

3. I told the High Commissioner that we hoped to see Pakistan playing an effective role in negotiation for the restoration of an effective regime of control of the Suez Canal. So far as the Middle East situation generally was concerned, we hoped that the United States would take the lead in working to solutions of each of the outstanding issues between Israel and the Arab States. But one thing was fundamental. Arab and Muslim States generally must be prepared to accept the State of Israel. It is no longer a question of risks of "incidents" in the Middle East. World peace might not survive another situation comparable to that in November. Whether it did or not, every outbreak gave the Russians an opportunity - whether political or military. Every outbreak placed strains on the alliances of the non-Communist world. There was a good deal more at stake than particular squabbles between Israel and her neighbours.

4. The High Commissioner said Pakistan was much exercised by the possibility of Russian pressure on her. She thought that there was some risk that Kashmir might become "another Israel".

/5. At the

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 * Secretary.
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 * A/S ~~Admin~~ (4) and Pacific Br.
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Karachi

Report prepared by

(A. H. Tange)

ACTION:

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Record of Conversation with the Pakistan High Commissioner
on 4th January, 1957 (contd.)

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5. At the conclusion of the talk, I asked the High Commissioner whether I could expect to see him in the Department frequently, which we would hope to do. I said this had been a rarity with his predecessors. He said we would be sick of him: he would live in Canberra, not having any objection to living in modest circumstances following his recent tent life, and would bring a Second Secretary up here immediately. I said this was good news, admitting that we had few, if any, adequate houses in Canberra to offer him.

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Mr White
Mr Billing
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File No. 173/11/20

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Record of Conversation with H.E. Nai Konthi Suphamongkhan, Thai Ambassador

on 4th January, 1957

Officers Present The Secretary

R.R. Fernandez

MAIN SUBJECT(S):

ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SEATO CONFERENCE IN CANBERRA

The Ambassador asked about the preparations being made for the SEATO Council of Ministers Conference in Canberra. The Secretary said that Mr Cutler (recently Australian Minister in Egypt) would be in charge of a secretariat which would handle the organization and arrangements (e.g. accommodation) for the conference. Mr Cutler was on leave until 10th January, but after he returned to Canberra he would enter into liaison with missions of member countries about arrangements. Following the practice of past conferences in which the host country had provided the conference secretariat, Mr Cutler would presumably be appointed Secretary-General of the Conference. The Council of Ministers meeting would be from 11th to 13th March. These meetings would be held in Parliament House, and Parliament would adjourn for a week to allow the meetings to take place.

2. The Secretary commented that the military planners had made considerable progress and although their work was not yet complete, this year's Council meeting would be an important one. Progress was also being made on the question of subversion. The Permanent Working Group had proved to be a useful experiment. Subversion was an elusive subject to deal with as it had so many facets with all the various media which the Communists used to extend their influence. Governments needed to devote staff and time to come to grips with the problem.

3. The Secretary asked the Ambassador whether he knew who would be in the Thai delegation. The Ambassador replied that he had not heard anything from Bangkok, and thought he would not hear anything until Prince Wan returned from New York where he was President of the United Nations General Assembly this year. The Secretary then raised the question whether Prince Wan would be able to get away from New York before the beginning of March.

United Nations General Assembly - Middle East Problems

4. The conversation then turned to issues before the General Assembly. The Secretary said that in the Australian view there were three problems requiring urgent solution before the General Assembly at the present time :-

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Bangkok, New York

Report prepared by R. Fernandez

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- (a) the question of the clearance of the Suez Canal, including who should pay for it;
- (b) what sort of regime was going to run the Canal after it was cleared; and
- (c) the settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute.

(i) Arab-Israel Dispute

Of the three an Arab-Israel settlement was probably the most vital. The point had been reached where clashes were no longer incidents. A repetition of October could mean world war, or at least further strains upon the non-communist world. Countries like Thailand were affected by this. Pre-occupation of the major powers in the Middle East would provide a temptation to Peking. The only country which could gain out of the continuation of the present situation was the Soviet Union. Although the Anglo-French intervention had brought about a cease-fire and stopped the spread of war, the free world had been sharply divided and the United Kingdom and France had suffered humiliation in the United Nations. The trouble was that while the Arab countries refused to recognize Israel it was impossible to get them to negotiate with her. Recognition was indispensable. The Secretary said he was pessimistic about any solution being arrived at in the full General Assembly.

(ii) Clearance of the Suez Canal - Costs

The Australian Government had not yet adopted any firm attitude, but advisers to the Government felt that as Egypt had blocked the Canal we should not accept any financial responsibility until the question of the future regime over the canal was clearer. The Secretary said he was sure that Ministers would endorse this view.

(iii) Future Regime Over the Suez Canal

In reply to a question by the Ambassador, the Secretary said that the Secretary-General would have to ascertain whether Egypt still stood by the six principles (freedom of passage of the Canal, etc.) which had been agreed upon in New York in October. These principles would need to be elucidated and worked out in greater detail as a party.

Mr Menzies' Interview with U.S. News and World Report

5. The Ambassador asked some questions about the Prime Minister's criticism of the United Nations in a recent interview with an American magazine (U.S. News and World Report). What did the Prime Minister mean by "realism"?

3.

6. The Secretary said that voting in the United Nations was more often guided by emotional outlooks rather than by the fundamentals of the case at issue. The United Nations was, in effect, pacifist in its attitude to the use of force. It could paralyse action by the great democracies but could not prevent action by an expanding power injurious to others and contrary to the spirit of the Charter. The Soviet Union was singularly unaffected by the limitations imposed by the United Nations against the use of force. He added that this situation had grave consequences for the security of small countries such as Australia and Thailand.

7. Commenting on the United Nations Emergency force, the Secretary said it was an interesting experiment. But it must be realized that it was complementary to the Anglo-French action. By bringing the fighting to an end the United Kingdom and France had created the conditions under which, albeit after 5 weeks, a United Nations police force was able to take over. The experience exposed one important aspect of the uniting-for-peace concept. The General Assembly could only make recommendations and Egypt was asserting that the United Nations Force could remain in Egypt only by her consent.

8. The Prime Minister's point was that the free world must take its lead from the great democracies such as the United States, United Kingdom and France, if its security was to be preserved. The Ambassador observed that these three were, in fact, divided among themselves.

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FOR THE MINISTER

PROPOSED EGYPT-ISRAEL TALKS

The following is the text of the Prime Minister's reply to Dr. Evatt's proposal that Australia call for high-level talks between Egypt and Israel:-

"I am sure that you will agree that as the United Nations has taken charge of the Middle East problem, any meeting between Egypt and Israel should be organized from that source. For myself, I am not prepared to make a request to the United Nations which would appear to isolate the Egypt-Israel problem and give it top priority. There are several matters in the Middle East, some of which vitally concern the future of the Canal and some of which affect the future of Israel in relation to all its neighbours and others of which affect the overall need to check the growing Soviet influence in that part of the world. I have consistently urged that all these matters should be taken into account and dealt with. My Government desires most earnestly a peaceful settlement but it will at all times do its best to secure one which restrains communist aggression and gives adequate protection to the vital and legitimate interests of the free world in the stability of the Middle East."

2. It is not to be overlooked that Israel wants direct talks with Egypt. It has consistently been Israel's position for many years that she wanted direct negotiation with the Arab States. It has been the Arab States, including Egypt, which have refused - on the grounds that they could not so recognize the State of Israel.

3. It may be that we should, at some time, support direct negotiations. I read the wording used by the Prime Minister as permitting us to take this position provided we do not argue that this step should be given priority over others.

[Signature]
(A. H. Tange)
Secretary

3/1/57
A.H.Tange/SCB

→ W. Kinniburgh

LAME *[Signature]*

Mr. Kevin
(or several) *Would a U.N. resolution calling on the two parties to be appropriate - at the proper time?*
To negotiate
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TELEGRAM FROM DR EVATT ON THE MIDDLE EAST

Sir Allen Brown rang me last night at 8.15 to say that the Prime Minister wanted Mr Tange either to come and see him at his office at Parliament House at 9 p.m. or else to ring him at that time. The Prime Minister had received a telegram from Dr Evatt calling for immediate high level talks between Egypt and Israel and asking that Australia propose this. The Prime Minister had some ideas on how this should be dealt with, and he wanted to speak to Mr Tange about it.

2. I tried to get Mr Tange at his home but he was out and I could not locate him. I also tried to get Mr Kevin at the Hotel Kurrajong but he also was out.

3. Heseltine (the Prime Minister's Private Secretary) rang me at the office at 9 o'clock and I told him I had been unable to find Mr Tange. He said that the Prime Minister had himself drafted a reply to Dr Evatt and had asked him to let me see it if Mr Tange could not be found. He read it to me over the telephone as follows :-

*Israel wants
direct talks.*

"I am sure that you will agree that as the United Nations has taken charge of the Middle East problem, any meeting between Egypt and Israel should be organized from that source. For myself I am not prepared to make a request to the United Nations which would appear to isolate the Egypt-Israel problem and give it top priority. There are several matters in the Middle East, some of which vitally concern the future of the Canal and some of which affect the future of Israel in relation to all its neighbours and others of which affect the overall need to check the growing Soviet influence in that part of the world. I have consistently urged that all these matters should be taken into account and dealt with. My Government desires most earnestly a peaceful settlement but it will at all times do its best to secure one which restrains communist aggression and gives adequate protection to the vital and legitimate interests of the free world in the stability of the Middle East."

4. I explained to Heseltine that I had been away from Canberra for three weeks until yesterday afternoon and that, in any case, the Middle East did not come within the scope of my normal duties within the Department. I said, however, that the suggested telegram seemed to me to be a good one and I undertook to talk to Mr Casey about it. I rang Mr Casey at Berwick and read it out to him and he expressed his agreement. I then rang back Heseltine and told him of this.

5. Heseltine said that the reply would be sent to Dr Evatt first thing on Thursday morning.

*→ Mr Keenan
what do you think of
the reply*

3rd January, 1957

J. Plimsoll
(J. Plimsoll)
Assistant Secretary
Division 1

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs.

For information.



A. P. Brown.
(A. S. BROWN) *lea.*
Secretary.

FA

CR



PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT,

CANBERRA,

3 JAN 1957

In reply quote No.

56/1095

Dear Miss Fitz-Gerald,

I am directed to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 12th December, 1956, concerning Britain and the Middle East situation. I am to say that the suggestions made by you will be given consideration.


Yours faithfully,

(A. S. BROWN),
Secretary.

Miss Mona G. Fitz-Gerald, M.B.E.,
117-119 Church House,
Ann Street,
BRISBANE, Queensland.

For your hoped for personal perusal the statement below is submitted, which I had intended for Press publication, and decided to forward to you direct when the local Telegraph printed an article on the possibility of Petrol ration being considered by your advisers. "BRITAIN SHOULD NOT SHOULD THE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SUEZ DEBT"

13 DEC 1956



Recent advice of the probable allocation by America of financial assistance to Britain in her present grave National crisis, raises the question of our own (Australian) obligation in this direction.

We are reputed as the most financial and prosperous of the British Commonwealth of Nations, it therefore, undoubtedly, our obvious duty, if our alleged allegiance to the Crown is genuine, to assist the Mother Country in her present serious position, caused solely through her prompt and courageous action in the recent Suez conflict, and which action alone prevented the then possible even graver extension and its culmination into a Third World War.

An immediate Public Appeal for financial aid for Britain would undoubtedly culminate in a very favourable response from all true British-loving Australians, and if subsidized by the customary Commonwealth and State £ for £ basis, should result in material financial assistance for Britain.

Nominations for British migrants now clamouring at the door of Australia House (since the threat of further unavoidable load in taxation, food shortages, petrol rationing is to be once again shouldered by them) should be the obvious duty of all leading Church Organisations, Patriotic Societies, Migration officials to work to achieve immediately such required nominations now.

If stocks of petrol are in Australia so abundant as declared, the question of some rationing should be given early attention by requisite Government officials, or a voluntary system of surrender of coupons could be arranged, as was previous; done during the War years with food coupons to relieve Britain then drastic food shortages.

To permit a nation outside the British Commonwealth of Nations to bear the whole burden of aid for Britain which we should definitely also shoulder, depicts an element of selfishness and self-centredness quite unworthy of our own great country Australia, and unfair to the many true and loyal Britishers herein, who would willingly participate, if permitted, in a definitely needed aid for Britain plan.

COPY on File
664/1/6

MONA G. FITZ-GERALD M.B.E.

Queensland representative

"The British Empire Union in Australia"

117-119 (Church House)

Ann Street, Brisbane
12/12/56

It is undoubtedly only right, when we see all around us here how petrol is being utilised and wasted for pleasure trips, that we should be made to economise somewhat to relieve Britain's need. Your consideration on coupon surrendering (voluntarily) which I organised or submitted in the first place to the then Prime Minister (Mr. Churchill) was very successful.

& raised question of British food that petrol could be gained this way also

If you would permit me to assist as previously, or give some official support which I have solicited for so long for my work to secure British migrants nominations, which are so anxious to migrant, I could do so much more. Please let me have your kind advice on these matters, of which I have spoken previously.

COPY. - The Secretary,
External Affairs Department.



RT. HON. H.V. EVATT
LEADER OF OPPOSITION
COMMONWEALTH OFFICES
SYDNEY.

YOUR TELEGRAM RECEIVED. I AM SURE THAT YOU WILL AGREE THAT AS THE UNITED NATIONS HAS TAKEN CHARGE OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM ANY MEETING BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL SHOULD BE ORGANISED FROM THAT SOURCE. FOR MYSELF I AM NOT PREPARED TO MAKE A REQUEST TO THE UNITED NATIONS WHICH WOULD APPEAR TO ISOLATE THE EGYPT/ISRAEL PROBLEM AND GIVE IT TOP PRIORITY. THERE ARE SEVERAL MATTERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST SOME OF WHICH VITALLY CONCERN THE FUTURE OF THE CANAL AND SOME OF WHICH AFFECT THE FUTURE OF ISRAEL IN RELATION TO ALL ITS NEIGHBOURS AND OTHERS OF WHICH AFFECT THE OVERALL NEED TO CHECK THE GROWING SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD. I HAVE CONSISTENTLY URGED THAT ALL THESE MATTERS SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AND DEALT WITH. MY GOVERNMENT DESIRES MOST EARNESTLY A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT BUT IT WILL AT ALL TIMES DO ITS BEST TO SECURE ONE WHICH RESTRAINS COMMUNIST AGGRESSION AND GIVES ADEQUATE PROTECTION TO THE VITAL AND LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE FREE WORLD IN THE STABILITY OF THE MIDDLE EAST.

R.G. MENZIES.

3 rd JANUARY, 1957.

CR

45

F

COPY.

RECEIVED 2nd January, 1957.

THE RT. HON. R.G. MENZIES
PRIME MINISTER
CANBERRA.

AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION I HAVE REACHED THE OPINION THAT AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD IN THE SEARCH FOR A JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE NATIONS DIRECTLY CONCERNED WOULD BE AN IMMEDIATE MEETING AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF EGYPT AND OF ISRAEL STOP THE CHANCES OF AN OVERALL MIDDLE EAST UNDERSTANDING WOULD BE GREATLY ENHANCED IF THESE TWO NATIONS COULD COMPOSE THEIR DIFFERENCES STOP THAT IN TURN SHOULD ALSO ACCELERATE A SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT OF THE QUESTION OF THE MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF THE SUEZ CANAL STOP IF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WERE NOT AGREEABLE TO DIRECT TALKS THEY COULD BE ASSISTED BY ONE OR MORE MEDIATORS STOP ACTION ON THESE LINES WOULD BE STRICTLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE U N CHARTER BECAUSE IT IS VERY CLEAR THAT THERE ARE A NUMBER OF MATTERS IN DISPUTE BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL AND THE CHARTER PLACES AN OBLIGATION ON ALL PARTIES TO INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES TO SEEK PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS INCLUDING DIRECT TALKS MEDIATION AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION STOP THE MOVE I PROPOSE TO YOU WOULD AMOUNT TO A PEACEFUL INITIATIVE TAKEN BY AUSTRALIA WHICH WOULD ATTRACT I AM SURE THE FULL SUPPORT BOTH OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND ALL PEACE LOVING PEOPLES STOP BECAUSE OF YOUR SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY I AM ADDRESSING THIS COMMUNICATION TO YOU FOR URGENT CONSIDERATION STOP I AM CERTAIN THAT THE SUGGESTION WOULD BE SUPPORTED BY THE PEOPLE OF AUSTRALIA AND BY ALL POLITICAL PARTIES INCLUDING THE AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY

HERBERT V EVATT LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION.

44

28.12.56

FROM - MINISTER

Q. HOW DO YOU REGARD THE INTERNATIONAL PROSPECTS FOR 1957?

Q. DO YOU THINK THE MIDDLE EAST STILL CONTAINS THE SEEDS OF TROUBLE?

A. YES INDEED. ALL THE MANY TENSIONS AND ACUTE PROBLEMS THAT EXISTED BEFORE NASSER SEIZED THE SUEZ CANAL IN JULY STILL EXIST.

Q. WHAT PROBLEMS IN PARTICULAR?

A. WELL, THE RELATIONS BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL - WHICH HAVE BEEN
BAD FOR SEVEN OR EIGHT YEARS - ARE STILL VERY BAD. *By me*

THE QUITE UNJUSTIFIED DENIAL BY EGYPT OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO USE
THE SUEZ CANAL STILL EXISTS. THE CAMPAIGN TO ELIMINATE ISRAEL HAS YET TO BE
INDEED THE INTERNATIONAL FUTURE

OF THE SUEZ CANAL IS AS UNCERTAIN AS EVER. [THE FUTURE CONTROL
CONTROL OF GAZA STRIP AND CONTROL OF GULF OF ARABIA - ONE OF ISRAEL'S LIFELINES -
OF THE GAZA STRIP OF THE MEDITERRANEAN BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL
DANG IN THE GULF OF ARABIA
AND THE AQUADA ISLAND - BOTH OF THESE ARE LITTLE POWDER
I HAVE NOW TO BE SOLVED.

~~MAGAZINES:~~ 7 THE FUTURE OF THE STATE OF JORDAN IS UNCERTAIN.

Q. DO YOU REGARD THE MATTERS YOU HAVE MENTIONED AS LIKELY TO BLOW UP INTO TROUBLE?

IS TO BE CREATED THEN ~~MADE~~ THERE IS A CASE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL
arrangement distributing the costs of
 FUND TO PAY FOR CLEARING THE CANAL. BUT IF EGYPT IS TO BE
sale
 THE BENEFICIARY AND THE CANAL IS TO BE EGYPTIAN - THEN I
of Capture use and development of the Canal are to be at Egypt's
disposal, then I
 * CANNOT SEE NATIONS RUSHING IN TO PAY FOR ITS CLEARANCE.

*

with varying degrees of effectiveness,
- as witnesses - developments in the Middle East
- Hungary.

* Perhaps the one encouraging feature in the present disturbed situation in the M.E. is the recent show of solidarity by the Moslem members of the Baghdad Pact, otherwise

A. YES ANY ONE OR MORE OF THEM COULD PRECIPITATE ACTIVE TROUBLE - ^{unless, as we must confidently hope, the United States gives firm} PARTICULARLY IN THE ABSENCE OF FIRM POLICY AND LEADERSHIP ON THE PART OF SOME OF THE GREAT POWERS. ~~By THE UNITED STATES.~~

Q. WHAT ABOUT THE U.N.?

A. THE U.N. DOES NOT HAVE A FOREIGN POLICY. IT CAN ONLY DEAL WITH EVENTS AS THEY BOIL UP. - AND (EVEN) THEN, YOU HAVE TO FACE THE DISCOMFORTING FACT THAT MEMBER NATIONS OF THE U.N. TEND TO LINE THEMSELVES UP ON THE BASIS OF EMOTION AND ON THEIR INTERNATIONAL LIKES AND DISLIKES, AND NOT ON THE FACTS OF ANY ~~CIRCUMSTANCE~~ SITUATION AND WHAT IS LIKELY TO DEVELOP OUT OF THEM. IN OTHER WORDS THE U.N. CANNOT LOOK FORWARD OR TRY TO ANTICIPATE WHAT IS LIKELY TO HAPPEN. ONLY INDIVIDUAL NATIONS CAN DO THAT - AND AT THE MOMENT THE GREAT POWERS SEEM TO BE ^{OF THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD} MARKING TIME. ^{WHILE THE SOVIET UNION, UNDETERMINED BY UNITED NATIONS OPINION, IS EXPLOITING ITS POWER TO THE FULL. IT IS TO BE HOPED THAT THE SMALLER POWERS IN THE U.N. CAN BE BOLD ENOUGH TO SEE THE DANGERS OF THIS SITUATION WHICH HAS GROWN OUT OF THE CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.} [AFTER THE EVENTS OF THE LAST COUPLE OF MONTHS] IT IS DIFFICULT FOR BRITAIN AND FRANCE TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AND THE UNITED STATES DOESN'T SEEM TO HAVE MADE UP ITS MIND AS TO WHAT TO DO BY WAY OF GIVING A LEAD TO THE WORLD.]

Q. THEN YOU ARE NOT HAPPY ABOUT THE PROSPECTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

A. NO I AM NOT AT ALL HAPPY. AND ONE OF THE IMMEDIATE THINGS ^{PROSPECTS}

metaphors too mixed.

COMING UP THE LIFT IS THAT I EXPECT AT ANY OF MOMENT THE HAT

IS GOING TO BE PASSED ROUND TO COLLECT THE LARGE AMOUNT OF

MONEY NECESSARY TO PAY FOR THE CLEARING OF THE CANAL THAT

NASSER SABOTAGED. IT MAY WELL COST ONE HUNDRED MILLION

DOLLARS TO PAY FOR THIS WILFUL ACT OF SPIE ON NASSER'S PART

IN WRECKING THE CANAL AND ITS EQUIPMENT. THEN AGAIN NASSER

DELAYED THE START OF CLEARING THE CANAL FOR A MONTH AND THE

TRADING NATION+ NATIONS OF THE WORLD, HAD TO PAY HEAVILY FOR

THAT DELAY. IF SOME PROPER INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE CANAL

IS TO BE CREATED THEN ^{as part of that arrangement,} MAYBE THERE IS A CASE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL

arrangement distributing the costs of

FUND TO PAY FOR CLEARING THE CANAL. BUT IF EGYPT IS TO BE

THE BENEFICIARY AND THE CANAL IS TO BE EGYPTIAN - THEN I

disposal, then I

CANNOT SEE NATIONS RUSHING IN TO PAY FOR ITS CLEARANCE.

Q. YOU MENTIONED HUNGARY?

A. YES. I THINK COMMUNIST RUSSIA HAS DEALT ITSELF ALMOST A MORAL MORTAL SELF-INFLICTED WOUND BY THEIR SAVAGE VIOLENCE ON THE HELPLESS HUNGARIAN PEOPLE. EVERYONE NOW KNOWS BY THIS FRIGHTFUL EXAMPLE WHAT INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM IS AND DOES. THERE CAN BE NO MORE HIGH-FAULTIN NOTIONS ABOUT COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY. IT IS JUST BRUTE FORCE AND TERROR.

Q. DO YOU THINK THIS LESSON HAS BEEN LEARNED?

A. YES I THINK MOST SMALL COUNTRIES ON THE BORDERS OF RUSSIA AND COMMUNIST CHINA ARE SEEING THEMSELVES IN THE SAME POSITION AS HUNGARY AND I THINK IT IS A LESSON THEY WON'T FORGET. *no*

Q. ~~MYX~~ HOW DO YOU THINK THE EVENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAVE AFFECTED AUSTRALIA'S RELATIONS WITH ASIA? *will not say to break among*

A. I HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT OUR RELATIONS HAVE DETERIORATED.

~~MR. TANGE -- THIS SHOULD BE DEVELOPED.~~

Q. WILL RECENT EVENTS AFFECT AUSTRALIA'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE COLOMBO PLAN?

A. I DO NOT BELIEVE SO AT ALL. *40*

Q. WHAT ABOUT THE REVOLT IN SUMATRA?

A. THAT IS SOLELY THE AFFAIR OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA.

(MR. TANGE -- THIS SHOULD BE DEVELOPED.)

MESSAGE ENDS.

*Mr. Kinn
have these cards
filled in pls?*

Yes, but the effects will no doubt differ. Countries

on the borders of Russia and Communist China which have maintained

their independence by keeping communism at arms length

(to hold the balance between permanent communist and liberalisation)

internally will no doubt re-double their efforts. Those

Communist countries in Eastern Europe *already saddled with communist party and* which are within reach

of Soviet force will probably continue their efforts to take a

separate road to maintain as much national integrity as Soviet overlordship makes possible. It is clearly in the

interests of the free world that they do so, but the fact

cannot be disguised that the Soviet assault on Hungary is a

warning to these

formidable threat to other countries seeking to take their

separate own path.

to hold the balance & retain

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172/11/20

854/10/13/4/3

28th December, 1956.

Egypt-Israel : Draft Resolutions currently before the
General Assembly

The Secretary (a) a French draft resolution complaining that the
(Copy to Mr. Kevin) treatment of French nationals in Egypt constitutes
a violation of International Law, of provisions
of the Charter and the Declaration of Human
Rights, as well as of the 1949 Geneva Convention.

The subject was debated in the Assembly in the last days before the recess, (with the United Kingdom associating itself, in respect of British nationals, with the complaint) but the resolution has not been put to the vote.

(b) an Egyptian draft resolution requesting the Secretary-General to report on an "assessment basis for payment by Israel, France and the United Kingdom of adequate compensation", for casualties, destruction, and damage to the Canal, Egyptian property and the Egyptian economy.

Our delegation's impression is that Egypt will not press for immediate action on this draft, but will keep it in reserve as an answer to possible complaints at the delay in clearing the Canal and to the French draft ((a) above).

(c) the two United States drafts (submitted to the Emergency Session) on solutions to the Suez Canal and Arab-Israel problems.

As at 19th December the State Department knew of no intention to press the resolution on Suez. The desk officer spoke in favour of resumption of direct United Kingdom-France-Egypt discussions.

The resolution on Arab-Israel relations appears to be also in cold storage.

M. Landau

38

KDS:MG.
28th December, 1956.

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Mr. Kinnin

—
He

For your consideration

wrote 28/12

Mr. Lancelot

As held for future reference

giving

27
1/14

F
11

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CONFIDENTIAL

175/11/20.

ConfidentialFile No. 163/4/7/3/3Date. 27th December, 1956.SUBJECT : BRITISH AND FRENCH COMMUNITIES IN EGYPT

FOR THE SECRETARY.....

Mr Kevin

This note is based primarily on a report, written by the British Ambassador on his return from Cairo, and which is concerned directly with the treatment of British subjects, but it is probably safe to assume that in essentials it would cover the attitude of Egyptians to the French community also.

Physical Maltreatment

The Ambassador's report mentions no cases of actions of physical violence. However the fact that foreigners fell into the category of offenders against the law meant that they suffered the treatment normally meted out to Egyptian law-breakers : that is they were imprisoned in conditions of extreme filth and lack of sanitation. Although this entailed instances of brutality, it did not appear to be the result of a calculated policy - treatment varied, and examples of "robbery, vexation and humiliations" were considered the result of individual spite.

Legal and Financial Measures

After the issue of a decree (at the beginning of the Emergency) calling on British and French nationals to register, no action was taken against individuals until 11th November. In the meantime, however, all British and French firms had been placed under sequestration.

On 11th November the first expulsion orders were issued (aimed, apparently, at those regarded as holding key positions) and a number of British subjects (28 or 58) were imprisoned. In addition the majority of the Cairo and Alexandria communities were placed under house arrest from 17th-20th November.

Although subsequently denied by the Egyptian authorities, there is no doubt that a general expulsion order was issued on 23rd November.

However, the ten-day time limit then announced was withdrawn and exit visas became available on demand.

On 13th December, the Swiss Legation was given the text of an Egyptian Government order, the main clauses of which are:-

- (a) Those subjects (British and French) still in Egypt are permitted to sell their personal effects with exception of jewels, precious stones, title deeds and automobiles.
- (b) Regarding furniture belonging to those subjects who have already left the country or to those who are still residing in Egypt and who have not been able to sell their possessions, it will be possible for the Legation to take possession of these

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2.

effects after an inventory has been made in the presence of a representative of sequestration and properties have to be evacuated within two weeks. The Legation may proceed with the sale of this furniture in the presence of a representative of sequestration and may pay the proceeds to general sequestration for account of British and French subjects concerned.

- (c) If the Legation desires to retain furniture and if it is difficult for the Legation to arrange for the evacuation of properties, the Legation may leave the furniture in place after an inventory has been drawn up in the presence of representatives of sequestration; in this case it is understood that rents are at the charge of the Legation for the entire period of occupation.

Egyptian Policy

Following the abrogation of the general expulsion order, it was made known that British subjects were free to go or stay as they pleased. However, measures adopted since make it clear that the aim is to rid Egypt of the bulk of this community, no doubt out of a desire to eradicate all vestiges of the long established British "special position" in both the political and economic spheres. The impossibility of earning a living and fear of repressive police action are sufficient to induce most to leave "voluntarily" - it is significant that most exit visas are marked "no return".

In brief, the Egyptians have taken the opportunity to "secure national aspirations and to settle old scores".

William G. L. L.

HDW.LFS.
Africa and Middle East.

26

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~~See [unclear]~~

You should know of this
before seeing Murdoch next
week. Brief is being
prepared

July 29/20

→

→ Mr. Beza

Mr. Scott

↓
Mr. Remond

File 175/11/20




LEGATION OF ISRAEL

6559/2195

צירות ישראל

27 December, 1956.



Sir,

Acting upon the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to bring to the earnest and urgent attention of your Government the following statement of incidents that, to its grave concern, have occurred in Israel, within the past few days, evidencing the purposeful renewal of fedayin raids across the Jordan border under Egyptian instigation and direction.

Not only does this recrudescence of commando violence constitute a breach of the General Assembly's Resolution of 2 November, which called upon all parties to desist from raids into neighbouring territory, but it represents a serious threat to the security of Israel.

1. On 11 December, the Israel railway line was blown up in the section between Lod and Hedera, four kilometres from the Jordan frontier. Two anti-vehicular mines were laid under the permanent way and the explosion took place as the train was passing over the mines. The foot prints of three saboteurs led south-east to the border. It should be noted that, on 16 December, Radio Cairo mentioned two dynamitings of the Israel Railways: one being that already cited and the second, at a point north of Ayal, was carried out on 3 December, both with the declared purpose of severing communications.
2. On 15 December, a two-storey house in Tel Mond, eight kilometres from the border, was blown up by a charge of fifteen kilograms of explosive. The house was completely destroyed, the owner was killed in its collapse and his wife and child were injured. The three assailants fled eastward, and, on their way, threw hand-grenades into a house in Kfar-Hess. Miraculously none of the occupants was hurt.

The Tel Mond region has long been the scene of attacks by gangs of fedayin organised and trained by Egyptian agents in Tulkarm within Jordan.

3. On 23 December, a clinic of Kupat Holim (Workers' Health Service) in Yokneam, 20 kilometres from the frontier, was dynamited, a charge of explosives, with a time-device, being placed beneath the columns on which the clinic is built. Serious damage was caused to the building by the explosion. The tracks of two men led to the neighbourhood of the frontier, where two other men joined them. These other men had carried out two further acts of sabotage in the same area: the blowing up of an irrigation reservoir on the Emek-Iron road, and of an aqueduct, in both instances four kilometres from the border.

These three attacks exemplify a long series of raids into Israel perpetrated during the last few weeks. Egypt has publicly announced that it is launching a new campaign of fedayin assaults upon Israel, and boasts of it incessantly: on 2 December, Radio Cairo broadcast: "The fedayin headquarters has decided to carry out large-scale action during the coming winter season." This declaration was translated into action at once and, from 3 December, fedayin carried out no less than nineteen attacks deep within the territory of Israel.

In Notes presented on 3 and 10 December, the Israel Delegation at the United Nations has drawn the attention of the General Assembly to this renewal of Egyptian aggression, which is in conflict with the Assembly's Resolution of 2 November:

It is clear that Egypt intends to revert to a state of belligerency endangering the peace of the whole region, that, as in the past, Egypt continues to repudiate its international commitments and that it does not conceal its intention to evade the obligations laid upon it by the Resolution of the Assembly.

*Mr. H. W. (11) Sum
Mr. L. (12) Sum
Mr. White (13) Sum
Mr. H. (14) Sum
J. (15)*



LEGATION OF ISRAEL

צִירֹת יִשְׂרָאֵל

27 December, 1956.

Meanwhile, Israel still awaits guarantees from the United Nations to prevent renewal of Egyptian belligerency by sea and on land.

My Government asks that the Government of the Commonwealth be moved to take such measures as may seem proper to it, in the United Nations and through diplomatic channels generally, to bring about the instant cessation of Egypt's open contempt for the Resolution passed by the General Assembly on 2 November, and at last to secure for Israel the protection and freedoms which are its right.

Israel is withdrawing its troops from the Sinai Peninsula in good faith, and feels itself entitled to demand binding guarantees that hostile acts by Egypt shall not be renewed and that access by sea to Elath shall remain free; and that the Suez Canal shall be open to its shipping.

Yours faithfully,

Mordechai Nurock

Mordechai Nurock,
Minister of Israel.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, ACT.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

RR:SHA

0.17634.

PRESS

Dated: 22nd December, 1956.
1150

TO:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

1113.

UNCLASSIFIED.

The following was released to the press on
evening of 21st. Begins:

Australian-American Relations.

In the last few days I have had an opportunity
to look through the Australian newspapers of a few weeks ago
when I was in the United States.

I am surprised to find that there were wide-
spread reports that, as Australian representative, I was given
a cool reception by the American Government.

I realize that such a story was published in
some of the American papers, but in fact nothing could be
further from the truth. I was never more warmly received in
the United States.

The story probably had its origin in the fact
that I was unable to see President Eisenhower. This was
completely understandable. Over 30 foreign ministers were in
the United States at the time for the United Nations Assembly
and most of them made efforts to see the President in the
period immediately after the Presidential elections.

Clearly he could not see anyone of us without
offending the others. But, so far as I was concerned, I was
freely able to see Mr. Herbert Hoover, who was then Acting
Secretary of State, Admiral Radford, the Head of the American
Armed Services, and all the other American leaders. In addition,
the ANZUS Conference in Washington was probably the most intimate
and friendly of such meetings that I have attended.

I think it is necessary to say this to dispel
any idea that Australian-American relations have deteriorated
in any way in recent times.

Ends.

Cost £3/4/2

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s

24th December, 1956.

SEC A/Ss L&T(DIV 5) UN TA ER CR PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA SEA RAF&ME
E AF&ME INF DL C&P

CONFIDENTIAL

for white

for the file

175/11/20.

21st December, 1956.

was 24/12

: MIDDLE EAST CRISIS - ISRAELI CEASE-FIRE

MR. KEVIN

The following is a chronological account of events which have a direct bearing on the Israeli decision to accept a cease-fire:

Night	29/30 October	:	Israeli forces entered Egyptian Territory.
	30 October	:	Anglo-French ultimatum to combatants.
	31 October	:	4.15 p.m. (G.M.T.) Anglo-French bombing of Egyptian airfields commenced.
	2 November	:	United Nations' resolution demanding a cease-fire and withdrawal of forces.
	3 November	:	In the General Assembly, Eban announced that Israel was prepared to cease-fire immediately provided a similar response was forthcoming from the Egyptians.
	4 November	:	In reply to cable from Hammarskjöld, requesting a cease-fire, Israel asked for clarification of points relating to Egypt's attitude.
	5 November	:	United Kingdom paratroops landed at Port Said at 5.15 a.m. (G.M.T.) Eban informed Hammarskjöld that his request for clarification of the points did not affect Israel's undertaking given in the General Assembly on 3rd November to cease-fire, provided the Egyptians did likewise. 31 Israel, however, would still welcome the clarification she had sought. About 11.15 p.m. G.M.T. (1.45 a.m. 6th November Israeli time

the Israeli Government cabled Eban saying that "Israel agrees unconditionally to cease-fire. Since this morning 5th November all fighting has ceased between Israel and Egyptian forces on land, sea and air and full quiet prevails".

2. According to the A.B.C. (7.45 a.m.) news on 5th November, Official Israel Radio reported that morning that Israel troops were then within three miles of the Canal. (We have no official confirmation of this.)

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2.

3. The United Kingdom's decision to cease-fire was announced simultaneously in New York and London at 6 p.m. (G.M.T.) 6th November and took effect from midnight 6th November (G.M.T.).

4. The Israeli decision to cease-fire was therefore made approximately 18 hours after United Kingdom troops had landed at Port Said and 19 hours before the announcement of United Kingdom's decision to cease-fire. It is believed that when Israel announced its decision, Israeli forces were within 3 miles of the Canal.

WGAL.LFS.

Europe, Africa and Middle East Section.

30

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Billington

172/11/20



955

FOR THE PRESS

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CANBERRA

PR 136

21st December 1956

AUSTRALIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Statement by the Minister for External Affairs, Mr. R.G. Casey.

In the last few days I have had an opportunity to look through the Australian newspapers of a few weeks ago when I was in the United States.

I am surprised to find that there were widespread reports that, as Australian representative, I was given a cool reception by the American Government.

I realise that such a story was published in some of the American papers, but in fact nothing could be further from the truth. I was never more warmly received in the United States.

The story probably had its origin in the fact that I was unable to see President Eisenhower. This was completely understandable. Over 30 foreign ministers were in the United States at the time for the United Nations Assembly and most of them made efforts to see the President in the period immediately after the Presidential elections.

Clearly he could not see anyone of us without offending the others. But, so far as I was concerned, I was freely able to see Mr. Herbert Hoover, who was then Acting Secretary of State, Admiral Radford, the head of the American Armed Services, and all the other American leaders. In addition, the ANZUS conference in Washington was probably the most intimate and friendly of such meetings that I have attended.

I think it is necessary to say this to dispel any idea that Australian-American relations have deteriorated in any way in recent times.

29

FD

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM ~~RESTRICTED~~

175/11/20

SHA:ABK.

O.17446.

Sent: 19th December, 1956.
1735.

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

636. RESTRICTED.

Jews in Egypt.

1. President Council of Australian Jewry, Sydney Einfeld, en route to New York may want to discuss possible Assembly action on charges in our 584.

2. For your information, Einfeld has been given only formal acknowledgement of a telegram urging an Australian initiative.

(Cost £5/14/-)

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'S.

20th December, 1956.

SEC A/Ss L&T(DIV.5) UN PAC&AM AM&SP E.AF&ME AF&ME INF
C&P.

[Handwritten signature]

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175/11/20

19th December, 1956.

The Australian Legation,
TEL AVIV.

....

I enclose for your information copy of a
record of conversation with Mr. Dover on 11th
December.

(D.J. Billington)
for the Secretary.

MR TANGE

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD TELETYPE MESSAGE.

CORRECTION TO MIN. 1401.

ANSWER 5 - SECOND LINE - SECOND LAST WORD SHOULD BE 'FACE' AND
NOT FACT'.

ANSWER 7 - FIFTH LINE - SHOULD READ HIGH-FALUTIN - (NOT FAULTIN).
ENDS.

34

REPUBLIC Commonwealth Offices,
TREASURY GARDENS,
MELBOURNE.

19 DEC 1956

195/11/20 19th December, 1956.

CANBERRA.

Dear Mr. Binns,

On his return to Australia, Mr. Casey has now seen your letter to him of 1st November, and he has asked me to write to you to thank you for it.

Unfortunately, by the time Mr. Casey was able to see your letter, events had already moved a long way ahead of the pre-intervention stage and the British and French Governments had agreed to withdraw their forces from Egypt. Nevertheless, Mr. Casey appreciated the trouble you went to in sending him your views.

Yours sincerely,

(R.H.GARDNER)
Private Secretary

S.E. Binns, Esq.,
Hereford Road,
MT. EVELYN. VICTORIA.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. (Mr. Landale)

For information.

19th December, 1956.

R.H. Gardner
(R.H.GARDNER)
Private Secretary.

76

FA

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CONFIDENTIAL

File No. 175/11/20

Date 18th December, 1956.

2959/55.

SUBJECT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI

FOR THE SECRETARY

Meeting with Yugoslav Units of U.N.E.F.

Reuters report that on 14th December Yugoslav reconnaissance units came in contact with Israeli forces in Sinai 34 miles east of the Canal and were refused permission to advance further into Sinai.

Israeli Obligation to Withdraw

2. The Israelis are under a continuing obligation, imposed by the General Assembly's resolution of 2nd November and reaffirmed by subsequent resolutions, to "withdraw all forces behind the Armistice lines".

3. On 8th November Mrs. Meir informed Hammarskjöld that the Israeli Government would willingly withdraw its forces from Egypt "immediately upon the conclusion of satisfactory arrangements with the United Nations in connection with the international force". Israeli spokesmen have since made it clear that Israel will not voluntarily agree to any arrangement which would allow Egyptian forces to come back to the Israeli border.

4. The undertaking relates only to withdrawal from "Egypt"; it may well be that the Israeli Government proposes to place a legalistic interpretation on it for it seems to be their intention to treat Gaza (which is not part of Egypt proper) and Tiran Island (which appears to have been res nullius until the Egyptians established their boycott post there) as separate issues distinct from Sinai.

Present Israeli Withdrawal Position

5. The fact that the Israelis are now, according to the Yugoslavs, within 34 miles of the Canal, is not inconsistent with any specific undertaking Israel has given. In its letter of 1st December to the Secretary-General, Israel reaffirmed the undertaking of 8th November progressively to withdraw its forces (paragraph 3 above) and gave an assurance that by 3rd December "there will be no Israeli forces anywhere within a wide belt of territory about 50 kilometres (31½ miles) in the proximity of the Suez Canal along its entire length."

6. By this same letter of 1st December, the Israeli Government said it was prepared to discuss with General Burns the location of units of U.N.E.F. in the area between the Canal and the "western limits of the Israeli positions" and that it would offer whatever technical assistance may be necessary to carry out this measure.

7. Hammarskjöld was to have seen the Israelis in New York on 5th December when he hoped to get some more definite indication of their plans for withdrawing their forces. Hammarskjöld personally hoped

CONFIDENTIAL

that they could be induced to withdraw within the next three weeks. There has been no report of the outcome of that meeting.

Extent of Israeli Withdrawals to date:

8. On 24th November, Israel announced that the equivalent of two infantry brigades had been withdrawn from Egyptian territory and on 1st December that a third infantry brigade had been withdrawn and demobilised.

W. G. A. Landale
(W.G.A. Landale).

DJB.
Middle East Section.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

File No. 175/11/20

Date 17th December, 1956

Mr. Bullington
ten copies were handed
to Mr. Davis. Suggest we
put this one on file under 14/12

SUBJECT

Middle East: Curtailment of Egyptian
Military Action.

FOR Foreign Affairs
Committee.

In a broadcast on 30th November the Egyptian Commander in Chief said that Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Yemen and Syria were "committed to hasten co-ordination of military efforts in face of any armed Israeli aggression on any one of them in defence of their territory and freedom".

2. The broadcast continued: "When the Israeli aggression opened against Egypt on the evening of 29th October, in my capacity as Commander in Chief of the Joint Arab Forces I issued instructions to put into effect the plans prepared to meet this treacherous aggression. On the evening of 30th October Syrian armoured units began to move from their concentration points to areas allocated for their operations within the territory of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The Saudi forces were assigned to move to the Jordanian-Israeli front to undertake a joint operation with the Arab Jordanian Army and the National Guard. The nature of these movements required that they should be accomplished in complete secrecy and that operations should begin as soon as the common enemy exhausted his military potentials in his attack on Egypt. Thus the larger success would be achieved in the operations on other fronts".

3. Following upon the Anglo-French intervention, "the Egyptian Government decided not to involve the Arab States in military operations which would not have decisive results with regard to the Anglo-French attack on Egypt. Orders were therefore issued to the Commands of the Joint Forces to avoid taking part in substantial military operations".

Europe, Africa and Middle East Branch,

DJB/JS

23

FF

NR Reference page 2 para 10

UN will prepare paper

on 'Arab refugee problem'.

Mr. Bevington

Mr. White to prepare

paper on 10 (b) wrox 18/12

CONFIDENTIAL

Department of External Affairs.

17/11/20.

File No.....

Date. 17th December, 1956.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE: MEETING 11TH & 12TH DECEMBER

FOR:

Minister
Secretary
Mr. Kevin
Mr. Waller
Mr. Quinn
Mr. Furlonger
Mr. Renouf
Mr. Landale
(see para.10)

1. The Minister addressed the Committee and answered questions in relation principally to the Middle East Situation and United Kingdom-United States relations. A brief summary is attached.

2. The Committee subsequently gave consideration to what contribution Australia could make to improve United Kingdom-United States relations and towards an improvement of the general international situation.

3. Mr. F. Chaney moved a resolution which was adopted after discussion that "This Committee requests the Government to take all steps possible to bring about a closer liaison between the United States and Great Britain in respect of their policies in the Pacific."

4. In the course of the discussion Senator Pearson recommended that the Committee should press the Minister to acquaint the Committee with what steps are in fact being taken to encourage closer liaison between United Kingdom and United States. Considerable discussion was directed to the question of the relationship between the United States attitude in the current Middle East crisis with United Kingdom policies in the Far East, particularly the unilateral decision of the United Kingdom to recognise Communist China.

5. Senator Pearson moved a resolution which was adopted after discussion recommending to the Government that "we urge the United States to assist in promoting ways and means whereby the Suez Canal will be cleared for traffic at the earliest possible date and also provide sufficient safeguards for freedom of passage for all nations at all times".

6. With regard to Hungary the Confidential portions of Situation Report No. 3 were read to the Committee. After discussion of the Hungarian situation Mr. Kent-Hughes moved a resolution, for submission to the Minister, that: "If any nation refuses to allow the

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F

United Nations Secretary-General to have free access to its territory after a resolution to this effect has been passed by the General Assembly, the membership of such nation will be suspended as long as such attitude is maintained". The resolution was adopted.

7. Mr. Kent-Hughes suggested that one possible method of making a contribution to improved United Kingdom-United States relations might be to arrange some informal meetings between Members of Parliament of the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and Australia on a non-governmental level with a view to discussing ways and means for improving these relations. This was discussed inconclusively.

8. Mr. Wentworth moved a resolution, which was adopted, to the effect that "it is considered important for the conduct of Australia's Foreign Policy in the light of recent developments in the Middle East that the Government should prosecute vigorously the search for oil in Australia and New Guinea". The exact wording was left for the Convention to draft after the meeting adjourned.

9. The Committee gave brief consideration to -

- (a) the need for an Australian monitoring service in relation to foreign radio broadcasts (Senator Cole raised the question and was informed about the monitoring of Radio Peking).
- (b) the need for quicker and better communications facilities for the Department of External Affairs - including the possible use of direct radio links in lieu of reliance on Commercial cables with consequent delays.

10. The Committee requested information papers on

- (a) the Arab Refugee problem;
- (b) the reasons why Saudi Arabia has been financing Egyptian propaganda activities.

11. The Committee decided to meet again

- (a) in Canberra on 19th December at 2.30p.m;
- (b) Mid January on a date to be determined - probably in Melbourne.



(O.L. Davis)

MINISTER'S COMMENTS

1. The Minister outlined his impressions of his recent visit to London, Ottawa and Washington. He mentioned tackling Eden on his failure to inform the United States and the Commonwealth prior to intervention in the Middle East. Eden had carried the whole burden of the decision and the failure appeared to have been one of oversight in the rush. The Minister also mentioned that the failure to obtain an appointment with President Eisenhower was not a rebuff but was due to the President's health and the fact that 34 other Foreign Ministers were asking to see the President.

2. The Minister stressed the complete isolation of the United Kingdom in the General Assembly. All feeling seemed to be directed against them, rather than Israel or France. The United States representatives would not discuss policy at all with the United Kingdom.

3. The Anzus Council meeting was as frank and warm as usual.

4. In reply to questions regarding the real motives of the United Kingdom, the Minister said that he believed there was no collusion with Israel, though not many in the United Nations believed that. The intention was to get between Egypt and Israel and prevent the other Arab States joining in. The threat of Russian intervention was a factor. The fear of Russian intervention was very real. The United States regarded it seriously. United Kingdom saw Nasser's ambitions as a threat to her economic existence. The United Kingdom believed that it was necessary to bring Nasser down as it could not face a future dependent on his good will.

5. The Minister mentioned his phone conversation with Selwyn Lloyd on 7th December stressing the need for the United Kingdom to go all out to mend United Kingdom-United States relations by capitalising on the fact that the Americans were beginning to have twinges of conscience on their Middle East policy.

6. The nett result of the intervention included:

- (a) Nasser was still in charge despite his army's humiliating defeat;
- (b) United Kingdom had suffered in prestige immensely;
- (c) it could take a long time for the United Kingdom to recover;
- (d) the economic cost to the United Kingdom was very high;
- (e) the Commonwealth had received a great shock;
- (f) the Canal was out of action and there was little chance of an international regime;
- (g) a wider conflagration may have been stopped;
- (h) the United States attached no blame to Australia for her support of United Kingdom;
- (i) the countries of South and South East Asia blamed Australia less than might have been expected.

7. In response to questions the Minister agreed that it was probably true that there had been insufficient publicity regarding Nasser's destruction of the Canal and of the fact that the intervention had stopped the other Arab States from joining in and attacking Israel.

8. On the question of United States-United Kingdom relations, the origins of the present rift go back to a basic inadequacy in the relationship which under the surface has been one of jealousy and suspicion.

9. On the future of the United Nations, the Minister stressed the significance of the Bandung bloc. Eden knew Europe, but not the Middle East and Far East. He lacked realization of the excitability of nations with recently gained independence. There was no more explosive feeling than newly found nationalism. The automatic vote of the Bandung bloc against the imperialists was a menace to the proper functioning of the United Nations. It inhibits proper consideration of issues. However the majority of countries thought United Nations had gained in prestige during the current session.

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CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

172/11/20.

OA:ABK.

0.17221.

Sent: 14th December, 1956.
1800.

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

616. CONFIDENTIAL - PRIORITY.

For Spender from Tange.

1. New Zealand has told us of meeting attended by Munro and yourself regarding the treatment of Jews in Egypt. We are told Mrs. Meir asked the Delegations to make representations to the Secretary-General for the release of a report about Nasser's intentions to deport Egyptian Jews and to confiscate their property; Israel has apparently asked the President of the Assembly to arrange a discussion of this subject.

2. Is above accurate and will there be Assembly discussion?

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'S.

(Cost £9/6/-)

17th December, 1956.

SEC A/Ss L&T(DIV.5) UN ER PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA E.A.F&ME E
AF&ME INF DL C&P.

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CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM



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Special Mission to the United Nations

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~File No. 175/11/20Date 13th December, 1956.

2050/55.

SUBJECT

THE GAZA STRIP

FOR THE MINISTER
THE SECRETARYORIGIN:

The Gaza Strip is a small portion of that part of the former Palestine Mandate which was to have become Arab territory under the 1947 United Nations Partition Plan. During the Palestine War, Egypt overran southern Palestine and when the Armistice was signed she was in occupation of only this small strip.

EXTENT OF THE STRIP:

2. The strip extends from the former Egyptian-Palestine frontier approximately forty-five miles up the coast towards Tel Aviv. At its widest it is approximately ten miles across.

STATUS:

3. The General Armistice Agreement signed by Egypt and Israel on 24th February, 1949, at the end of the Palestine War, recognises the area as being under Egyptian control. The area had not been incorporated into Egypt and has now been occupied by Israeli forces and placed under Israeli military administration.

IMPORTANCE OF THE STRIP

4. The strip has been the scene of some of the worst Arab-Israeli border clashes. Economically it is of little value, being mostly arid and crowded with Arab refugees, of whom the Egyptians claimed there were 200,000 in Gaza town and district alone. The Israelis allege that this figure is exaggerated and that the count they are now taking will probably reveal that there are not more than 200,000 in the entire strip. Its chief importance, has been a political one in that it represented the sole remaining Egyptian inroad into the former mandate territory and was used by the Egyptians as a base for fedayeen attacks on Israel.

POPULATION:

5. Israeli occupation forces have found the population badly demoralized. They are split on the one hand between Arab and non-Arab and on the other between refugee and original inhabitant, with constant skirmishing between the groups. The Israelis claim that Egypt deliberately kept the area in a depressed state to keep up tension and unrest which it exploited to its own political ends.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

6. The Israelis are known to be seriously concerned at the refugee problem to which they have now fallen heir and for that reason to be all the more pleased that they have been able to come to some arrangement with U.N.R.W.A. for its continued functioning.

ISRAEL'S CLAIM TO THE GAZA STRIP:

7. Ballard reports that his conversations in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs about Gaza have not proceeded on any assumption on the part of the Israelis that they would be withdrawing in the immediate future. Their plans for administering the area are also not based on any short term.

8. Israel already exercises sovereign powers over the areas assigned to her by the United Nations Partition Resolution plus the areas acquired by conquest in the Palestine War. The Gaza Strip comes into neither of these categories. Her claim now can conceivably be based either on the right of conquest or on the desire to render the area incapable of being used as a base for fedayeen attacks against Israel proper.

luk
(J.C.G. Kevin)
Assistant Secretary
Division 4.

D.J. Billington.
Middle East Section.

16

175/11/20

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD SAVINGRAM.

S E C R E T

SH.

O. 17059

TO:

Sent: 12th December, 1956
1230

Australian Mission to the
United Nations,
NEW YORK

SAV.74. S E C R E T

EGYPT - ISRAEL: CASUALTIES IN PORT SAID

Further to our savingram 71 of 10th December,
the following has now been received from the United Kingdom
High Commissioner:

"I regret to inform you that there has been a further
change of plan as Mr. Steen has now decided not to accept our
invitation on the ground that the task would be too difficult.
We are considering urgently whether we would now wish to pro-
ceed further in this matter."

MIN & DEPT EA (854/10/13/4/3)
P.M.'s

12th December, 1956

SEC A/SS L'T(DIV5) UN@ CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA
EAF&ME E AF&ME INF DL C&P MT

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Fa

175/11/20/6

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD SAVINGRAM.

VA: Amended Copy. O. 17046/47/48/49/50/51/
52/53/54/55

Sent: 12th December, 1956
1100

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,*
NEW YORK.....SAV. 73

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.....SAV. 194.

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA.....SAV. 146.*

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.....SAV. 223. (For External.

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI.....SAV. 121.

Australian High Commission,
KARACHI.....SAV. 55.

Australian High Commission,
COLOMBO.....SAV. 26.

Australian Embassy,
TOKYO.....SAV. 33.

Australian Commission,
SINGAPORE.....SAV. 195.

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.....SAV. 60.

SECRET AND GUARD.

Middle East situation reports.

Further to our Savingram of 28th November,
herewith Sitreps Nos. 7 and 8.

E. A. * Amendment.
SIR ALLEN BROWN.

12th December, 1956.

SEC MR. KEVIN MR. QUINN MR. RENOUF MR. LOVEDAY MR. BILLINGTON

SECRET

FA



175/11/20

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

A.H. Tange, Esq., C.B.E.

With
Mr. R. G. Casey's
Compliments

[Handwritten signature]

13

→ *[Handwritten signature]*

[Handwritten signature]

not white

Mr. Buckingham

COMMONWEALTH OFFICES
TREASURY GARDENS
MELBOURNE, C.2

12.12.56.

was 18/12

[Handwritten initials]

Commonwealth Offices,
Treasury Gardens,
MELBOURNE. C.2

7th December, 1956.

Many thanks for your letter of December 4th with enclosed copy of "The Yarkon-Negev Project".

I enclose, as a possible matter of interest, copies of two speeches that I made in the United Nations Assembly, as well as copy of a written statement that I gave out to the press on arrival in Sydney on Saturday last.

I met and saw something of Mrs. Meir at the United Nations Assembly in New York and had quite a good talk with her on two occasions, on one of which she came to a small private luncheon that I had in the United Nations building. I also met and had talks with Mr. Eban and Mr. Kedron. If I may say so I think that Mrs. Meir and her delegation conducted themselves admirably at the Assembly.

R. G. CASEY

His Excellency Mr. Mordekhai Nurock,
Minister for Israel,
Room 403, 84 Pitt Street,
SYDNEY. N.S.W.

CONFIDENTIAL

175/11/20

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

BH

OUTWARD SAVINGRAM.

O. 17031

Sent: 11th December, 1956.

TO:

Australian Embassy,
BANGKOK,
Australian Embassy,
DJAKARTA.
Australian Embassy,
PARIS.
Australian Embassy,
RANGOON.
Australian Embassy,
THE HAGUE.
Australian Embassy,
BONN
Australian Embassy,
DUBLIN
Australian High Commission,
COLOMBO
Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA
Australian High Commission,
LONDON(E.A.Office)
Australian High Commission,
KARACHI
Australian High Commission,
PRETORIA
Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI
Australian High Commission,
WELLINGTON.

Australian Embassy,
TOKYO.
Australian Embassy,
MANILA.
Australian Commission,
SINGAPORE
Australian Commission,
KUALA LUMPUR
Australian Consulate-General,
GENEVA.
Australian Legation,
PHNOM PENH
Australian Legation
RIO DE JANEIRO
Australian Legation
ROME
Australian Legation
SAIGON
Australian Legation
TEL AVIV
Australian Delegation to U.N.C.U.R.K
SEOUL

Savingram 25.

GUIDANCE. CONFIDENTIAL.

SUEZ CANAL FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS UPON CONTROL AND
MANAGEMENT.

Present Position.

1. In their communications to the Secretary-General dated 3rd December regarding the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces from Egypt, the United Kingdom and France noted that the Secretary General would permit, as quickly as possible, negotiations with regard to the future regime of the Canal on the basis of the six requirements approved by the Security Council.
2. This notation followed conversations between Hammarskjöld and Sir Pierson Dixon in the week-end 1st-2nd December. During these conversations, Hammarskjöld told Dixon that if some satisfactory announcement upon withdrawal of forces was made on 3rd December, he understood Fawzi was prepared to start talks at once about settling the problem of the Canal and other long term problems connected with the Palestine question.
3. Hammarskjöld also said that Fawzi had suggested the following procedure for tackling the problem of the Canal.

CONFIDENTIAL

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
O.17031

OUTWARD SAVINGRAM.

- (a) Hammarskjöld should have talks separately with Fawzi and that the leaders of the United Kingdom and French delegations in New York with a view to giving more substance to and clarifying the conclusions of the Secretary-General as set out in his letter to Fawzi of 24th October (attached)
 - (b) direct negotiations between the United Kingdom France and Egypt at the Foreign Minister level, such negotiations not to begin before completion of the withdrawal of the Anglo-French Forces; and
 - (c) a final stage in which "Governments would be engaged and legal aspects worked out in the form of an agreement. Possibly a Committee of small countries might be brought in at this stage to help".
4. In a further communication to the Secretary-General dated 4th December, the United Kingdom said that in the negotiations upon the future regime of the Canal, the United Kingdom considered that in addition to the requirements approved by the Security Council, account should be taken of:-
- (a) the draft resolution submitted to the Security Council by the United Kingdom and France recommending adoption of the Eighteen-Power proposals;
 - (b) of the Lloyd-Pineau-Fawzi talks in New York; and
 - (c) of the Secretary-General's letter to Fawzi dated 24th October and Fawzi's reply thereto.
5. On 6th December the State Department told our Washington Embassy that the establishment by the Assembly of a small Committee to deal with the problem of the Canal might now not be needed; the most hopeful approach would be to support Hammarskjöld's plan to encourage informal discussions in New York between the United Kingdom, France and Egypt. The State Department hoped these discussions might commence before Christmas. If there were reasonable progress in the discussions, the United States would consider amending its draft resolution to give the Secretary-General the role proposed for the Committee and possible to endorse Hammarskjöld's initiative.

Conclusion.

The United Kingdom, France and Egypt appear to be waiting for Hammarskjöld to talk separately with Fawzi and leaders of the United Kingdom and French delegations in New York. These talks may clarify the conclusions drawn by Hammarskjöld in his letter of 24th October to Fawzi (Paragraph 3A above). There does not seem to be any objection from either side to the Secretary-General taking this initiative. However, the second stage of the negotiations, namely, direct discussions between Lloyd, Pineau and Fawzi awaits the completion of the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces from Egypt.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M'S.

12th December, 1956.

CONFIDENTIAL

175/11/20

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CONFIDENTIAL

MMC:SHA

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

0.17021.

Dated: 11th December, 1956.
1745

TO:

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA.

226.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 249.

We are not clear as to the reason why the Canadians may have to decide against sending their infantry battalion to the Middle East. Is the reason (a) that Burns needs headquarters and not infantry personnel or (b) that inclusion of the battalion would bring Canadian contingent above stipulated limits either of the Canadian contingent itself or U.N.E.F. as a whole.

Cost £6/3/4

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M.'s

12th December, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA EAF&ME E AF&MF INF DL MT
G

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OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

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SECRET

175/11/10

181/6/11

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

EBB:VH

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

0001

Sent: 11th December, 1956
1435

TO:

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.

291. SECRET. PRIORITY.

For Stirling.

We would appreciate telegraphic report on the results of the N.A.T.O. Council meeting. The following subjects would be of particular interest to us:-

- (a) Report of the "three wise men";
- (b) assessments of situation in Middle East countries;
- (c) assessment of Russian intentions in Europe and Middle East;
- (d) discussions on economic aid to Eastern Europe, Middle East and Asia.

- - - - -

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M's.

(Cost £4.3.11)
11th December, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN ER PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF&ME INF
DL C&P

G

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SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAMS

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Mr. White
Mr. Bullington
File
was 10/12

175/11/20
CONFIDENTIAL

POINTS FOR ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON EGYPTIAN SITUATION.

1. The United Kingdom and French Governments have decided to set in motion the withdrawal of their forces from the Suez Canal. In doing this they are abiding by the wishes of the United Nations General Assembly. Their decision contrasts with the attitude of the Soviet Union in Hungary as does their conduct while in Egypt contrast with Soviet behaviour in Hungary.
2. In retrospect the United Kingdom and France can say that their intervention in Egypt however grossly it may be represented halted the spread of hostilities in the Middle East.
3. The United Kingdom and France can also say that but for their intervention the United Nations might have been confronted with the need to pronounce upon a much graver situation than that with which the General Assembly had to deal. The United Nations might also have been called upon to send in a police force of limited size to operate under conditions of cease fire but a substantial fighting force capable of separating actual combatants.
4. The programme of Anglo-French withdrawal will be worked out between the British Commander in Chief and the Commander of the United Nations force (General Burns). The Secretary-General of the United Nations has undertaken to organise the task of clearing the Canal as expeditiously as possible. The United Kingdom and French Governments are also relying upon the United Nations to establish free and secure transit through the Canal when it is cleared: this in accordance with the General Assembly's resolution of 2nd November. The United Kingdom and French Governments also expect of the Secretary-General that he will promote as quickly as possible negotiations with respect to the future of the Canal.
5. In reaching their decision to withdraw, the two Governments are making an Act of faith in the United Nations. It is to be hoped that the United Nations and the Secretary-General will respond to the situation and will take immediate steps towards the opening of the Canal, the securing of free passage through the Canal for ships of all nations in accordance with the Constantinople Convention 1888, and the promotion of a satisfactory regime for the Canal.

not in

Given to Minister: and used by P.M. as you will have assumed. 4-8 6/1/56

CONFIDENTIAL

McDonald

CONFIDENTIAL

2.

6. Efforts to whitewash Nasser as the victim of aggression should cease. His attempts to dictate terms need to be curbed. He was the real aggressor; his sinking of a large number of ships in the Canal was an act of unparalleled malevolence and irresponsibility. His refusal to permit salvage operations in that part of the Canal held by Egyptian forces violates the General Assembly resolution of 2nd November. His treatment of British and French nationals has not been in accordance with civilised practice.

7. The situation that arose in Egypt now needs to be judged in the perspective of Syria where, as in the case of Egypt before the Anglo-French intervention, there has been a build up of Soviet arms and equipment and the adoption by Syria of provocative policies towards neighbouring States, Arab as well as Israel. The political ties between Egypt and Syria have been close and Nasser has assiduously cultivated them for his own ends. We have no assurance that having been saved by United Nations action from his self-imposed predicament in Egypt, he will not now resume mischievous policies throughout the Middle East.

5

CONFIDENTIAL

175/11/10

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD TELETYPE MESSAGE.

MESSAGE NO 1320 10.12.56

FOR MR KEVIN E A CANBERRA
FROM GARDNER

YOUR 1451.

MINISTER APPROVES TELEGRAM TO SPENDER, BUT PLEASE START
OFF 'FOR SPENDER FROM CASEY'.

MESSAGE ENDS

SM

4

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD TELETYPE MESSAGE.

MESSAGE NUMBER 1451

4.55

7.12.56

TO MINISTER OFFICE MELBOURNE

FROM TANGE E A CANBERRA

FOLLOWING DRAFT TELEGRAM TO SPENDER, BASED ON SAVINGRAM 37
FROM KARACHI, IS SUBMITTED FOR YOUR APPROVAL.

" SECRET AND GUARD

Mr Billington
was 10/12

FOR SPENDER. *from base*

IN CONVERSATION LAST WEEK WITH CAWTHORN, ISKANDER SAID THAT HE WAS BECOMING WORRIED BY THE UNITED STATES ATTITUDE. ISKANDER SAID THAT HE WAS AFRAID THE UNITED STATES WERE PLANNING FOR CLOSER CO-OPERATION WITH INDIA AT THE EXPENSE OF PAKISTAN AND "WOULD THROW US OVERBOARD." HE ADDED THAT APPARENTLY THE UNITED STATES WERE COMING TO THINK THAT THEY COULD SETTLE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS BY CO-OPERATING WITH INDIA RATHER THAN WITH THE BAGHDAD PACT POWERS. THE FOLLOWING DAY ISKANDER SAID THAT HE HAD HAD A REPORT FROM WASHINGTON AND ALSO FROM DELHI THAT DURING NEHRU'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO AMERICA, NEHRU WOULD PRESS FOR THE CESSATION OF UNITED STATES MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN AND FOR A UNITED STATES-INDIA AXIS TO REPLACE THE BAGHDAD PACT AS MUCH MORE LIKELY TO PRODUCE STABILITY IN SOUTHER ASIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST. ISKANDER ADDED THAT THERE IS AN ELEMENT IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT WHICH THOUGHT ON THESE LINES AND WAS INCREASING ITS INFLUENCE WITH DULLES. HE ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO FIND OUT WHETHER YOU HAD NOTICED ANY ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ TENDENCIES IN THESE DIRECTIONS. CAWTHORN TOLD ISKANDER THAT HE DOUBTED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY FOUNDATION FOR HIS FEARS FOR SUCH A RADICAL RE-ORIENTATION OF UNITED STATES POLICY.

3

2. I SHOULD BE GLAD OF YOUR COMMENT. YOU WILL, OF COURSE, APPRECIATE THE EXTREMELY CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF ISKANDER'S ~~REMARKS~~ REMARKS.

MESSAGE ENDS PMCC

175/11/20.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

SECRET

OUTWARD SAVINGRAM.

BH.MMc

O.16939

Sent: 10th December 1956
1000

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

SAV. 71. SECRET.

Egypt-Israel : Casualties in Port Said.

Further to our savingram of today's date, we have now been advised as follows by the United Kingdom High Commissioner.

"We have now been informed that the United Kingdom authorities wish after all to produce an independent report of Egyptian casualties in order to counter hostile propaganda about the United Kingdom-French action in Port Said. They have therefore invited Mr. Erling Steen, President of the Norwegian Red Cross, to visit Port Said in an individual capacity to make an independent assessment.

The French Government sees no objection to responsible observers from smaller countries and have asked to be associated with this project. Subject to the agreement of Mr. Steen, he will probably be acting on behalf of both the United Kingdom and French Governments. Mr. Steen arrived in London yesterday.

No publicity is being given to Mr. Steen's visit which we hope can be kept secret at least until his arrival in Port Said so as to minimise the danger of stories being specially concocted for him.

We do not yet know when Mr. Steen will be leaving the United Kingdom or how long he will wish to spend in Port Said. 2

In informing you of the above I am asked to stress the secrecy of this information at the present time."

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (854/10/13/4/3)
P.M.'s.

10th December, 1956.

SEC A/Ss L&T(DIV.5) UNO CR PAC&AM AM&SP
S&SEA SA E.AF&ME E AF&ME INF DL C&P MT

SECRET

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD TELETYPE MESSAGE.

MESSAGE NO. MIN.1312

10.12.56

175/11/20

TO - MR. TANGE
FROM - MINISTER
CONFIDENTIAL

I TELEPHONED SELWYN LLOYD IN LONDON FROM BERWICK ON FRIDAY EVENING. I SAID THAT, IN THE LIGHT OF THE SATISFACTORY VOTE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, I ~~BEIE~~ BELIEVED THAT HE COULD LOOK TO THE LONGER RANGE FUTURE RATHER THAN THE SHORT. THAT BRITISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS WERE MORE IMPORTANT THAN SHORTER RANGE MATTERS. THAT THERE SEEMED TO BE CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THE AMERICANS WERE NOW ANXIOUS TO HELP BRITAIN PARTICULARLY ECONOMICALLY. THAT I BELIEVED THAT IT WOULD BE GOOD VALUE FOR HIM (SELWYN LLOYD) TO SAY SOME GENEROUS THINGS PUBLICLY TO THE AMERICANS, IN ORDER TO ENABLE THEM (THE AMERICANS) TO HELP THE UNITED KINGDOM MORE READILY AND MORE GENEROUSLY. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THE AMERICANS NEEDED A GOOD RESPONSE FROM THE ~~U.K.~~ U.K.

WE DISCUSSED THE ABOVE TO-AND-FRO ANDHE THOUGHT THAT ALL THIS MADE GOOD SENSE.
MESSAGE ENDS.

→ *mtm* *ll*

Mr Landon

Mr W. A. D. W.
Mr. D. L. D. W.
W. A. D. W. 10/12

